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Abstract 
 
In August 1988, the Labour Government announced its policy to deregulate the 
broadcasting industry.  The policy was comprised two of major initiatives;  
1. Commercialising the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand, and  
2. Creating property rights out of the right to broadcast and establishing a market 
mechanism to allocate these. 
The policy was based on an economic analysis of “the Economics of Broadcasting and 
Government Intervention” presented to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting and 
Related Telecommunications in a submission devised and presented independently of 
any political authority or mandate by the New Zealand Treasury. 
This thesis is presented as a piece of “public” policy analysis, in the sense that it seeks 
to explain, to a non-expert audience, the strengths, weaknesses and ethical implications 
of Treasury’s analysis as well as the outcomes or effects that deregulation has had for 
New Zealand society.   
In doing this, it seeks also to explain to the community of policy analysts and advisors – 
using, as much as possible, the language of modern public administration and 
economics – the limitations of applying ‘orthodox’ economic theory to the role the 
media plays in mediating the relationship among audiences, the state, the market and 
society. 
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This piece of work will be likely to stimulate some debate, in which I fully expect my 
motives to be brought into question. 
I have had a history of involvement in broadcasting and broadcasting policy, which 
should be declared in the interests of transparency: 
• Radio Advertising Copywriter, (2CH, Sydney) 
• Manager of a community access radio station (2RSR fm, Sydney). 
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for the iwi-based Maori radio network. 
• Researcher/Analyst for New Zealand Maori Council and Nga Whakapumau i te 
Reo, on their Waitangi Tribunal claim on the airwaves. 
• Beneficiary of the Crown’s policy of selling spectrum rights. In 1991 I bought a 
UHF television frequency for $0.00, and used the resulting media attention to 
criticise the policy of spectrum sales. 
• Researcher/Analyst for New Zealand Maori Council, on the Broadcasting Assets 
case at the High Court. 
While my experience that undoubtedly motivated me to pose the questions asked in this 
thesis, my awareness of the scrutiny and debate likely to arise from it has shaped the 
way I have attempted to answer them. I have sought to test the current broadcasting 
policy and the ideas upon which it is based, as rigorously as possible.  I have also 
attempted to treat the subject matter in a fair and balanced manner as far as possible.  I 
only ask that those who dispute the analysis will reciprocate on similar terms. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In September 1988, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting and Related 
Telecommunications (RCBRT) delivered its report to Parliament.  Two years later, in 
August 1988, the Hon. Richard Prebble, Minister of Broadcasting, announced a 
programme of reform for New Zealand broadcasting. 
These reforms, embodied in the Broadcasting Act 1989 and the Radiocommunications 
Act 1990, owed little to the findings of the RCBRT.  Rather, they closely resembled the 
policy prescriptions presented to the RCBRT in a submission written by Treasury 
officials. 
The third section of the Treasury submission, titled “Economics of Broadcasting and 
Government Intervention” provided the philosophical foundations New Zealand’s 
current broadcasting framework. 
This thesis explores the reasons for this dramatic change of policy and describes the 
process by which it occurred.  The core of the thesis is a critical evaluation of the way 
the economics of broadcasting were employed in the third section of the Treasury 
submission. 
There are three key questions addressed in the course of the analysis: 
• ‘Was the Treasury submission to the RCBRT good policy advice?’ 
• ‘Was the Treasury submission good use of economic theory to this policy issue?’ 
• ‘What should be the outcomes (or social impacts) of broadcasting policy?’ 
The thesis is presented as a piece of ‘public’ policy analysis in the sense that it strives to 
illuminate the issues in a way that an interested citizen can engage with and understand 
them. It is also a piece of advice to the Government on the an issue of public policy.  
The recommendations made in the last chapter are therefore presented in the form 
expected of recommendations to a Cabinet committee. 
Maori Broadcasting 
The broadcasting policy reforms have had an enormous impact on Maori broadcasting, 
particularly Maori radio. There are now more than 20 Maori radio stations, there is an 
independent agency for allocating funding to Maori radio and television, and there may 
soon be a Maori television channel. Also, Maori claims before the Waitangi Tribunal 
over the allocation of broadcasting rights (or radio frequency spectrum), and successive 
court cases refuting the Crown’s right to sell broadcasting assets, have thrown up the 
most significant challenges to the policy framework. However, in this thesis Maori 
broadcasting is mentioned mainly to provide examples and illuminate points of the 
analysis.  The choice is deliberate, and requires an explanation. 
First, the story of how Maori radio emerged out of the policy changes in 1980s and 
early 1990s deserves a sustained analysis and discussion in its own right, and there are 
others who will undoubtedly take up that task. 
 1
Second, the claims in respect of broadcasting have predominantly been made under the 
second article of the Treaty of Waitangi.  They derive from the guarantee to Maori of 
their tino rangatiratanga over  o ratou taonga katoa, which was taken by the Waitangi 
Tribunal to mean the “fullness of control” over “all their valued customs and 
possessions”.  The Maori claims in broadcasting rely on the Tribunal’s acceptance that 
the Maori language is a taonga, within the meaning of the second article of the Treaty 
(Hay, 1996). 
This thesis discusses issues that fall within the provenance of article three of the Treaty, 
which guarantees Maori the rights and protections due to all British citizens. The 
citizens of New Zealand have no explicit rights in regard to the political and social role 
of the media.  To the extent they have implied or de facto rights, the nature and extent of 
these are currently determined by Government policy.  This matter is of concern to 
Maori just as much, if not more, than it is to other citizens.  The emphasis on funding 
for Maori language content has inhibited the development of broader social and political 
roles in Maori broadcasting. Derek Fox makes this point, for instance:  
“By restricting the focus (of funding policy) to Maori language programmes, the Crown 
positions itself quite nicely in a number of ways….  
 “…the upside for the government is that (an English language Maori news service) 
would help put an end to the ignorance of Maori issues enveloping most of Pakeha New 
Zealand.  And that would hasten the day when those issues might be dealt with properly.” 
(Fox, 1998: 24-25) 
By addressing the question ‘what should be the outcomes of broadcasting policy?’ this 
thesis also directly addresses the rights of Maori under the third article of the Treaty. 
Outline of Chapters 
As an index is not provided, here is a summary of the contents of each chapter: 
Chapter 2: Discussing the Media familiarises the reader with the major theoretical 
tools that may be brought to bear on the study of media in society. It the outlines the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methods of enquiry employed in studying the media. 
Finally, it describes the key ideas in economic theory and public administration that 
were applied in New Zealand’s reforms.  
Chapter 3: Method and Approach explores some of the debates in public 
administration journals about what constitutes good policy analysis and a good policy 
process.  It also explores the role of the economist in the policy process and the idea that 
economics may be a form of rhetoric, and used rhetorically in policy debates. This leads 
to some conclusions about how this thesis ought to proceed as a piece of policy analysis 
and how it should treat economic theory. 
Chapter 4: Social and Political Context presents an overview of the social and political 
context into which the current broadcasting policy framework was introduced. This is 
important to understanding how and why the reforms were introduced.  It also lays the 
foundation for the discussion of broadcasting policy outcomes in Chapter 10.  
Chapter 5: Broadcasting Policy describes the situation before, and the events leading 
up to, the introduction of the broadcasting reforms.  It traces the process by which the 
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Treasury submission to the RCBRT replaced the Commission’s report on the policy 
agenda, and the subsequent role played by officials from treasury and the Department of 
Trade and Industry in advising the Government on the reforms. 
Chapter 6: Broadcasting Economics describes how an economic model of the effects 
of competition in broadcasting has evolved over time.  It shows how Treasury used the 
model in its submission.  This is followed by a summary of developments in the New 
Zealand broadcasting market since deregulation, which indicates how and why some of 
the predicted short-term outcomes have not been realised.  Finally, it presents an 
original model of the broadcasting firm under competition, which demonstrates why the 
medium- to long-term outcomes of deregulation may have very different effects to those 
predicted in the model employed by Treasury. 
Chapter 7: Welfare and Consumer Preferences demonstrates how welfare economics 
may be employed to assess the benefits to society of different methods for funding 
television broadcasting.  It then outlines a critically important limitations for applying 
welfare economics to broadcasting markets.  Finally, it reviews Treasury’s use of these 
ideas. 
Chapter 8: Rights and Property Rights introduces the economic theory of property 
rights and allocative efficiency. Deregulation may mean the specification and creation 
of property rights where none previously existed, or the transformation of other sorts of 
rights into property rights. It then goes on to review the issues of ‘external benefit’ 
justifications for public broadcasting and externalities generally. 
Chapter 9: Broadcasting Policy and Law explores issues surrounding the relationship 
between the citizens and the state, and the nature and extent of the citizen’s right to 
freedom of thought and expression.  It also discusses the nature and extent of the state’s 
obligation to defend and protect those rights expressed in law or implied by the 
constitution. 
Chapter 10: Policy and Social Control explores some of the subtler implications of the 
idea that a free society permits and even encourages its members to enjoy the freedom 
of thought and expression, and some of the implications that has for social harmony and 
the legitimacy of the state.  This leads to a discussion of the conflict between competing 
ideas of liberalism expressed in the broadcasting reforms, and the roles of ideology and 
economic rhetoric in the process of deregulation.  
Chapter 11: Public Broadcasting analyses the difference between ‘state’ broadcasting 
and ‘public’ broadcasting.  It then reviews some of the principles or characteristics of 
public broadcasting using economic concepts presented in this thesis and based on the 
principles espoused by the BBC. 
Chapter 12: Conclusions and Recommendations provides answers to the questions 
stated at the beginning of this chapter.  As this thesis is designed to be a piece of public 
policy advice, some recommendations are presented in the form of a draft cabinet 
minute. 
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Chapter 2 Discussing the Media 
This chapter explores some of the academic disciplines, or discourses, which we might 
employ to discuss media policy, and the strengths and weaknesses of some ways of 
investigating media effects. It also briefly describes the key ideas behind the New 
Zealand economic and public sector reforms.  
Media Discourses 
Broadcasting policy can be discussed using a variety of discourses.  These are 
primarily: Political Science, Social Psychology, Sociology and Cultural Studies.   
Political Science is concerned with the power of the media to influence political beliefs 
and voting patterns, how the media sets the “agenda” for public debate by reinforcing 
certain ideas and beliefs and marginalising others.  It is concerned with the structure and 
role of the public sphere within which policy issues are debated. 
Social Psychology is concerned with the effect of the media on shaping social norms 
and values, or personal identity and self-image, including the effects of media on mental 
health.  The Mental Health Foundation has been an regular contributor to debates about 
broadcasting policy in New Zealand. 
Sociology has sought to investigate how media shapes society, specifically the 
relationship of the media to particular groups within society: women, indigenous 
peoples, social sub-cultures.  It is also concerned with how the media “legitimises” 
some groups and alienates or demonises others. 
Cultural Studies is a relatively recent academic pursuit, arising out of a fusion of 
literary theory and sociology, but encompassing many aspects of the foregoing 
disciplines as they relate to the media.  Its central premise is that media are “texts” that 
can be decoded by expert analysis. 
A great deal has been written about the media within each of these disciplines.  
However, it is possible to speak of the developments across these disciplines as if they 
represented a single field of enquiry that has developed over the years, without doing 
excessive damage to any of them.  What follows is a brief overview, based 
predominantly on similar outlines provided by Alan Cocker (1996) and Shirley Leitch 
(1992). 
Effects Research 
The effects research tradition developed predominantly in the United States after World 
War II. This research was intended to have direct policy applications, inasmuch as it 
attempted to “...identify the programming and broadcasting practices to be 
circumscribed and those to be encouraged” (Cocker 1996: 26). Underlying this research 
tradition was the notion that media messages had a relatively direct or “hypodermic” 
effect—as if media messages directly injected ideas into people’s minds.  Researchers 
sought to apply the method scientific experiment to discover these effects.   
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By the end of the 1950s, it was evident that “…(this research) didn’t show any dramatic 
results—nothing like the results that the early students of mass communication had 
anticipated” (Katz, 1988).  Lasora, (1992, 164), makes this summary: 
 “…(Klapper, 1960) noted that mass communication ‘ordinarily does not serve as a 
necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a 
nexus of mediating factors and influences,’ including selective perception, exposure, 
attention and retention; group dynamics; and opinion leadership.  More recent research has 
confirmed the indirect, subtle, and contingent nature of many, if not most, mass media 
effects on audience.” 
Cumberpatch and Howitt (1989) were less generous, stating that effects research 
“…offered a desert of inconsequential findings.” The failure of effects research to 
produce robust findings meant it had little influence on policy, and weakened the case 
for protective regulation of the media. 
The Cultural Studies School 
One response to the perceived failure of effects research was to turn the original 
question on its head: researchers sought to discover what the audience did with mass 
media, rather than what mass media did to the audience.  This became known as “uses 
and gratifications” research.  A broadcaster transmits the media “text” with a particular 
intention, but the audience uses it with different intentions—often to gratify particular 
social or psychological needs (Morley, 1980). At the extreme, the media is said to have 
little or no influence over beliefs and behaviour.  Rather, audiences bring their prior life 
experience and cultural beliefs to media “texts” and interpret them in ways that render 
the ideological influence of the media redundant. This line of thought became known as 
“active audiences” theory (Fiske, 1987). 
The cultural studies approach followed from Louis Althusser’s (1971) neo-Marxist 
concept that the mass media are among the “Ideological State Apparatuses” (along with 
religious, educational and cultural institutions), that constantly reproduce and reinforce 
capitalist dominance over western societies. One school of thought arising from 
Althusser’s theory is that the proletariat may be unable to overcome the combined 
power of Ideological State Apparatuses.  Another is that the proletariat might be 
empowered by popular culture to redefine its ideological condition.  In both cases, 
theorists are fundamentally opposed to the way mainstream media constructs social 
reality. For Cunningham (1992: 9), the difference of opinion lies between the optimists 
and the pessimists about the possibility of proletarian resistance to the ideology of 
capitalism. The optimists, like Fiske, reject the notion that Ideological State 
Apparatuses are effective, while the pessimists condemn the media generally, and 
public broadcasting in particular, for being a tools of the ruling class.  What both had in 
common was a “…reliance on the utopian notion that an end to the market economy 
was around the corner.” (Alvarado and Thompson, 1990: 2).  
As public broadcasting came increasingly under threat from neo-liberal theorists in 
Europe during the 1980’s, it became apparent that the perspectives of the popular 
culture theorists had “…been incorporated into neo-liberal rhetoric to justify the 
destruction of public service broadcasting.” (Curran, 1990: 156)  This has led to 
reappraisal and revisionism within cultural studies, where it is now argued that a non-
commercial public broadcaster is somehow “…more open to popular opposition 
movements than the more ‘closed’ organisations of the popular press.” (157) 
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In some quarters, a move away from a stance of opposition and resistance, toward 
positive engagement in policy debates has been envisaged.  Cunningham (1992) 
painstakingly, and almost apologetically, plots such course, which  “...implies that 
students of cultural studies should be exposed to studies of politics, public 
administration, entertainment economics and industrial relations,...  Studies in rhetoric 
and discourse analysis are similarly appropriate.…” (179). Windschuttle (1995) 
questions the utility of the entire approach, especially for instructing journalism and 
media students. 
Agenda-Setting Theories 
Empirical research into media effects did not entirely stop in response to the 
inconclusive findings of effects research.  In the United States “Research eventually 
turned, elsewhere, away from persuasion, to the equally sinister possibility… that media 
may determine what the public takes to be important.” (Iyengar et al., 1982).  This so-
called agenda-setting function of the media is encapsulated by the idea that “The press 
may not be successful in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about.” (Cohen, 1963: 13)  
Research has generally supported the validity of the idea, but indicates that agenda-
setting effect is not a simple phenomenon (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Weaver, 1987). 
It is more pronounced in regard to issues, such as US foreign policy, where the audience 
has little or no possibility of direct experience and limited alternative sources of 
information, (Iyengar et al., 1982). It is less pronounced if audiences have direct 
experience of events or multiple sources of information providing a variety of 
perspectives. 
Lang and Lang (1983) claim that the lack of “effects” indicates the media may be more 
effective at reinforcing beliefs than changing them.  In setting an “agenda” the media 
agenda diverts attention away from potentially important political issues and 
marginalises alternative viewpoints. This is consistent with results found by early 
effects researchers in the 1940s (Leitch, 1992: 50).  Derek Fox (1988) describes how the 
Maori community in New Zealand has experienced this marginalising effect. The 
“invisibility” of Maori language, culture and political perspectives in New Zealand’s 
media over many years has provided a powerful impetus for the establishment of 
independent Maori radio, television and print media. 
The Spiral of Silence 
In Europe, the research of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1987), into what she describes as 
the “Spiral of Silence” has generated a significant amount of research and academic 
debate. Salmon and Moh (1992) review Noelle-Neumann’s theories, and the many 
empirical studies, critiques, counter-critiques and commentaries that have attempted to 
replicate, test, challenge or assess the theory.  They summarise her idea thus: 
 “Noelle-Neumann contends that individuals have a virtually innate fear of social isolation.  
To be alone, apart from, or at odds with the crowd is more than most individuals can endure.  
To wear an unpopular fashion or to express an idea that many consider old-fashioned or, 
even worse, socially unacceptable is to risk incurring the wrath of others, a prospect that 
most find too unattractive to risk.  As a result of this concern, individuals must constantly 
monitor the environment, searching for cues regarding which sentiments, ideas, knowledge, 
or fashions are shared by many or only by a few.” (148) 
 6
Noelle-Neumann claims the mass media are a powerful source of these cues, because 
they are ubiquitous and consonant.  That is, electronic and print media pervade society, 
and produce a remarkably similar diet of news and information (reinforcing the notion 
of a media “agenda”).  In such an environment, people who have strong social and 
belongingness needs tend to suppress opinions they believe run counter to prevailing 
public opinion. Noelle-Neumann bases this notion on the ideas of German sociologist 
Ferdinand Tonnies who conceived of public opinion as a social force, an informal 
mechanism of social control: “Public opinion always claims to be authoritative.  It 
demands consent or at least compels silence, or abstention from contradiction” 
(Tonnies, 1922: 138).1   
However, it is difficult to generalise about the “spiral of silence”. Its power may be 
attributable, among other causes, to the prevailing culture of the society itself.  The 
effect may be weaker in a society that condones diversity and free speech, than in a 
society that has a cultural tradition of homogeneity and conformity, for instance.  
This view of society has important implications for public opinion research.  Noelle-
Neumann’s Spiral of Silence model sought to explain the events she had witnessed as a 
journalist in Germany during World War II. Her research suggests that the opinions of 
others and the general social climate significantly influence poll respondents’ answers. 
Another model, developed in the United States by George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae 
in the early 40’s, sought to prevent the occurrence of such events.  Their polling 
technique starts from the assumption that poll respondents are “…interested, 
knowledgeable and rational (i.e. not motivated by fear), regarding a social issue, and 
that polling provides a mechanism for an individual’s participation in the political 
system…” (Salmon and Moh: 153). Noelle-Neumann’s research findings imply that 
Gallup and Rae’s ideal is normative, (says what ought to happen) rather than descriptive 
(describes what actually does happen).  
Third Party Effects 
In America, Davison has developed a line of enquiry into “Third-Person Effects”, or the 
idea that:  
“…a message might lead to action not because of its direct impact on those presumed to be 
its target but because others (third persons) believe it will have such an impact on that 
audience and they act on that belief, regardless of whether or not the message has direct 
effects on the presumed target audience at all.” (Lasora, 1992: 165) 
 Empirical studies indicate that between 30-50% of polled respondents tended to believe 
that media messages will have a more powerful effect on others than on themselves, 40-
50% perceive equal effects between themselves and others. The residual 5-7% believed 
that the media has a more powerful effect on themselves than on others. 
The idea of third party “effects” is really not about media effects at all, but about how 
media policy is debated. It refers to the element of “moral panic” often involved in 
                                                 
1  Abraham Maslow’s theory of psychological health, in Motivation and Personality (1987), provides 
support for this idea: in his hierarchy of human needs, social and belongingness needs come 
immediately after the fundamental needs for food, clothing shelter and safety. 
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debates about the media and media policy, especially when the “third parties” include 
children or any section of society deemed to be more susceptible to media influence 
than others. Such claims occur in many areas of policy debate, where the common good 
is at issue. Protagonists in such debates may invoke the welfare of the general public, or 
of other individuals, to mask self-interest or to promote personal beliefs – as Davison’s 
idea implies. However, his sweeping generalisation is unfair to those who may be 
genuinely concerned about the impacts of policy on people unable or unwilling to 
represent themselves. 
Methods of Enquiry 
The strengths and weaknesses of the various ways of discussing media effects are 
intimately connected with the methods of enquiry employed. This section describes 
some of the different methods and their strengths and weaknesses for the analysis of 
media policy. 
Experimental method 
The method of scientific experiment ostensibly provides the greatest degree of rigour 
for determining media effects.  However, it suffers from the problems of applying 
scientific experiments to social policy issues generally. The idea of a “scientific 
experiment” refers to a replicable experiment, with valid control groups, which 
demonstrates strict causality and accurately predicts future events.  There are some 
problems of applying such a method to media effects research: 
• The studies will be culturally specific: people in different societies may react 
differently to the same media message, depending on their culture and beliefs. A 
study of media effects undertaken in one society may not be replicable in another. 
• Societies and cultures change, often quite rapidly.  Therefore, the results of 
experiments made at one point in time may not accurately predict similar effects in 
the future. 
• Societies change in response to the media, but the media also changes, in both form 
and content, in response to social and cultural change. Therefore the direction of 
causality cannot be determined in the long term.  
• Media effects may be indirect, as the effects researchers discovered, so the nature of 
causality is obscure. 
• There can be no effective “control” group. Media is so ubiquitous that any group of 
people not exposed to the media would be unrepresentative of the general 
population. 
The experimental method therefore cannot produce hard and fast universal truths about 
media influence. However, it can produce plausible conclusions, which will be fairly 
reliable within particular social and historical contexts.   
Content Analysis 
Content analysis refers to the measurement and interpretation of specific aspects of 
media “texts”.  The approach takes two general forms: objective measurement or 
subjective analysis, although both may appear in a single study.  
 8
Objective measurement techniques quantify and classify selected aspects of media texts. 
Atkinson (1994) took this approach, measuring the length of sound bites, camera shots 
and item lengths on Television One’s network news.  Atkinson criticises the quality of 
television news since deregulation on the basis that the average duration of news stories, 
and the quotations used in them, has become shorter.  He reports quantifiable facts that 
imply the existence of a problem, but do not prove it: does shorter item length mean that 
reporting is worse, or simply more concise?  
The subjective style of content analysis attempts to assess the meaning of a media text.  
This inevitably requires the researcher to make subjective judgements regarding both 
denotation and connotation.2  It is possible to control for consistency among a team of 
researchers, however this will only ensure the analysis is consistently subjective.  
McGregor and Comrie’s (1995) report on the qualities of “balance and fairness” in New 
Zealand’s broadcast news, commissioned by the Broadcasting Standards Authority and 
New Zealand on Air, provides an example of this approach.  
The difficulty with content analysis is that it provides evidence and analysis of 
symptoms, when the cause of those symptoms will generally lie elsewhere. It therefore 
provides a weak platform for policy development. It would be ridiculous to regulate the 
length of sound bites, as a way of improving the quality of the news, for instance. It 
would be fair to say that neither Jo Atkinson’s study nor McGregor and Comrie’s have 
had tangible effects on policy. 
Literary Criticism 
The term “literary criticism” is used here to encompass and conflate a range of ideas, 
including structuralism, post-structuralism, relativism and post-modernism.   
All of these approaches start from the idea that humans are born into the world with 
minds empty of content and the world is perceived through the senses.3  Our 
understanding of the world is built from seeing, hearing and experience.  Our 
knowledge of society, its rules, norms and expectations, is communicated to us through 
“texts” (or perceptions imbued with meaning). Therefore, textual analysis or literary 
criticism can be used to determine the truth about the social world.  Just as, by reading 
and analysing (“decoding” or “de-constructing”), the encoded messages and meanings 
in a book we can better understand the intentions of the author, so we can better 
understand the nature of a society by understanding its language, symbolism, etc. 
 The basis of anthropological Structuralism is the claim that we can understand the 
nature of society by understanding how different societies construct their social realities 
using symbolism and communication. Post-structuralism arises from the idea that when 
we study societies in this way we are unavoidably employing the precepts of our own 
culture, ideology or personal psychology.  
                                                 
2  Denotation refers to the literal qualities of the text: the actual words and symbols used. Connotation 
refers to the meaning that the message has in a particular context and for a particular reader.  
3  That is, philisophical materialism, as opposed to idealism, which holds that our minds possess some 
form of prior knowledge or ability to independently “know” the world. 
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Cultural Relativism follows from the idea that if society is “socially constructed”, there 
is no proper or natural form a society should take.  This idea provides theoretical 
support for utopian social reform movements, as it implies the possibility of explicitly 
choosing and creating a future society. Some feminists and other social activists believe 
changing a society’s language can bring about social change (Fairclough, 1992:135). In 
the Marxist version of this approach, texts contain the encoded ideology of the ruling 
class, and Marxists hope that deconstruction will help the proletariat discern the 
difference between ‘science’ (i.e. Marxism) and ‘ideology’ (anything else).   
Post-structuralism and cultural relativism give rise to post-modernism: the idea that 
there is no authoritative “meaning” attributable to a text – subjective appreciation is the 
only valid measure of worth.  Applied to the study of society, it implies that any social 
structure is good if its inhabitants believe it is. 
In the more extreme versions of the literary metaphor, texts become more important 
than the social events to which they refer. This constitutes the social condition of 
“hyperreality”, according to Baudrillard (1995), in The Gulf War did not really take 
place. Events since the Gulf War, including the O.J. Simpson trial and Princess Diana’s 
funeral, lend credence to the point: the social meaning of an event may be less a 
function of the event itself than of the way the media covers it.  The newsreader 
becomes more newsworthy than the news. 
Literary criticism hardly appears to provide a robust platform for public policy 
discussion.  It does not constitute a formal or rigorous method of enquiry, and many of 
its insights offer a critical view of society, rather than constructive proposals for change. 
However, the ideas outlined above can be boiled down to a few ideas that are very 
important to policy development: 
• The act of policy-making involves communication and the manipulation of symbols. 
• Policy does “construct” society in profoundly important ways. 
• Groups and individuals use rhetoric to promote or mask their political interests, and 
understanding their use of rhetoric can be useful in policy debate and analysis. 
• There is often no one “right” answer to a policy issue, and the outcome will rely 
heavily on the personal values and positional power of policy advisors, as well as 
the political beliefs of political decision-makers. 
• Many people have little or no contact with the world of politics and policy-making 
other than through the media.  The media’s coverage of an election campaign may 
be of significant influence in determining its outcomes. 
Obviously, ideas based on the metaphor of literary criticism do provide a rich source of 
insight, and often challenge the way that we think about the world.  They should not be 
too lightly dismissed. 
Economics and Public Administration 
The broadcasting policy reforms were heavily influenced concepts from economic and 
public administration theory that were widely applied during the 1980s.  Understanding 
these concepts is crucial for evaluating the current policy framework.  
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Economics 
The economic ideas that pertain to broadcasting will be explained in detail in later 
chapters. In this section we look at the key ideas applied to the New Zealand economy 
and the public sector generally.  The central idea was the need for microeconomic 
reform in the pursuit of allocative efficiency.  Essential to both notions is the idea of 
consumer sovereignty.  Secondary to these concepts are some supporting ideas: that the 
private sector generally manages enterprises better than the public sector; that the 
government should exit inessential business activities, leaving them to the private 
sector.  
Microeconomic reform generally meant the removal of regulations, tariffs, subsidies 
and other government interventions that “distorted” the allocation of goods and services 
(in consumption), and resources (in production), that would otherwise occur in a free 
market. 
Allocative Efficiency is the concept that, when two or more parties enter a voluntary 
arrangement to trade, the aggregated welfare of both parties will be maximised.4 An 
improvement in efficiency means that at least one party to a transaction will be better 
off after the transaction has taken place, and neither party will be worse off. Note this is 
different from the idea of technical efficiency in economics.  When technical efficiency 
improves, a greater amount of output is produced with a given amount of input or, 
equally, the same amount of output is produced with a lesser amount of input. 
Consumer Sovereignty is the idea that each individual is the best judge of her own 
needs and, if given the opportunity and incentives to do so, will make better 
consumption and savings choices than those made for them by the state. The best 
possible outcome for society is achieved, indeed can only be achieved, by summing 
over all consumers’ personal choices.  It is a fundamental principle of economics that 
we should not look under the veil of personal psychology or social influence to 
investigate an individual’s choices—hence the notion of “sovereignty”.5  
The idea of individual sovereignty is deeply embedded in the structure of English 
philosophy and jurisprudence.  It is associated with the thinking of Thomas Hobbes who 
claimed that “man is alone in a state of nature”, and the natural condition of mankind is 
that of an individual wandering in the wilderness, entering human society only for the 
protection it offers.  The place of the human being in economic theory can be traced to 
the thinking of Jeremy Bentham, who saw homo economicus as an individual who 
calculates the personal pleasure or pain associated with every decision and chooses to 
maximise his utility accordingly.   
                                                 
4  This is sometimes referred to as Pareto efficiency after Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian sociologist and 
economist who conceived the idea. 
5  This assumption poses problems for the analysis of mass media, since creating mass influence over 
consumers’ choices is the primary function of the commercial media.  This issue is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
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Public Administration 
Boston, et al, (1996; 16-40) set out the key ideas about public administration which 
underpinned the public sector reforms.  These may be paraphrased as: 
Public Choice Theory is an extension of the precept in economic theory that all 
individuals are rational utility-maximisers. If all human behaviour is motivated by self-
interest, then politicians’ actions are determined primarily by their desire to maximise 
future votes, government officials by their desire to increase departmental budgets, and 
so forth.  Public choice theory may be used as a rhetorical device to argue that 
politicians and administrators make “irrational” decisions that distort the allocations the 
market would otherwise create. Such decisions reflect politicians’ prejudices and/or the 
outcomes desired by interest groups, neither of which is in the best interests of all 
consumers. 
Agency Theory emerged from analysis of the problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and management of firms.  Social and political relationships can be 
understood as ‘contracts’ in which the principal binds the agent to do her bidding, in 
return for a reward.  The idea of a contract is broadly defined, and may include the 
relationships arising out of marriage, elections, and employer-employee or fiduciary 
relationships, for instance.  Agency theory asserts that agents do not necessarily act to 
maximise the welfare of principals. The behaviour of agents is difficult for principals to 
monitor, and may lead to “shirking, deception, cheating and opportunism”.  
Overcoming these possibilities is the primary focus of agency theory  The principals’ 
options include: monitoring, offering incentives, and enforcing a bond by instruments 
such as guarantees.  These all impose “agency costs” on the principal. Although 
principals may also compromise the relationship, by acting opportunistically, this idea 
does not figure strongly in the literature. 
Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE) closely related to agency theory. It focuses on the 
nature and extent of the costs involved in creating a contractual relationship, and how 
these affect the governance structures that are created. Transactions costs can be 
separated into ex ante costs and ex post costs.  Ex ante costs are those of negotiating and 
specifying a contract which fall before the contract is agreed.  Ex post costs are those of 
monitoring, enforcing and altering contracts once they are in place.  TCE presumes 
agents are prone to opportunism, or “self-interest seeking with guile”. Both parties enter 
the contract with limited information (or “bounded rationality”), and the cost of 
obtaining information may be a transaction cost for either party. Either party may 
possess information the other does not, which they may use strategically to obtain 
benefit from the transaction.   
Managerialism implies that there is a body of theory and practice called “management” 
that can be applied to any organised productive activity, whether in the public or private 
sector.  Easton (1997) has described this as commercialisation  “…which may be 
defined as ‘the application of business (or commercial) principles to the public sector 
(or a particular public sector activity)’.” (25) Commercialisation implies that private 
ownership is more efficient than public ownership. It makes a somewhat ill defined 
connection between allocative efficiency and technical efficiency, with the former 
supposedly giving rise to the latter. Commercialisation gives rise to the idea that State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) should separate their purely commercial functions from their 
purely social functions to the greatest extent possible, in the interests of transparency.  
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Where possible, the Government should then purchase outputs that it deems socially 
important from SOEs, as if from a commercial supplier. 
New Public Management (NPM) is managerialism applied to the public sector. It 
involves shifting the focus of control from processes to results, devolution of 
management control from politicians to administrators, adoption of private-sector 
management practices such as mission statements, strategic planning, performance-
linked pay, improved management information systems and a greater focus on 
efficiency and corporate identity.    
NPM and managerialism (but not commercialisation) are associated with an eclectic 
body of management literature and thinking. Businesses are insatiable in their appetite 
to adopt and test ideas of psychology, sociology, and anthropology—anything that will 
provide even a temporary competitive advantage.  They provide a testing ground for 
ideas about organisational structure and organisational change, and over time, these 
ideas have evolved in many interesting directions.  The management literature and 
therefore the New Public Management make few claims toward internal consistency or 
desire to be accepted as an intellectual system.6  This contrasts with TCE, Public Choice 
theory, Principal-Agent theory and commercialisation, which all follow from the 
application of economic theory to administration and organisation, and which can all be 
linked to the concepts of consumer sovereignty, microeconomic reform, and allocative 
efficiency. 
Philosophy and Beliefs 
The application of neo-liberal economic ideas and related public administration 
concepts to broadcasting policy can be described as “ideological”.  That is, these ideas 
take on the character of a political philosophy or a system of belief.  
The basis of this philosophy could be expressed as “…the belief that the moving force 
in society is or should be self-interest.” (Jesson, 1987: 120) The aggregation of 
individuals’ rational choices can and will lead to the best possible social outcomes.  
This implies that the state will play a minimal role in society, expressed by the idea of 
the neutral state, in which:  
“…it is not the function of the state to impose the pursuit of any particular set of ends upon 
its citizens.  Rather, the state should leave its citizens to set their own goals, to shape their 
own lives, and should confine itself to establishing arrangements which allow each citizen to 
pursue his own goals as he sees fit—consistent with every other citizen’s being able to do the 
same.” (Jones, 1989: 9) 
To assess the quality of Treasury’s economic analysis and the political neutrality of the 
policy advice provided by officials to the government, we may need to identify when 
the application of a concept of set of concepts takes on the character of a belief system 
or political philosophy. Leslie Stevenson (1987) offers the following definition of a 
‘closed system’ of belief:  
                                                 
6  Charles Fox (1996) critiques Osborne and Gabler’s (1993) Reinventing Government along these 
lines, accusing the authors of inconsistency, self-contradiction and even post-modernism. 
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“There are two main ways in which a belief can be maintained in the face of intellectual 
difficulties.  If a theory of human nature is maintained by these two devices – (1) of not 
allowing any conceivable evidence to count against the theory, and (2) of disposing of 
criticism by analysing the motivations of the critic in terms of the theory itself – then I shall 
say that the theory is held as a ‘closed system’.” (15) 
In order to decide whether the first of these devices is being employed, we have to be 
aware whether the statement concerned is normative or positive.  That is, whether it is 
“…a value judgement, saying what ought to be the case, rather than a statement of fact, 
about what is the case” (17).7 Another indicator is when an analytic statement is passed 
off as a synthetic statement.  An analytic statement is true by definition “…the statement 
that all men are animals does not really make any assertion about the facts about men, 
but only reveals part of what we mean by the word ‘man’.”(19)  Being an analytic 
statement, it can neither be proven nor disproven by any evidence.  A synthetic 
statement, on the other hand, does attempt to make genuine assertions about facts, and 
at least implies that the truth of the statement might be proven.   
These distinctions – between normative and positive statements, and between analytic 
and synthetic statements – provide us with two simple tests, which may help us decide 
whether or not a statement has the character of a value judgement.  We may also be able 
to identify when ideas, particularly ideas from economic theory, are being employed as 
part of a “closed system” of belief.   
This is one of the tests of what makes ‘good’ policy advice.  If advice from officials to a 
government has the character of a value judgement, or if it represents the product of a 
“closed system” of belief, then its political neutrality might be called into question. 
 
                                                 
7  We have already seen this conflict expressed in the different approaches taken to survey research by 
Gallup and Rae and by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. 
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Chapter 3 Method and Approach 
The previous chapter has briefly reviewed the main discourses and methods of enquiry 
we might employ to analyse media policy. How, might we use these various and 
sometimes conflicting ideas to talk about broadcasting policy?   
This chapter will look at debates regarding the role and function of policy analysis, the 
process of policy development, the role of the economist in policy debates, and the 
ability of economics to build persuasive arguments.  The method and approach of this 
thesis reflect choices that should be seen in the context of these debates. 
Policy Analysis 
According to Wildavsky (1979), the function of policy analysis, as a discipline, is to 
bring rigorous analysis to the political process. Its fundamental mission is to “speak 
truth to power”. Capturing reliable data and using robust analytical techniques to 
formulate conclusions is an essential aspect of “speaking truth to power”. Wildavsky 
therefore proposes a rational and objective, or modernist, mode of enquiry. 
On the other hand, the practice of advising, formulating and developing policy is largely 
about persuasion – it is rhetorical. There is a small and relatively recent literature about 
the rhetoric of policy analysis in the policy analysis journals.8 Danziger (1995) notes 
that the debate has much deeper roots, which can be traced back to ancient Greece: 
“The underlying sophist assumption… is that ‘ “truth” for any man was what he could be 
persuaded of.’ Plato, on the other hand… insists that the public needs a philosopher king to 
counteract its ignorance.  To simplify a somewhat heated ongoing policy debate, the sophist 
teachers of rhetoric championed a democratic practice, while the more traditional 
philosophers who criticized them were profoundly anti-democratic and advocated 
philosophical expertise as the key criterion for political power.  In short, the ancient 
advocates of rhetoric would be opposed vehemently to the proponents of truth as technical 
expertise.” (437) 
Deleon (1994) has pointed to the increasingly technocratic and disempowering 
orientation of the policy sciences. He calls for the return to policy sciences with a more 
multidisciplinary character, in order to enhance democratic participation and 
governance and thereby improve their value and usefulness:  
“The policy sciences have been well accepted within the halls of power but their record of 
discernible successes has not been especially striking.  The reasons for these shortfalls can be 
attributed to an over reliance on instrumental rationality (in general, the effects of positivism, 
in particular, the influence of neoclassical economics), the complexity of the problem 
contexts, and an increasingly technocratic, undemocratic orientation.”( 82) 
                                                 
8  See, for instance: Majone (1989), Throgmorton (1991), Farmer (1995), Danziger (1995) 
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Throgmorton (1991), analysing policy debates surrounding the Love Canal 
environmental disaster, emphasises the rhetorical nature of the sphere of activity within 
which policy formulation occurs: “...policy analysts are embedded in a complex 
rhetorical situation created by the interaction of three broad communities (or audiences): 
scientists, lay advocates and politicians….”(153) Each of these communities has its own 
normal discourse and agreed-upon conventions of persuasion. The diagram below 
shows the role of the policy analyst in the interactions among these three spheres. In 
applying the model to the subject matter of this thesis, it may help to substitute the word 
“economist” for “scientist” in the lower circle.  
Figure 1: Roles of the Policy Analyst 
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Throgmorton (1991), presents the analyst as somewhat trapped in this nexus of 
relationships: 
“By acting as advocates for clients, analysts can directly influence decision making.  But 
they do so at the risk of losing legitimacy in the eyes of advocacy communities…. By acting 
as issue advocates, analysts earn greater credibility and legitimacy with particular 
communities.  But they do so at the risk of losing the trust of elected officials…. And by 
acting as mobilizers, analysts are more likely to get things done in a way that satisfies both 
elected officials and particular groups.  But they do so at the risk of being seen by scientists 
of producing decisions that are ineffective and guided by emotion.”(167) 
He sees the ‘ideal’ policy analyst as an active mediator, working with the participants in 
a sphere where conflict between opposing points of view occurs. He argues that “The 
role of the policy analyst is to help create (through honest argument directed at those 
audiences), a community that is technically competent, politically astute, and 
legitimate.”(153) His prescription for the analyst to engage in “active mediation” neither 
implies that a synthesis of these distinct discourses can be achieved nor that there 
should be consensus among parties to the policy discussion.   
Danziger (1995), supports this point about conflict, and emphasises that the role of 
rhetoric in mediating among conflicting interests should be clearly understood in the 
policy process: 
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“…conflict generates understanding, clarification, change, and sometimes even consensus.  
The goal for policy analysis is not to avoid conflict, or to avoid rhetoric—because it is an 
inescapable aspect of public policymaking. Students must learn to apply it constructively, 
recognize its strengths and limitations, and minimize its power to distort and do harm.” (447) 
What shall we make of all this? First, recognising the need for rhetoric in policy 
analysis does not preclude the need for accurately collecting, analysing and reporting 
facts if they are available. Although active mediation may be the most preferred role, an 
analyst may play any of the proposed roles, depending on what is needed at the time.  In 
the absence of any one of these communities of interest, in a given situation, the analyst 
may choose to act as the devil’s advocate on that community’s behalf, for instance.  
Finally, in the presence of conflict, it behoves the analyst to provide input and advice 
without fear or favour. 
The Policy Process 
Differing perceptions about the proper role of a policy analyst are reflected in debates 
about what is, or should be, a good policy development processes.  
In 1959, Charles Lindblom published “The Science of Muddling Through”, which 
contrasted two models of policy-making, the rational/deductive and the incrementalist 
(or “muddling through”). He elaborated his ideas in a number of subsequent 
publications.  These have been summarised by Bob Gregory (1989), who identifies six 
interrelated ideas about policy making in Lindblom’s writings:  
• Policy makers’ level of theoretical understanding of the relationships among 
relevant variables is low. 
• Policy makers tend to confine themselves to consideration of variables, values and 
consequences of immediate concern that differ marginally from the status quo. 
• In the face of limited information and theoretical input, policy movements tend to be 
based on marginal, trial and error interventions. 
• Policy and/or political change therefore occur marginally, or “incrementally”. 
• Policy making is a process of political and social interaction among competing 
interests and values, which Lindblom describes this as “partisan mutual 
adjustment”. 
• Political and policy change is not a function of any coherent set of transcendent 
objective goals. 
The first three points concern the role of formal analysis in policy-making, and 
emphasise Simon’s (1947) notion of “bounded rationality”—the notion that the 
knowledge contributing to any decision is only ever partial and contingent.  The second 
group of three points describes the reality of the policy process, as Lindblom sees it. 
Critics of the “muddling through” concept tend to object to the prescriptive element in 
Lindblom’s writing, which emphasises the democratic and participatory nature of the 
policy process. Gregory notes that:  “Goodin… is concerned with formal theory in 
policy making.  His proposition is that incrementalists either fail to use formal theory at 
all; or, if they do, they do not use enough, or they use it too cautiously.”(141) 
Champions of the rational-deductive model tend to criticise “incrementalism” as for 
appearing to support irrationality in policy development and argue that it is 
inappropriate for introducing comprehensive and rapid change. 
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Lindblom was not necessarily in favour of “irrationality”.  In his later works, especially, 
he is more explicit about the main thrust of his ideas, which is  “...that public policy 
making has to be understood essentially as a political process, rather than an analytical, 
problem-solving one.” (Gregory, 147)  Lindblom sees the rational-deductive ideal as 
possessing dangerously anti-democratic and ideological tendencies, and refutes the 
claim that “incrementalism” cannot manage comprehensive and rapid change.  A 
multitude of incremental changes can have comprehensive effects if they are 
implemented concurrently and with a common direction. 
As far as policy process is concerned, the choice of a rational/deductive or 
incrementalist approach is really contingent on a number of factors.  These include the 
urgency and scope of the policy issue, the state of theoretical sophistication and 
availability of facts. In all cases, the democracy nature of the process is paramount – but 
that does not preclude a rational/deductive process in the presence of firm and clear of 
political principles espoused by elected politicians. 
Finally, if we acknowledge that the role of the analyst may require the use of rhetoric, 
this does not mean that policy analysis and development is, or could be described as, 
post-modern. Post-modernism implies that all cultural and social viewpoints are equally 
valid, and people are, or should be, free to construct their own realities as they please. 
Fox (1996), points out that this form of social pluralism complicates the idea of a 
common good, and militates against the possibility of purposive political action. Policy 
analysts and decision-makers are intimately involved in the process of constructing 
social realities. Policy analysis, evaluation and implementation ultimately result in the 
creation of specific laws, regulations and institutions.  These necessarily entail a 
“distribution of sacrifice” among competing interests and conceptions of what 
constitutes a good society.9 The very idea of policy—of making, legitimising and 
enforcing laws, regulations and incentives—is inherently normative.  To the extent that 
policies imply there is a right way of doing a particular thing, and imposes that decision 
on society, it is an irreducibly modernist undertaking.   
Role of Economists 
According to Nelson (1987), the role of the economist in policy debates during the 
twentieth century has evolved through three distinct stages.  At the turn of the century 
the economist was seen as a Progressive Neutral Expert (52).  The progressive outlook 
reflected confidence in science and human progress, so the economist was seen as being 
a value-neutral scientist or technician, providing advice on the means of implementing 
policy that would fulfil society’s chosen ends.  This reflected both a dichotomy between 
politics and administration, and a precedence of one over the other. 
By mid-century, the political process came to be seen not as a rational pursuit of a 
unified public good but a contest, or a process of bargaining, among competing interest 
groups.  The economist became an Entrepreneur for Efficiency, whose role had a noble 
purpose: 
                                                 
9  This idea is explicated below, in the section titled “Error! Reference source not found.”, page 
Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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“…as spokesmen for the diffuse and otherwise weakly represented interests of the general 
citizenry, acting as a counterweight to the pervasive special interest pressures exerted by the 
beneficiaries of particular government programs.”(55) 
This translated into an increasing concern for allocative efficiency and support for the 
consumer sovereignty. Economists also had to become more skilled as policy advocates, 
finding allies and building coalitions of support for their view (56).   
Alongside this change in practice, there emerged significant challenges to the 
progressive belief in scientific rationality, from libertarians and environmentalists.  The 
libertarians such as Hayek (1945, 1952) saw the technocratic states created by Hitler 
and Stalin as the logical outcome of applying scientific rationality to social organisation.  
Hayek’s ideas were not popular immediately after the war, but began to gain favour in 
the late 1970’s, as the problems associated with Keynesian economic management 
became evident. Environmentalists were also expressing scepticism in the value to 
humanity of science and technology.  In response to these challenges, economists had to 
become Ideological Combatants, as Nelson puts it: 
“Because ideological debate has played a greater role in public policy making, economists 
have been pressed to assume a new role, as defenders of economic ideas against ideological 
attacks.” (57) 
While Nelson portrays American economists as resisting the Hayek’s critique of central 
planning, in New Zealand the opposite was true. Libertarian ideals provided a tonic to 
those dismayed by Muldoon’s economic management style, and Treasury economists 
(in particular) can be seen as Ideological Combatants in favour of Hayek’s ideas. 
At the end of his article, Nelson argues that for economists to become more effective 
proponents of the perspectives that economics has to offer the policy process, they need 
to be both less rigidly ideological in their approach, and more persuasive in their 
presentation. (86) 
Since Nelson’s article was published, there has been a lively if somewhat limited debate 
on this issue in the economic literature, which first gained prominence with Donald 
McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of Economics (1986).10 He says that, if economists need to 
present their ideas persuasively, they should apply disciplines such as the art of classical 
rhetoric.  McCloskey has met with disapproval from those, such as Rosenberg (1988), 
who treat economic theory as a body of scientific knowledge, modelling their mode of 
enquiry on Physics.  According to Throgmorton (1991: 158), they “…do not think of 
their talk as ‘rhetoric’.  Defining themselves as objective researchers who let the facts 
speak for themselves, they are ‘anti-rhetoricians’ who consciously try to expurgate their 
discourse of unproductive stylistic flourishes.”  
At times, McCloskey appears to support a post-modern approach.  For instance, he 
believes it is an error to teach economics as a canon of immutable principles.  Rather, it 
should be taught as an ongoing conversation:  
                                                 
10  A useful overview of the arguments about economic rhetoric can be found in Klamer et al. (1988) 
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“…the way we teach is the way we think…. It is hardest of all to teach how to argue like an 
economist, that is, to enter into the conversation of the field.  Students come to think of the 
formal economics as the economics; when they teach others they teach by theorem and 
‘observable implication’ rather than by argument and figure of speech.  Modernism breeds 
modernism.” (178-179) 
Some may interpret statements like this as a claim that economics is ideologically 
biased and an exhortation to economists to deconstruct their rhetoric in order to be more 
self-conscious of its ideological content.  However, that is probably going too far. 
McCloskey follows Marshall (1961 [1898]), seeing economic theory as a toolbox of 
concepts from which one chooses the appropriate elements to analyse a policy problem 
and argue for or against a policy accordingly.  These tools are: 
“… economic theory in its verbal and mathematical forms, statistical theory and practice, 
familiarity with certain accounting conventions and statistical sources, and a background of 
stylized historical fact and worldly experience.  The use of such tools to fashion sturdy little 
arguments is the métier of the economist, the economist’s method.” (24) 
McCloskey also states the values appropriate for employing these tools: the economist 
must be self-conscious about the social and historical context of the analysis, careful to 
explain the use of simplifying assumptions and, most of all, considerate of the needs of 
its audience and other points of view: 
“..at the peak of scholarly enterprise, stand the conversational norms of civilization.  The 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his tradition call these Sprachethik….  Don’t lie; 
pay attention; don’t sneer; cooperate; don’t shout; let other people talk; be open-minded; 
explain yourself when asked; don’t resort to violence or conspiracy in aid of your ideas.  We 
cannot imagine good conversation or good intellectual life deficient in these.”(24) 
So McCloskey is not ‘deconstructing’ economics, but defending it, and possibly seeking 
to rescue it from the ridicule and disparagement that any discipline deserves when 
applied dogmatically and without self-conscious awareness of the values and beliefs 
which it entails. 
Economics and Media Effects 
Other social sciences have given inconclusive answers to the question of whether the 
media is influential, and in which ways it influences behaviour.  What could economics 
contribute to this debate? 
One of the “sturdy little arguments” of economics provides a straightforward answer: 
the existence of a multi-billion dollar global advertising and public relations industry 
indicates that it is the collective view, of a great number of rational economic actors, 
that the media is influential. Also, that it is influential across different times and 
different cultures. 
The economic idea underlying this is that if a product or service is not effective, the 
market will not provide it.  Rational consumers may act mistakenly, in the short-term, 
and the market will therefore provide some products of little or no value.  However, 
consumers will learn from their mistakes, and therefore act rationally in the long-term.  
A product or service that is valuable will therefore persist in the market. 
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The advertising, marketing and public relations industries seek to influence attitudes 
and behaviours. They have not merely persisted for the greater part of this century but 
rapidly grown in size and scope.  This indicates either that a great number of people 
have been systematically mistaken for a very long period of time, or that the media does 
effectively influence peoples’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. 
This is a simple argument, built on one observable “stylised fact” and a highly plausible 
assumption about human behaviour.  It doesn’t tell us a great deal about how media 
influences behaviour, or what policy responses might be appropriate.  But it does help 
us to unequivocally state that media effects exist and they are influential. 
An approach to “method” 
We began this chapter by asking how we might use a variety of ideas and discourses to 
talk about broadcasting policy.  There is no philosophical or theoretical framework that 
stands over and above all of these ideas, approaches and discourses that represents a 
methodological approach. McCloskey has proposed, however, that there may be an 
ethical approach.  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the manner in which Treasury used economic 
theory in its submission to the RCBRT, and whether or not Treasury’s arguments in 
favour of deregulation were an honestly explained and thoughtfully applied use of the 
tools that economics provides.  In doing this, it seeks to treat the economic theory of 
broadcasting as a conversation, and often a debate, about matters of policy, situated in 
particular social and historical contexts.  Where possible, therefore, specific examples 
from the New Zealand situation have been used to illustrate the economic ideas.   
This thesis is also intentionally didactic. That is, it assumes the reader has little more 
than a passing knowledge of broadcasting policy, the broadcasting industry, economics, 
political science or public administration.  The intention is to lead readers through the 
analysis in such a way that they can understand the key policy issues and they will 
therefore be empowered to engage in debate about them.  This might be understood as a 
means of overcoming some of the bounded rationality of the participants in a policy 
debate, and making possible a form of active mediation between competing ideologies 
and interests.  
Finally, in the closing chapters, this thesis seeks to persuade the reader that a particular 
course of action is desirable.  To that extent, it is explicitly rhetorical – although it aims 
to be transparently so. The method of this thesis therefore resides in its style and the 
structure of its exposition.  It is an attempt to create a transparent analysis employing a 
range of discourses that all bear significantly on the policy issues at hand. 
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Chapter 4 Social and Political Context 
The changes made to broadcasting policy in the 1980s were part of a broader process of 
change in New Zealand society and have to be understood in that context.  This chapter 
describes New Zealand before, during and after the reforms of the 1984-1990 Labour 
Governments. 
New Zealand before the Reforms 
This section reviews three perspectives on New Zealand society and its economy in the 
period leading up to the reforms of the fourth Labour Government. The picture 
presented here consists of three glimpses, written by commentators who provide 
viewpoints that can be described as Liberal, Conservative and Marxist.  None of these 
completely captures the period, but each illuminates different aspects of it.  
Austin Mitchell captures the essence of New Zealand society in this era, in his 
affectionate and satirical book The Half-Gallon Quarter Acre Pavlova Paradise (1972).  
His portrait of the New Zealand economy demonstrates the accuracy of his observation: 
“Since there are three million New Zealanders, not just the 100,000 which economic logic 
would dictate, they have taken the protective measure of building a fence of tariffs and 
licenses around the economy so that a pampered industry can develop” (29) 
He goes on to say that New Zealand’s industrial and service sectors existed primarily to 
redistribute the wealth created by the agricultural sector “Agricultural exports provide 
enough for all to live on…(therefore) Industry exists not to make things, but to make 
work.” (32) The situation was untenable, in economic theory, but it produced the 
outcomes New Zealanders sought: 
“Being practical men, New Zealanders are not concerned with hypothetical questions such as 
would Adam Smith or even Robert McNamara, approve of our economy, but does it work?  
It does.  The people have jobs, a good standard of living, a car and a lovely home each….  
They are not concerned with the problem of whether the system could work better…. (it) 
works so well and has made the inhabitants so contented that they are the world’s most 
stable, and probably most conservative society.”(32) 
In The Quiet Revolution, Colin James (1986) paints a picture of New Zealand society as 
essentially individualist, in which people use the state to pursue individual or narrow 
sectoral ambition:   
“...the dominant ‘idea’ of how society should run in European New Zealand, that 
is, majority New Zealand, has been...individualist.... This is not the rugged 
individualism of frontier myths.  It is a defensive individualism of getting for 
oneself a good and secure share of the fruits of the economy, keeping that share 
for oneself, and using the state to make life easy by removing the vicissitudes of 
economic life.”(14) 
 “New Zealanders have been by and large for more state spending on things they 
have seen themselves benefiting from: free education for their children, free 
medical care, subsidised housing and a pension at the end of the day.  But they 
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have been much less enthusiastic about social welfare spending: the unemployed 
have been frequently seen as layabouts who don’t want to work; solo mothers 
have been seen as either irresponsible in getting pregnant or having too lightly 
skipped their marriage.”(15) 
According to James, New Zealanders join groups to serve their individuals interests.  
The National Party has owed its success to its contact with groups such as the 
Manufacturers Federation, Federated Farmers, Chambers of Commerce and down into 
the less formal groups such as sports clubs and service organisations.  By contrast, 
Labour’s social links have always been weaker and more fragmented, as the minority 
ideology of collectivism has less legitimacy in New Zealand.  Its bases have been in 
Māoridom, in the collectivism of the women’s movement of the 1970’s and 80’s and in 
the union movement.11 
In Behind the Mirror Glass Bruce Jesson (1987) paints a different picture of the roots of 
New Zealand’s supposed egalitarianism. We have a class structure; it was, however, 
different to that which Wakefield had sought to export from England: “Social class in 
New Zealand has been stripped of the trivia of heredity and status and reduced to its 
barest essential: economics”(11). The rapidity of change in New Zealand during the 
1980's was due to delayed change.  The disintegration of the British Empire after World 
War II was not much discussed in New Zealand, and we carried on as if nothing had 
changed.  Jesson attributes this to an external focus: the baby boom generation protested 
against Apartheid in South Africa or the Vietnam War, they didn’t apply their critiques 
to New Zealand society itself: 
“Our political landscape was marked by the things that weren't there. There wasn't a 
politically conscious union movement.  There wasn't an intellectual tradition of critical 
enquiry.  There wasn't even an intelligent conservatism.”(9) 
These three commentators, taken together, paint a picture of a stable, contented and 
pragmatic society.  
To understand how this stability was achieved and sustained, we will use a model 
borrowed from management literature on strategic planning. Its premise is that an 
organisation that successfully achieves its mission and strategy must create this 
“congruence” among its organisational mission, leadership, critical tasks, human 
resources policies, business processes and organisational culture. The model presented 
in Figure 2, below appears in Tushman and O’Reilly (1997: 59). It shows how an 
organisation’s strategic choices may be distilled into a few critical tasks, which 
determine the rest of the structure.  Decisions must be made about the people required 
for those tasks, the formal organisational structure that will support them, and the 
organisational culture required for achieving them.  Finally, the component elements are 
tested for congruence: people with culture, people with processes, and processes with 
culture.  
                                                 
11  It could be argued that ideological collectivism in the unions has resided in the unions’ hierarchies, 
more so than in the rank and file. 
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The key roles of executive leadership (as opposed to simply “management”) are to 
make strategic choices, define the critical tasks, and create a strong organisational 
culture. 
Figure 2: A Congruence Model of Organisational Policy 
 
This model can be adapted to provide a way look for congruence in social and political 
change, and the integration of cultural policies, including broadcasting policy, within a 
strategic policy context.12 
The Figure 3, below, shows the policy congruence that emerged and became prevalent 
in New Zealand between World War II and the early 1980s.   
• Critical Tasks: Our critical task was to obtain social and economic security.  This 
included full employment and a welfare state for the labouring classes; regulated 
privileges and guaranteed returns to capital.  One could say this bred a “claimant” 
culture for both workers and capitalists.  
• Law and Economy: The economy was regulated to deliver security to workers via 
full employment policies, a labour market based on regulated wage rounds and 
arbitration and universal entitlements to welfare. It provided security to local and 
British investors via regulation that provided economic privileges and guaranteed 
returns.  A large public sector allowed the government to use fiscal policy to 
manage domestic demand. 
• People: Policies that affect reproduction, immigration, education and health 
determine who we are: our society’s “human resources”. Policies tended to favour 
the white, male over Maori and women.  The congruence fits with popular culture 
based in mainly male pursuits, and the assumption that the male is a wage earner in 
a primary industry or the protected manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
12  For the moment, we will ignore the question of how leadership is selected and mandated, which is 
central to understanding this as a political model. That issue will be addressed in Chapter 9. 
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• Culture:  Our cultural policies were monocultural and assimilationist.  We looked 
to Britain and Europe for our elite culture, for which government provided limited 
support. Popular culture was also imported, based on English sports that were male-
oriented and team-based.  Racing was an industry regulated for elite privilege.   
Figure 3: "Tight" congruence in Post-war policy 
 
Our broadcasting system was well integrated with this model. We had a monopolistic, 
monocultural, state-owned broadcasting industry, providing a steady fare of either 
British, or BBC-styled, television and radio programming.  Radio New Zealand saw its 
mission as being to bring high culture from the outside world to lift our aesthetic 
standards. The license fee was used to ensure universal coverage, in keeping with Colin 
James’ view of New Zealanders’ characteristic selfish egalitarianism. As Bruce Jesson 
noted, it generally provided little place for informed social and political debate.  It is 
reasonable to claim that significant “Spiral of Silence” could be observed in New 
Zealand during this era. 
One can see that there was a tight congruence between the elements of this policy 
model; each part reinforced the others. The critical tasks aligned well with the strategic 
vision, and the elements of policy fitted together in a mutually reinforcing manner. It 
was safe, secure, and monotonous.  The very tightness of the model may be an 
Critical 
Tasks 
People Culture 
Law & 
Economy
 Social and economic security, based on 
exporting primary produce to UK. 
Vision
 British colony  
 White, male 
 Maori/female as “other” 
 2.25 children – universal family 
benefit
 Egalitarian and Conformist  
 Anti-intellectual 
 Monocultural and Assimilationist   
 Mixed public/private sector economy 
 Subsidies for agricultural producers 
 Tariffs/protectionism for manufacturing
Leadership: 
 Authoritarian,  
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explanatory factor in New Zealand’s inability to adapt or change when change was 
required.  
Forces for Change 
The source of wealth on which New Zealand’s security was founded was eroded by 
Europe’s into the EEC, the OPEC oil shocks, and the period of global stagflation that 
occurred as America financed the Vietnam War with budget deficits.  The economy had 
to diversify, which put pressure on the domestic economy and the mechanisms that 
regulated it (Easton, 1994b).  Social movements in the 1970s—feminism and Maori 
activism especially—threatened the white male monoculture.  In broadcasting, Radio 
Hauraki represented the challenge of a younger generation and a new spirit of ant-
authoritarianism and private enterprise. 
In the years up to 1987 the government, under Sir Robert Muldoon’s leadership, sought 
to resist or contain the forces for social change and keep the congruent model intact. 
Meanwhile the economy was changing around him, and with it, power relations within 
business the elite: 
“The National government between 1975 and 1984 represented a political economy that was 
becoming outmoded.  Maintenance of its power base required the support of an élite whose 
significance was diminishing with the changing economic structure, most notably pastoral 
farmers and associated rural and commercial interests.” (Easton 1994b: 79) 
This resistance to economic change was characterised by and the 1984-86 wage and 
price freeze, and to social change by the events surrounding the 1981 Springbok tour. 
According to Jesson (1989), social liberals joined the Labour Party in droves, during the 
lead up to the 1984 election, specifically to unseat Sir Robert Muldoon.  The social 
groups of which this cohort was comprised—the women’s lobby, Māori, unions and 
gays had little in common. They were informed by an emotional moralism and a strong 
sense of social justice, but were essentially apolitical and unable to participate 
intelligently in economic debate.13  
The Labour government came to power with a sense of urgency, and in the midst of a 
currency crisis.  The Treasury’s post-election briefing to the government, titled 
Economic Management (1984) was a blueprint for wide-ranging change, which would 
destroy the familiar institutions of the existing order. Although Jesson was scathing 
about the free-market philosophy embodied in Treasury’s advice, he acknowledged that 
the prevailing economic conditions lent considerable power to arguments is favour of 
free-market policies: 
“The strongest arguments for the free-market policies are actually the negative ones.  We 
couldn’t continue subsidising agriculture and forestry, protecting inefficient industries, 
maintaining an unrealistic exchange rate.  We couldn’t run up enormous overseas debts to 
maintain our traditional way of life.  We couldn’t continue with policies of ad hoc 
interventions.  Our economy had to be reconstructed, and New Zealand had to 
change.”(Jesson, 1987: 6) 
                                                 
13  Jesson may be implying that these members of the Labour Party were uninformed by a coherent 
political theory, such as Marxism. 
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For Jesson, periods of economic and social reform in New Zealand were historically 
characterised by conflict between reforming governments and the incumbent social and 
business elite.  Out of these phases of conflict, new economic development and growth 
had occurred.  The reforms of the 1980’s were different, as business moved in unison 
with government. 
Colin James (1986) presented the revolution as driven largely by the events of 
demographic, historical and economic cycles. James proposes that change in New 
Zealand society occurs every second generation, and at a time when the social status 
quo is experiencing social and economic tensions.  This leads to the emergence of a “big 
change generation” which wields influence as it comes into its late 30’s - mid 40’s: 
“Michael Moore, socialist Cabinet minister, and Michael Fay, free-enterprise merchant 
banker, have enormously different ideologies.  But they get on famously together.  They like 
each other’s enthusiasm and delight in new ideas.  Rob Campbell, socialist union leader and 
Labour Party executive member, and Ron Brierley, international investment capitalist, 
gravitate naturally towards each other in a room, all smiles and animated conversation.  All 
four are part of a revolution....  It is not the policy content of Rogernomics that is the 
revolution.  It is the sharp change of attitude it reflects, represents and stimulates.” (165) 
Jesson takes a less benign view of these relationships, noting that soon after the 1984 
election power shifted, within the government “…to a small group of hard-line right-
wingers in Treasury, the Reserve bank, business and some university departments.  In a 
country as small and claustrophobic as New Zealand it is easy for a network of contacts 
to develop and for a common purpose to form” (10).  That common purpose was built 
around a philosophy of free-market reform, which he calls “…the philosophy of 
acquisitive individualism, the belief that the moving force in society is or should be self-
interest.”(120)  
In 1989, Professor Richard Mulgan gave a public lecture at Auckland University.14  His 
topic was the way in which the1984 Labour Government married the social liberalism 
of its party members to the neo-liberal theory of the free market. Labour’s social-liberal 
emphasis on individual rights was expressed in policies such as homosexual law reform.  
It captured the women’s vote on issues such as health and women’s rights against the 
power of the medical establishment.  The rhetoric of devolution appealed to Māori.  The 
economic-liberal theory of the free market promised economic growth and the creation 
of greater wealth for all to share.  The enduring image of Labour’s promise in those 
years is the promise that it could deliver both equity and efficiency: social autonomy 
and economic security, nurtured at the breast of capitalism.  Mulgan’s lecture also noted 
the curious lack of an overarching vision in the reforms: 
“..if one looks back to Seddon and Savage one sees they articulated, in however general and 
idealistic a form, a vision of where their reforms were leading.  When one looks to the 
present government, however, and to those who support its programme, one usually searches 
in vain for their vision of who we are or where we are going.”  
                                                 
14  The lecture was titled “The New Radicalism”, reported in the NZ Herald, as “Socialism lure 
dimmed by rival from right”; 8 June 1989, pg 2.  Professor Mulgan kindly supplied the author with a 
copy of his speech notes. 
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The new model of policy presented in Figure 4 demonstrates the comprehensive nature 
of the transformation, when compared with the previous policy framework presented in 
Figure 3.  The vision of a “neutral state” represents the deliberate absence of political or 
social leadership.  
Figure 4: Labour's Vision and Policy, 1984-1990 
The pursuit of economic efficiency dominated the agenda, as did the critical task of 
addressing the Government deficit by introducing widespread microeconomic reform 
and implementing irreversible change. To a lesser extent, Labour’s social liberals 
introduced policies that provided greater rights for Māori, women and other groups such 
as homosexuals.   
While social liberal policies changed the social and political position of Maori and 
women, these benefits accrued predominantly to the upper and middle classes.  
Microeconomic reform devastated the lives of working class Māori, who were thrown 
out of work in thousands as jobs were stripped out of protected industries and inefficient 
state-owned enterprises. Targeted entitlements reduced women’s access to childcare and 
other services.  Women also suffered job losses and reduction in household income as 
lower skilled jobs were stripped out of the economy.  
Immigration policy did not change significantly under Labour, but subsequently under 
National was altered in favour of immigrants able to import capital. Wealth, rather than 
skill, education or ethnicity, became the primary criterion for citizenship. 
Critical 
Tasks 
People Culture 
Law & 
Economy
 Resile from pre-1984 policy settings 
 Implement irreversible change 
Vision
 Economic Efficiency  
 Asian immigration (to import 
capital) 
 User pays for education and
 Individualism, competitiveness 
 Commercialised media, sport, 
corporate sponsorship. 
 Microeconomic reform (Remove tariffs / deregulate) 
 Devolution of economic power 
Leadership: 
 Authoritarian,  
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The cultural picture became confused, as conflicting images of New Zealand society 
were promoted by different elite segments.  The Government promoted biculturalism, 
and to a lesser extent multiculturalism, which was picked up and promoted by the 
churches, teachers and other traditionally social liberal groupings. The media, especially 
the business press, promoted an image of competitive individualism, and the pursuit of 
self-interest as a social virtue.  The corporate world gave us sponsorship and advertising 
appeared all over the All Blacks and virtually anything else that moved.  
The model established under Labour does not require significant modification to 
represent the years 1990 to 1999.  The National government from 1990 to 1993, 
removed social equity from the agenda and focused almost exclusively on continuing 
the drive for economic efficiency.  Since the introduction of MMP, National’s coalition 
partners have reintroduced other concerns to the policy agenda, but these have tended to 
be issue-specific and marginal.  There is no sense that the coalition is bound together by 
an overarching or common vision for New Zealand society. 
Intimacy and Dictatorship  
In order to introduce rapid and irreversible microeconomic reform, the Cabinet – 
particularly members of Labour’s Cabinet Policy Committee – dominated the Caucus 
and largely ignored the desires and protests of the Labour Party rank and file. To 
understand how the changes were introduced, it is necessary to understand some 
characteristics of New Zealand’s political environment.  
Much has been written about the “intimate” nature of politics in New Zealand.  Paul 
Harris (1995) identifies 14 separate articles or books in which this idea of political 
intimacy has appeared. He is critical of the notion that this idea of political intimacy 
refers to a close relationship between citizens and their elected representatives.  He 
does, however, propose that: 
“…a small polity may give rise to an intimate politics at another level.  If a small country is 
likely to have a small political elite, it may be likely that the relationships within this elite 
will exhibit intimacy, whether or not intimacy also exists in citizen-representative 
relationships.  Evidence pointing to an intimate political elite might include its size, social 
composition, ideological coherence, the social networks that exist within it, and its ability 
and willingness to act in a unified way on various issues.”(9) 
The key to understanding the notion of intimacy in New Zealand politics, and how that 
intimacy affects the political process, is entailed in what Mulgan (1992a) refers to as 
New Zealand’s “Elective Dictatorship”. The term dictatorship, when used to condemn, 
is levelled at governments that “…are unlimited in their power.  Like the dictators of 
old, they are above the law and the constitution, free to act at will or according to 
whim” (513). While this is not the actual case in New Zealand, our constitutional 
arrangements lend themselves to the domination of Parliament by the Government, of 
Government by Cabinet, and in some eras, of the Cabinet by a single individual or a 
small group of cabinet ministers (Palmer, 1987). 
The Cabinet, as the source of executive power and controller of the legislative 
programme, is the source of power in the New Zealand system.  Without the legal or 
structural restraints of a written constitution, an entrenched Bill of Rights, or an upper 
house, the primary restraint on the power of cabinet is political influence.  This may 
take the form of a concern for public opinion or the direct influence of other political 
parties—especially in a coalition government.  
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If the government has a clear majority in Parliament and a strong cabinet, then one of 
these restraints is removed.  If it shows little regard for public opinion, and acts to 
implement its programme without consultation and persuasion, then it may be deemed 
to be acting as a dictatorship. Mulgan (1992b) claims this is how the 1984-1990 Labour 
Governments and the subsequent National Government acted: 
“Public opposition, expressed through traditional political channels, such as interest groups 
or party rank and file, is treated with disdain….  (Jim Bolger and his colleagues) like Labour 
before them, have allowed themselves to accept a view of politics which treats such disdain 
not as dishonest but as positively courageous and public-spirited.          
 “According to this view, government is a complex, serious business which must be 
entrusted to the public policy elite, to ministers and their expert advisers.  These decision-
makers must not be deflected by ‘political’ influences from the wider public or by obviously 
foolish commitments made on the hustings.  Such ideas permeate the corridors of power and 
the businessmen’s clubs.  They are the political theory which went with Rogernomics—
‘Rogerpolitics’.”(16) 
Atkinson (1989) claims there was a shift away from the intimacy of pre-reform politics, 
represented by National’s close connection to its constituencies through service groups 
and clubs, toward a more professional style of political mediation. This new style 
employed survey research companies to gauge public response to policy initiatives and 
public relations consultants to market policies appropriately. Atkinson claims the 
“mediation” between government and governed thus became remoter, and less 
democratic, than it had been. 
The intimacy among a small elite persisted, however. Goldfinch (1998) undertook a 
survey of business and political leaders thought to be likely to influence economic 
policymaking.  They were asked to nominate individuals thought to be influential in a 
number of economic policy decisions during 1984-93.  The study identifies a number of 
key policy initiatives and the individuals most closely associated with them from 
Parliament, the public service and private enterprise.  The group is surprisingly small, 
and Goldfinch attributes this to the smallness of New Zealand society and the simplicity 
of its political institutions: 
“…the key to understanding the New Zealand experience is to see economic policy-making 
dominated by a small number of key members of institutional elites largely from the 
Treasury, Cabinet, the Reserve Bank and the Business Roundtable.” (178) 
These individuals are identified in Goldfinch’s study, along with the specific policy 
initiatives they were influential in implementing.  The final table in the article is 
reproduced below, with the names of public officials highlighted. The table highlights 
the number of government officials who were deemed by their peers to have been 
influential in designing and implementing key reforms. Of the 30 individuals named, 16 
were public officials, 11 were politicians, and the remaining 3 were from the private 
sector.15 
                                                 
 
15  Note that among the most influential of the officials is Pat Duignan, who played a significant part in 
the broadcasting reforms.  According to Cocker (1996), Duignan was “…credited by (Doug) 
Andrew as being the co-author of the 1984 Treasury document for the incoming Labour government 
entitled Economic Management.”(183) He later worked on Treasury’s submission to the RCBRT, 
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Figure 5 : Officials Influential in 1980's policy reform 
2 Decisions 3 Decisions 4 Decisions 5 Decisions 6+
Birch Andrew Duignan Caygill Kerr
Bolger De Cleene Trotter Deane Scott
Cameron Fancy Wilkinson Douglas
Chetwin Gibbs Lange
Jones McKenzie Myers
Galvin Richardson Palmer
Marshall Prebble
Martin
Rodger, Stan
Russell
Stockdill
Zohrab
Reproduced from Goldfinch (1990). Public servants have been highlighted.
PERSONS WITH INFLUENCE OVER SELECTED ECONOMIC POLICY 
DECISIONS 1984-93
 
How was it possible that New Zealand could have such an intimate, elite “dictatorship”?  
According to Mulgan (1992a), the term “dictatorship” has not always been used 
pejoratively: 
“Dictatorship, of course, was once an honourable calling.  The original dictators of the early 
Roman Republic were usually elder statesmen or generals called on to save the state in a 
time of military or constitutional crisis.  They held unlimited power subject to no appeal or 
veto, but the office was temporary, often lasting no more than half a year.” (513)  
New Zealanders’ acceptance of a benign authoritarianism is reflected in Bob Gregory’s 
(1979) notion of an “overhead democracy”: 
“A new era of social unity was to be born out of the bitterness and conflict of the depression; 
Savage, the Minister in Charge of Broadcasting, was also an immensely popular Prime 
Minister, something of a political messiah who, it could be seen, was rightfully using radio 
to point his many followers in the direction of the promised land.  Radio was thus 
instrumental in a New Zealand system of ‘overhead democracy’.  Far from this being a 
sinister use of an important public utility, it was —in terms of the public mood of the time—
an integral element in a revitalised crusade of state-led nation-building.” (47) 
Thus, dictatorship may not be perceived by the public to be necessarily bad, if it 
represents leadership around a core set of social values.  It could be argued that New 
Zealand’s elective dictatorship enjoyed exactly this sort of popular support, or at least 
acquiescence, from Savage’s era until Muldoon’s.  This may also help explain the ease 
                                                                                                                                               
and was also a member of the Rennie Committee, which planned the corporatisation of the 
Broadcasting Corporation. 
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with which New Zealand abandoned its upper house of Parliament in 1950, and the 
failure of the political system to evolve other checks and balances on executive power. 
Summary  
The congruence among New Zealand’s strategy, critical tasks and policy settings in the 
post-war years led it to be regarded as one of the most satisfied, well-ordered countries 
in the world. New Zealanders’ faith in their political leadership perhaps explained the 
erosion of a truly democratic polity and the emergence of an elective dictatorship.  The 
tight congruence of policy and an elective dictatorship meant New Zealand was slow to 
implement economic change, when external forces required it, or respond to social 
change emerging from within. 
When the congruent model finally came under too much pressure to resist change, the 
lack of checks and balances, and the way an “intimate” elite can wield enormous power 
in New Zealand policy environment, were critically important elements to the reform 
process.  
It is arguable that New Zealand’s political traditions and institutions are ill-suited to the 
challenges of leading an increasingly diverse economy, a multicultural society and a 
parliament elected by proportional representation. Perhaps this also explains why the 
post-reform policy framework reflects the emptiness of vision that lies at the heart of the 
‘neutral state’ concept. 
 
 
 
 
   
 32
Chapter 5 Broadcasting Policy 
This chapter outlines some of New Zealand’s broadcasting institutions immediately 
prior to deregulation, including the Broadcasting Tribunal (especially in regard to the 
third television channel warrant hearings) and the Royal Commission on Broadcasting 
and Related Telecommunications (RCBRT).  
We then explore events that played an important part in creating the new broadcasting 
policy framework, including the process that saw the RCBRT report dismissed in favour 
of the policy outlined in Treasury’s submission. 
The BCNZ 
The BCNZ has emerged out of the NZBC, and before that the NZBS – which had been 
a full government department under Ministerial control (Gregory, 1985).  In the mid-
eighties the BCNZ was a relatively independent Corporation, established under the 
Broadcasting Act 1979, although it clearly displayed vestiges of its previous 
incarnations. 
 
The Broadcasting Tribunal 
The movement away from monopolistic state broadcasting began when Radio Hauraki 
commenced broadcasting from a boat outside the territorial limit.  Unable to resist the 
pressure for private commercial radio, the government eventually introduced the 
Broadcasting Act 1976, which opened up the industry to limited private competition. 
Applicants for broadcasting licenses had to appear before the Broadcasting Tribunal and 
plead a case that, among other things:  
• there was a public need for their proposed service, 16 and 
• that the service would be financially viable.17  
After a warrant had been granted, a radio station could not easily change its 
programming to meet changing audience needs.  If it had originally proposed a talkback 
                                                 
16  Section 80 provided for the Tribunal to have regard to “(a) The extent to which the proposed service 
is desirable in the public interest:… (b) the needs of New Zealand or the locality or localities 
proposed to be served, in respect of broadcasting services:… (h) the requirement that frequencies be 
best utilised in the public interest:” 
17  Section 80 (b) stated that “[in considering any application for a warrant, the Tribunal shall have 
regard to] ..the economic effect which the establishment of the station... is likely to have in respect 
of broadcasting stations already in operation.” Section 80 (c) makes similar provisions for the BCNZ 
specifically. 
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format, or a music format, or a programme to serve a particular age group, for instance, 
it had to apply to the Broadcasting Tribunal for permission to change its programming. 
The economic role of regulatory agencies is theorised in Owen and Braeutigam’s (1987) 
The Regulation Game. It makes an interesting and useful basis for analysing the role of 
the Broadcasting Tribunal. It is generally assumed that a regulatory agency fulfils a role 
as an “agent” of the public.  However, a regulatory agency may also act in the interests 
of the industry it regulates.  This is sometimes described as industry “capture”, of which 
there are two varieties: In the first, agencies are established to guard the public interest, 
but become the captured by the industry they regulate.  In the second, an agency is 
created explicitly to serve as a cartel manager for the industry. 
It could be argued that the Broadcasting Tribunal fulfilled the role of ‘cartel manager’, 
by restricting entry into the market, ensuring incumbent broadcasters were faced with 
minimal competition and could produce monopoly “rents”. However, the roles of public 
agent and cartel manager appeared to entail a quid pro quo.  The Tribunal also protected 
the public interest by imposing conditions on broadcasters’, compelling them to provide 
particular programme elements such as local news. Thus, the Tribunal effectively 
guaranteed broadcasters’ “economic rents” and captured a portion of them for the 
audience’s benefit. 
The Tribunal system produced a mix of programming deemed to suit the public’s needs, 
and maintained the radio industry (which it predominantly regulated, TVNZ being 
relatively independent), in a state of profitability.  Under this regime, however, some 
audiences weren’t served at all.  Māori, for instance, had virtually no access to Maori 
language radio apart from minor contributions on National Radio.   
The Tribunal also heard complaints about broadcasts, and one of the most powerful 
tools at the its disposal for disciplining errant broadcasters was its ability to impose 
conditions on their warrants.18   
The Third Television Channel Hearings 
Flaws in the Tribunal system began to emerge during the Third Television Channel 
hearings. In 1983 the Minister of Broadcasting, Dr Ian Shearer, instructed the Tribunal 
to allocate four regional television warrants and a separate programme warrant for a 
single news and current affairs service. The hearings commenced in 1985, and a 
decision was made in favour of TV3 in August 1987, but not formalised until 
September 1988, following a High Court judicial review.  While all this was going on, 
TVNZ was preparing to face competition; restructuring and entering into long-term 
                                                 
18  A trawl through the first six years of Tribunal decisions provides a potted history of New Zealand 
politics: there are complaints about programmes on abortion law reform, overstayers, nudists, the 
Springbok Tour, homosexual law reform. An indefatigable Waikato resident made numerous 
complaints, holding 1XW and TVNZ to account for alcohol and cigarette advertising by subterfuge 
(NZ Gazette, 1977 – 83). 
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programme purchasing deals that would effectively restrict the range of programming 
available to TV3.19   
Again, Owen and Braeutigam’s book The Regulation Game (1978) provides useful 
insights: 
• Administrative processes are similar to those governing courts of law.  All parties 
must be accorded due process, and there are ample opportunities for appeal within 
the agency and through the courts.   
• The laudable desire for procedural fairness creates opportunities for any party to 
impose delays and expenses on other parties.   
• Under these circumstances  “Strategic use of the administrative process is at least as 
important to many industries as the traditional decision variables: prices, entry and 
innovation.”(2)  
The authors note that they “…have chosen to write this as a “how to” manual.”(1) The 
section titled Strategic Use of Litigation is particularly instructive: 
“Litigation costs are usually small compared to the stakes in a regulatory decision for an 
established firm or industry.  On the other hand they are likely to be proportionally more 
important to new firms, prospective entrants, and public interest advocates…. The delay 
which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to undertake other measures to 
reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision…. The agency cannot resist the 
effort to delay through exhaustion of process because this would be grounds for reversal on 
appeal to the courts.”(4-5) 
The various players in the hearings, particularly the BCNZ, might well have read the 
book and taken these instructions to heart. Marcia Russell, TV3’s head of news and 
current affairs, writing in the Sunday Star, reported the outcomes: 
“It would take more than two years before the decision was made.  The hearings turned into 
a marathon of legal and technical detail and adversarial proceedings.  The ensuing paper war 
would have stripped a rainforest; the tedium was soul destroying; the legal bills incurred by 
the contenders would have built another Avalon.20  
 “…the BCNZ withdrew its financial support from the Aotearoa Broadcasting Trust, a 
consortium of Maori interests … and decided to oppose the issue of warrants. 
 “The ensuing barney took six months.  It involved the High Court (which upheld the 
Tribunal’s view that as a non-contender and latecomer to the proceedings, the BCNZ had 
forsaken its rights to present evidence) and the Court of Appeal which reversed the decision.  
The state corporation was permitted to present its case that no warrants be issued while the 
contenders sat on their hands and paid the mounting legal bills.  
 “It was a breathtakingly cynical tactic.  And all the more astonishing for being taken by 
a State corporation which, by statute, was obliged to ‘be mindful of government policy’.” 
(Russell, 1990)  
                                                 
19  It wasn’t until the channel was sold to CanWest, a Canadian television operator with global 
aspirations and established programme purchasing arrangements in the North American market, that 
it overcame this disadvantage. 
20  Literally speaking, the television network centre in Lower Hutt, since sold.  
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The third channel, in a regulated environment, would have been a license to print 
money.  It attracted powerful business and media interests who were not pleased with 
the slow progress through the Tribunal or the BCNZ’s game-playing.  While the third 
television channel hearings were going on, the Tribunal’s other work mounted up.  By 
1988 it had a backlog of 10 applications for radio warrants in Auckland alone.21   The 
whole debacle provided a powerful impetus for the demise of the Tribunal system. 
The Royal Commission 
The Labour Party had promised a Royal Commission on broadcasting in the run-up to 
the 1984 election. One of the first acts of the incoming Government was to establish the 
RCBRT, by vice-regal warrant dated 4 February 1985.  Its establishment at this early 
stage, before the nature and direction of the Labour Government’s reforms were 
established, proved to be an important factor in the way its recommendations were later 
treated. 
The Royal Commission could be seen as an example of the democratic or “muddling 
through” style of policy-making.  This is quite explicit in the introduction to the 
Commission’s (1986) Report:  
“There are two major ways in which a Commission may act.  It can launch the process of 
major change particularly where a situational problem has become rigid or intractable.  Or it 
can make many and connected recommendations for the repair and better conduct of a 
situation which is under strain and faces change for other reasons to which it requires to 
adapt quickly on the basis of familiar institutions.”  
 “It is hoped that as a Commission our recommendations will be recognised as the 
second kind.”(17) 
What was missing from the Commission’s approach was a clearly and explicitly stated 
framework or overall philosophy.  The preamble to the Terms of Reference did state 
that the Commission should report on: 
“…what changes are necessary or desirable to use in an economically efficient manner those 
advances in technology which fit New Zealand’s circumstances and resources, to widen the 
choice, and improve the quality, of programmes, to secure independence, depth, and 
impartiality in news and current affairs programmes, and to reflect New Zealand’s cultural 
and social variety so that the structure and resources of broadcasting may be better organised 
to serve all New Zealanders…” (8) 
And indeed, the RCBRT’s report is an attempt to respond to this exhortation.  However, 
it did not grasp the opportunity to clarify and reinforce the meaning of this guiding 
statement, nor to directly relate its plethora of individual recommendations to it and so 
produce a more coherent and compelling set of findings.  On the other hand, the 
Commission’s Terms of Reference left little scope for a more comprehensive or 
strategic approach: they contained nine clauses with forty-one sub-clauses, mostly on 
matters specific to the existing broadcasting policy framework.  Within the confines of 
these Terms of Reference, the Commission was more or less bound to only consider a 
                                                 
21  “Backlog led to Radio Decision”  NZ Herald, 21 May, 1988: 5 
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raft of relatively minor adjustments to the existing system, rather than a wholesale 
review.   
This was unfortunate; by the time the RCBRT was ready to receive submissions in July 
1985, the structural economic reforms introduced by the Labour Government had 
gained considerable momentum.  The thrust toward deregulation and of the economy 
and commercialisation of SOEs was reflected in Treasury’s submission, which was 
presented in September that year.  The Treasury submission contained three major 
proposals: 
1. That the radio frequency spectrum should be allocated by a market mechanism, 
rather than by regulatory agency. 
2. That the government’s social and cultural objectives in broadcasting should be 
achieved by government agencies contracting directly with broadcasters. 
3. That the BCNZ should not be obliged to fulfil non-commercial objectives, and 
should have no advantage or disadvantage relative to private sector broadcasters 
The RCBRT showed some interest in the first of these proposals, and suggested that it 
be grafted on to the role of the Broadcasting Tribunal.  Competitive tendering would 
only take place after the Tribunal had decided on the nature of the service to be 
provided and the appropriateness of the potential tenderers (257-258).   It dismissed the 
second proposal, on the grounds that it would “…represent a radical step back towards 
direct government control of a sector of broadcast programming more complete than 
anything in our past”(104).22 The Commission was sympathetic toward the third 
proposal, saying it understood “…Treasury’s desire to clarify, define and differentiate 
the public service from the commercial side of television” (104).  However, it decided 
that to do this would be an attempt to “…unbundle the unbundleable…” (105).  To the 
Commission, the social objectives of broadcasting policy, as set out in the preamble to 
the Commission’s Terms of Reference, were inseparable from the BCNZ’s social 
objectives.  The issues of funding and commercial transparency entered the picture only 
as a means to improve the efficiency and accountability of the Corporation.   
Finally, the Commission explicitly rejected the concept – which crucially underpinned 
the Treasury proposal – that a free commercial market would naturally provide for these 
objectives, in response to consumer demand (254).23 
It was clear that the RCBRT was not well prepared to hear an in-depth discussion of the 
application of economic theory to broadcasting, saying “…felt it was unable to make 
economic recommendations….  Instead (it) concentrated on a structure which was more 
concerned with protecting the political integrity of the public broadcasting system in 
terms of the existing arrangements” (Easton, 1990: 286).  Although the Treasury 
submission was not well received by the RCBRT, and officials apparently had a torrid 
                                                 
22  However, government departments do now pursue social policy objectives, such as road safety 
campaigns, by advertising on radio and television.  The concept of “social marketing” has recently 
emerged to support this type of activity (Kotler and Roberto, 1989; Andreasen, 1995). 
23  The RCBRT’s rejection is quoted in the conclusions to Chapter 6. 
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time under cross-examination (Easton, 1990), it was later to become the basis of New 
Zealand’s broadcasting policy framework. As Cocker noted:  
“Although in Andrew’s view the submission ‘needed considerable more work done on it’, it 
is notable that nearly all the conclusions of the Treasury case were to become key 
components of the legislation reforming broadcasting four years later.” (1996: 167)24 
One commissioner, Laurie Cameron, wrote an Addendum to the main report, which 
appeared to be in agreement with the thrust of the Treasury argument. In this, he: 
• Agreed with the idea of frequency allocation by competitive tendering. 
• Agreed that the BCNZ’s commercial and non-commercial activities should be 
separated, but not with the idea of making the BCNZ wholly commercial. Instead, 
he proposed that “…serious consideration should be given to the option of 
dedicating one television channel solely to public service television broadcasting” 
(453). 
• Proposed that the BCNZ’s “…non-commercial functions should be determined by a 
separate body—trustee—whose role is to apply the available funds to public service 
broadcasting”(453).  In this respect, he was promoting the idea of greater 
transparency and accountability in the use of the public broadcasting fee. 
This did not amount to full support for the fundamental assumptions presented in the 
Treasury submission, particularly those which proposed that the market would provide 
the bulk of socially desirable outcomes, while the government would fund explicit 
social objectives.   
Cameron recalls that he wrote the addendum in one night, starting at 6 p.m. and 
working until 8:15 the next morning. 25 He had discovered that, although he had written 
extensive notes for the researchers drafting the report, the Commission was not 
intending to examine the economic issues raised by Treasury. The chairman of the 
Commission was, according to Brian Easton, “…concerned to keep the broadcasting 
system publicly accountable but out of the hands of the politicians.” (1987: 59)  
Cameron wrote to Brian Easton explained his reasons for writing the addendum: 
“My concern was really that, if the Commission’s report did not, at least, examine and 
discuss alternatives, other parties… would (do so) and, as a consequence, much of what is 
good in the overall Report would not be recognised.  
 “…I firmly believed it was the future as discussed by yourself and the Treasury 
officials, which would decide in the long term, the organisational and financial structures of 
broadcasting in New Zealand.  
 “…the limited time did not allow me to explain and express what I believed was 
essential to safeguard public service broadcasting which I feel is a democratic imperative in 
a society as complex as it is in New Zealand today.  
 “I also concluded that this democratic imperative could not be serviced by a commercial 
broadcasting system efficiently serving a marketing role in, what will be in the future, a 
                                                 
24  The internal quote is from an interview between Cocker and Doug Andrew at Treasury, on 14 
March, 1994. 
25  Telephone conversation, 8 June 1999. 
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highly commercial and unregulated competitive society.” (1987) 26  
 
Despite Cameron’s intentions, his worst fears were realised; the Royal Commission’s 
report was largely dismissed as irrelevant and officials even his addendum to justify the 
broadcasting reforms that were later implemented.27  As Cocker (1996) put it:  “The 
‘Cameron Addendum’ was to have political utility while the full report was condemned 
and ignored by the reforming politicians” (174) 
The Royal Commission process was lengthy, exhaustive, exhausting, expensive and 
ultimately irrelevant.  The Commission was established by warrant in February 1985 
and finally reported in September 1986, after obtaining an extension of time to complete 
its report.  It sat for 71 days, received 282 submissions and listened to the oral 
supportive evidence of 117 organisations and individuals.  The complete transcript 
totalled 9765 pages.  The final report was 518 pages, and contained 186 
recommendations.  The whole exercise cost close to a million dollars. Cocker (1996) 
claims that the process was “…perceived as the public’s long promised opportunity for 
input into the broadcasting policy process” (173).  However, in the end:  
“The Royal Commission’s report served only to encompass the concerns of the interested 
parties who had made their submissions to it and gave them the illusory comfort that the 
views would be heeded when policy was enacted.”(174) 
The sense of disillusionment that Cocker expresses arose because the RCBRT could not 
place its findings within the policy direction of the Government, which had emerged 
over its first year in office.  In particular, its Terms of Reference did not permit it to 
adequately address the Government’s policy in regard to SOEs, set out clearly for the 
first time in the Economic Statement of December 1985 (Easton, 1997: 22).  As a result, 
its policy proposals were almost totally ignored. 
Treasury Policy  
The broadcasting policy reforms that were implemented in 1988 owed little or nothing 
to the RCBRT’s report, and a great deal to the Treasury submission.  So much so, that 
Cocker was moved to state: 
“… there is clear and traceable policy-making by Treasury.  From its portals came the 
theoretical framework, the shaping of the theory into a blueprint for structural change and, 
with the enthusiastic support of key ministers and other elements of the public bureaucracy, 
the enactment of that plan into legislation.  This was achieved with the minimum of 
disputatious debate or any sign of ‘muddling through’.  It can be stated without equivocation 
that New Zealand’s broadcasting policy is Treasury policy.” (1996: 159) 
This statement could be taken to imply that officials were pursuing political agenda of 
their own, which would be a clear breach of constitutional conventions in respect of the 
                                                 
26  Brian Easton supplied the author with a copy of the letter, which Laurie Cameron kindly gave 
permission to quote from. 
27  In evidence before the High Court, in New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General 
(unreported) 
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public service.  It is therefore worth reviewing the events that took place between 
September 1986 and the establishment of the officials’ review of broadcasting, which 
began in March 1988. 
While the RCBRT hearings and the third television channel hearings were in progress, 
reform in the state sector was well underway. A major thrust of the public sector 
reforms was to remove policy advice functions from trading departments. The 
Broadcasting Act 1976 Act stipulated that the BCNZ should “…advise the Minister in 
respect of matters relating to Broadcasting”. In the mid-1980s it was not clear which, if 
any, government department or Ministry had authority to provide contestable advice on 
matters of broadcasting policy. 
The Post Office had a radio regulatory branch, which monitored the use of radio 
frequencies and allocated frequencies for purposes other than broadcasting (which were 
the Broadcasting Tribunal’s responsibility). As part of the restructuring of the Post 
Office, this regulatory function was moved to the Department of Trade and Industry, 
which also had responsibility for providing advice on telecommunications policy.  
These functions all came under the management of J.R.A. (Jim) Stevenson, as Assistant 
Secretary for Communications.28  At that time, the BCNZ owned a microwave 
transmission network, which (before the construction of a fibre-optic cable network), 
provided the only potential competition for Telecom’s long-distance toll call market.  
The Broadcasting Act stipulated that this could not be used for other purposes, and this 
created a problem for telecommunications deregulation. 
Stevenson wrote to Richard Prebble, shortly after he had been appointed Minister of 
Broadcasting in 1987, proposing that telecommunications and radio regulatory policy 
should be reviewed together, as the biggest bottleneck to telecommunications 
deregulation was the availability of radio spectrum for non-broadcast purposes.  He also 
proposed that Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) should do a 
report on broadcasting, which Prebble agreed to.  This report took the form of a letter, 
dated 17 September 1987, from Jim Stevenson (for the Dept of Trade and Industry), and 
M.D. Curran (for Treasury) to the Minister of Broadcasting and Minister of Finance.29  
The 7-page letter succinctly outlines a case and a programme for reform: 
“…There is pressure, as evidenced by the recent third channel hearings, for greater 
competition to be permitted in television broadcasting and pressure stemming from the 
cumbersome and questionable method of allocating television warrants…. There are 
pressures within BCNZ arising from the conflicting commercial and public interests of 
broadcasting, with associated financial difficulties.”   
 “These examples point to the need for an in depth review of Government intervention in 
the broadcasting and related communications sector.  The Royal Commission on 
Broadcasting… was charged with reviewing broadcasting policy in accordance with certain 
                                                 
28  Stevenson had  been Assistant Secretary for Business Competition, and was Chairperson of the 
Officials Committee on the Regulatory Environment of State-Owned Enterprises, which was 
established to strip out all the regulatory impediments to competition. It is noteworthy that 
Stevenson had previously headed the division of DTI that had managed, and later dismantled, the 
wage and price freeze created by the Economic Stabilisation Act. 
29  In an interview conducted in December 1998, Stevenson spoke of sending two letters to Prebble 
about this time.  Only one could be identified, however, and it is assumed that this is the second of 
the two. 
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terms of reference.  In practical terms the majority Commission report did not really address 
the pressures facing the broadcasting sector and largely confirmed the existing policies 
applying to broadcasting.”(1) 
“…The central aim of broadcasting policy should be to achieve the efficient use of 
broadcasting resources.  This is essentially an economic aim and may well need to be 
qualified by social equity and other social considerations, such as cultural, educational and 
other qualitative aims.” (2) 
“The BCNZ currently has conflicting commercial, non-commercial, regulatory and policy 
advice roles.  There is a clear need to separate these functions, as has been the case in the 
reform of State Owned Enterprises…”(5) 
The report pointed to DTI’s responsibilities for telecommunications and radio spectrum 
regulation, and noted that “Broadcasting policy should be part of a coherent 
communications policy.”(5) It also noted Treasury’s interest in the liberalisation of 
product markets and financial monitoring of the BCNZ, and proposed that the two 
departments undertake an officials’ review under DTI co-ordination.  The letter sets out 
a timetable for reform encompassing the establishment of a new Broadcasting Act, the 
restructuring of the BCNZ and changes to spectrum allocation regulations – all to be 
completed by 31 December 1988. 
Officials from DTI and Treasury met with Prebble a few days later, on 21 September 
1988.  According to a file note of the meeting, Prebble gave his approval for an 
Officials’ review of broadcasting, emphasising that “… he wanted to move quickly in 
this area.  He emphasised that he wanted a pragmatic, rather than academic approach to 
the review.”  Apparently there was some discussion on this point, as the note then 
mentions that “Mr Curran suggested that the review should be done on a first principles 
approach. While the Minister agreed that officials might want to do this, he reiterated 
that he wanted a pragmatic approach.”30   
This exchange ensured that the “in-depth review” envisaged by officials in the report 
would not occur.  It is unclear what Officials might have envisaged.  Certainly, we 
know from what happened subsequently what it would not involve: the economic 
analysis prepared by Treasury for the RCBRT would not be revisited, and the and the 
broad policy proposals which relied on that analysis would not be rigorously tested. 
Officials then moved quickly, as Prebble requested.  A draft report was sent to the 
Minister of Finance on 7 December 1987.  The agenda of a meeting between Prebble 
and Treasury officials on 28 January 1988 notes: “Officials intend completing final 
draft of Ministerial paper to (Cabinet Policy Committee) by 11 February. Takes into 
account BCNZ submission, views of Tribunal and interested parties.”   A letter from 
Treasury official Doug Andrew to the Minister of Finance, dated 22 February 1988, 
enclosed the final draft report.31  The letter notes “The final draft addresses satisfactorily 
almost all the issues which arose during the course of the review and were dealt with 
incompletely by the Royal Commission on Broadcasting and Related 
                                                 
30  The file note was obtained under the Official Information Act.  Treasury file ref: COMP 10/7/9. 
31  Treasury was unable to locate a copy of the report itself, or the earlier draft of 7 December 1988, to 
which the letter also refers. 
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Telecommunications.”  Apparently the role that was later to be taken on by the 
Broadcasting Commission (NZ on Air) was to be played by a trust with a board of 
trustees.  It notes that:  
“The specification of the Government’s social objectives in broadcasting are critical in 
determining the contract between the Government and the Board of Trustees….  In practice, 
the level of funding needed and the monitoring of the Trustees’ performance in the meeting 
of Government’s social objectives requires a clear view of these objectives.” (2) 
The letter also notes the supposed benefits of allocating broadcasting rights in a 
commercial market, and that work was already underway to investigate the means for 
doing so: 
“The Minister for State-Owned Enterprises has instructed the Department of Trade and 
Industry and Treasury to commission a study of the best means of allocating the radio 
spectrum to achieve efficiency.  The removal if (sic) economic restrictions on the best use of 
spectrum linked with a high rate of technical change should allow for a much more 
diversified broadcasting market, with stations targetting (sic) quite specific common-interest 
groups.” 
Finally, it raises the spectre of the BCNZ’s vested interest in maintaining the status quo: 
“The possibility of the Broadcasting Corporation pre-empting any decision on the future of 
the Corporation in a revised broadcasting environment has been highlighted by many of the 
individuals we consulted as part of the review.” 
Recommendations were made to the State Owned Enterprises cabinet subcommittee on 
29 March 1998, along with a supplementary memorandum from the BCNZ, which 
pointed out that the draft policy redefined, and constituted a major reduction in, 
government’s social service objectives in broadcasting.  Specifically, because: 
“(a) The minimum level of access to television and radio services has been reduced to one 
network in each medium; 
(b) There is no requirement for the provision of an accurate and impartial news service; 
(c)  There is no provision securing diversity of choice in the range of programmes offered 
by television or by radio. 
(d) There is no basic requirement for any service to be owned by and operated on behalf of 
the people of New Zealand.” 
The Government subsequently agreed to the recommendations in the Treasury report, in 
a Cabinet meeting of 18 April 1988 (CM 88/14/13), incorporating the BCNZ’s concerns 
into a list of “minimum public service objectives”.  The Cabinet directed officials to 
report to the Cabinet Policy Committee by 31 July 1988 on ways and means of 
implementing the recommendations it had accepted.  Following this decision, two 
Officials’ committees were formed:  
• The Steering Committee on Broadcasting, which reported in July 1988, on the 
restructuring of the BCNZ on state owned enterprise principles. 
• The Officials Co-ordinating Committee on Broadcasting, which reported in August 
1988, on the implementation of broadcasting policy reform. 
 42
Jim Stevenson was a member of the Rennie Committee, and chair of the Officials Co-
ordinating Committee.  
The Rennie Committee 
The Steering Committee on Broadcasting is known as the “Rennie” Committee, after its 
Chairman Heughan (Hugh) Rennie – then also Chairman of the BCNZ.  The report of 
the Rennie Committee recommended that: 
• BCNZ be replaced by two state owned enterprises: Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and 
Television New Zealand (TVNZ). 
• Radio New Zealand should establish a separate business unit to operate the non-
commercial services (Concert Programme and National Programme). 
• RNZ should have “…the freedom to buy, sell, franchise or establish joint venture 
radio stations”(iii).  Once a competitive environment was established, RNZ’s 
commercial stations could be privatised. 
• Separate arrangements should be made for Maori radio. 
• Certain strands of public service broadcasting should not be funded from the 
broadcasting fee, but by separate Parliamentary vote. The short wave service should 
be funded from Vote: Foreign Affairs and educational broadcasting should be 
funded by educational institutions.  
• Television New Zealand should place greater emphasis on outsourcing programmes, 
rather than producing them. 
• The Listener should be established as a separate business, jointly owned by RNZ 
and TVNZ. 
• The NZ Symphony Orchestra should be managed by an independent trust board and 
management structure. 
• The Broadcasting Services Division should be divided between RNZ and TVNZ.32 
This amounted to the commercialisation (per Easton, 1997) of the BCNZ.  The 
committee sought to separate the commercial activities from the social activities, and 
put in place arrangements that would allow the Government to purchase outputs that it 
deemed socially desirable from these and other suppliers.  This led, eventually, to the 
sale of Radio New Zealand’s commercial radio stations.33 However, the government 
retained ownership of Radio New Zealand’s non-commercial networks—Concert FM 
and the National Programme. 
The Officials’ Co-ordinating Committee 
Whereas the Rennie Committee worked on the plan for what was essentially an 
organisational restructuring of the BCNZ, the Officials’ Committee report attended to 
other matters, especially the establishment of the Broadcasting Commission (New 
Zealand on Air) and the Broadcasting Standards Authority.  In respect of these, it 
outlined the policy framework within which they would operate, and laid much of the 
                                                 
32  The TVNZ component was established as Broadcast Communications Limited (BCL). 
33  Following a series of landmark court cases, in which Māori attempted to prevent the sale.  
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groundwork for drafting the 1989 Broadcasting Act.  The report of the Officials’ 
Committee: 
• Commented at length, approvingly,  on the Rennie Committee’s proposals for 
restructuring the BCNZ 
• Recommended that special controls on overseas ownership were not required, 
especially as these would restrict the ability of broadcasters to exploit economies of 
scale (11).   
• Commented on the need for special provisions in the Commerce Act to restrict the 
aggregation of media ownership.  In this regard, it noted that: 
“The main concern about the aggregation of control in broadcasting is that this could have an 
impact on the editorial independence of the media and restrict programme diversity.  The 
general provisions of the Commerce Act which limit the ability to achieve or abuse a 
dominant position in an industry already apply to broadcasting.” (12) 
• Reinforced earlier statements by officials regarding the outcomes of competition, 
saying: “Additional competition should also serve to increase the editorial 
independence and diversity of the media.” (13) 
• Set out proposals for the implementation of a grant scheme for funding 
government’s social objectives in broadcasting, which eventually led to the 
establishment of New Zealand on Air. 
• Set out proposals to maintain standards of “public decency and behaviour in the 
broadcasting media.” This laid the foundation for establishing the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. 
These recommendations completed the arrangements necessary for the 
commercialisation of the BCNZ, while imposing only weak sanctions on broadcasters 
to prevent them from broadcasting indecent and undesirable material. 
The rules for purchasing outputs (other than advertising and promotions purchased by 
Government Departments) were subsequently set out in the Broadcasting Act 1989, 
under the functions of the Broadcasting Commission (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Output Purchasing in the Broadcasting Act 1989 
 
36. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION– 
The functions of the Commission are– 
(a) To reflect and develop New Zealand identity and culture by– 
(i) Promoting programmes about New Zealand and New Zealand interests; and 
(ii) Promoting Maori language and Maori culture; and 
(b)  To maintain and, where the Commission considers that it is appropriate, extend the 
coverage of television and sound radio broadcasting to New Zealand communities 
that would otherwise not receive a commercially viable signal; and 
(c)  To ensure that a range of broadcasts is available to provide for the interests of– 
(i) Women; and 
(ii) Children; and 
(iii) Persons with disabilities; and 
(iv) Minorities in the community including ethnic minorities; and 
(d)  To encourage the establishment and operation of archives of programmes that are 
likely to be of historical interest in New Zealand-- 
by making funds available, on such terms and conditions as the Commission 
thinks fit, for– 
(e)  Broadcasting; and 
(f)  The production of programmes to be broadcast; and 
(g)  The archiving of programmes. 
Conclusions 
It could be said that the RCBRT exemplified the “incrementalist” approach to policy-
making, and that the two Officials Committees, which designed and implemented the 
current policy framework, exemplified the technocratic or “rational-deductive” 
approach.  Cocker holds the RCBRT up as a virtuous process, despite its duration, 
expense and lack of a coherent overall framework.  He beleives the officials’ 
committees and the role played by “Treasury” officials were undemocratic and 
ideologically driven: 
“If Treasury power and influence generally fell short of the ‘capture’ of policy-making 
during the term of the Fourth labour Government, this was not the case with broadcasting….  
No other stream of advice was taken note of and the findings of the (RCBRT), which 
represented an opposing policy schema, were ignored.” (1996: 159) 
However, one might take a less baleful view of the officials’ role than Cocker does. 
Undoubtedly the Royal Commission was out of step with the broader policy directions 
of the Labour Government (through no fault of its own), and it was confined by a 
prescriptive Terms of Reference. Stevenson took the initiative to solve a problem that 
affected more than one sector of the economy, and moved to resolve the deadlock in 
broadcasting policy. He and other officials acted with determination and vigour to 
deliver the outcomes desired and mandated by the government within its broad 
economic strategy. Due process was followed, and Ministers made the key decisions. 
Jim Stevenson, in a personal interview, put the position this way:  
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“To say that officials drove it is true, but only in an environment of economic reform and 
fundamentals that didn’t suggest other alternatives were going to take us very far, very fast.  
The Royal Commission was built on a different basis.  We were now in the mid-to-late 
eighties when a lot of sister industries were changed radically…” 
It is a moot point whether the policy process was “bad”, and we might argue back and 
forth whether the role that officials played in the process was appropriate. What should 
concern us more, is whether the policy advice was sound and whether it has, or will, 
achieve desirable outcomes for New Zealand society.  
It is evident from this overview presented in this chapter that: 
• The current broadcasting policy framework was primarily based on advice contained 
in the Treasury submission to the RCBRT.  
• The submission was acknowledged by officials to have required further work, and 
the opportunity to develop it further was not forthcoming.  What is not clear, from 
the available evidence, is how strongly officials advised Prebble to undertake a more 
comprehensive review of broadcasting at their meeting in September 1987.  It is 
clear, however, that Prebble chose not to. 
• The policy advice presented in the Treasury submission has not been subjected to 
official scrutiny or review since the RCBRT hearings in 1986.  
The purpose of this thesis is to critically evaluate the advice contained in the Treasury 
submission to the RCBRT, focussing specifically on the economic analysis of 
broadcasting contained therein, which provided a justification for the institutional 
changes later embodied in the Broadcasting Act 1989 and the Radiocommunications 
Act 1990.  
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Chapter 6 Broadcasting Economics 
Introduction 
The Treasury submission to the RCBRT is divided into four sections:   
• Section I contains an introduction and a summary of conclusions.   
• Section II discusses the management of the radio frequency spectrum.  It proposes 
the abolition of the Broadcasting Tribunal, and the creation of a market mechanism 
for allocating the right to broadcast. 
• Section III discusses the “Economics of Broadcasting and Government 
Intervention”.  Its recommendations are set out in detail below. 
• Section IV discusses the ‘Role of the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand”.  It 
proposes that the BCNZ have as its primary objective, the most efficient use of its 
assets, the removal of its non-commercial objectives, the removal of privileges and 
advantages that it has over private sector competitors, and the abolition of the 
television licence fee. 
Sections II and IV of the Treasury submission make recommendations regarding the 
institutional structures that give effect to policy.  Section III makes recommendations 
regarding the type and nature of the broadcasting outputs that the government should 
either produce or encourage. This thesis focuses attention on the recommendations 
arising from Section III , which are reproduced in Figure 7 (Treasury, 1985: 2).  
The recommendations numbered ix and x provide support for the concepts outlined in 
Section II, regarding the sale of broadcasting rights.  The recommendations numbered 
xi and xii provide support for the recommendations made in Section IV, regarding the 
corporatisation of the BCNZ.  Therefore it appears that Section III has been structured 
to support the creation of institutional structures. Our purpose here is not to review the 
institutional structures.  Rather, it is to explore and evaluate the concepts contained in 
the supporting theoretical material. 
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Figure 7: Treasury's Recommendations 
xvii The achievement of social objectives by means of explicit contracts with broadcasters 
could be handled by a variety of institutional structures including the QE II Arts Council
xvi If the government or community groups considered that the composition or level of outputs 
of the broadcasting industry was not socially optimal, then the most effective and efficient 
intervention would be to directly contract with broadcasters to alter outputs in the desired 
direction be it wider coverage, more cultural programming, no advertising or more local 
content. 
xv The development of industry along these lines will tend to result in a more efficient pattern 
of resource use and consumption than the existing or alternative developments because it 
will be based more directly on consumer preferences and opportunity costs. 
xiv Open competitive access to the radio spectrum will tend to promote the development of 
efficient broadcasting systems funded by advertising, pay or club methods, and of efficient 
non-broadcasting systems such as cable TV.  It can be expected that most, if not all of 
these systems will tend to emerge in an open competitive system. 
Broadcasting Outputs 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the theories and ideas that led to Treasury’s first conclusion: 
that open competition in broadcasting will produce the optimal amount of diversity in 
programming.  We will then review the way that Treasury used these theories in its 
submission.  Finally, we will outline an extension to the existing body of theory, which 
reaches very different conclusions about competition and programme diversity. 
Modelling Competition 
We start with a simple example from economic theory, which demonstrates some key 
ideas about broadcasting and competition.  It also demonstrates, for non-economists, the 
power and limitations of economic theory as a form of argument. 
The subsequent sections of the chapter elaborate this idea, describe how it has evolved 
over time as an academic argument about broadcasting policy and show how Treasury 
used the model in its submission to the RCBRT. 
Stability in Competition 
We will begin with Hotelling’s article on “Stability in Competition” (1929).  He begins 
with the simple premise that customers for a business are uniformly distributed along a 
line such as a “…main street in a town or a transcontinental railway.” (45).  Two 
retailers, A and B, have established businesses at either end of the line.  They both 
supply the same goods, at the same price, so the only competitive variable is the cost 
that consumers pay—in money or convenience—to travel to their respective stores.  
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Figure 8: Hotelling’s Model of Spatial Competition 
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However, if business A moved to point A1, it would capture the consumers for the 
distance between points A to A1, and the consumers for half of the distance between 
points A1 and B (point a1).  B would therefore lose customers from the centre to point 
a1, representing a quarter of her market share. 
B’s response will be to move closer to A, in order to re-capture market share.  If B 
realises what the outcome of this game will be, she will move her store to the centre of 
the line.  A will then follow and equilibrium will be restored, with both stores attracting 
an equal number of customers.34   However, the average travel distance incurred by both 
stores’ customers will remain the same as it was at the beginning. The socially optimal 
location for the two stores would be at the quartile points on the line, as this would 
minimise the travel costs for all consumers. 
Hotelling is making an argument that competition is not necessarily a good thing:  “As 
more and more sellers of the same commodity arise, the tendency is not to become 
distributed in the socially optimal manner, but to cluster unduly”(53).  This tendency to 
excessive sameness can be applied to a multitude of examples, including the sameness 
of programme formats in the radio market, or the tendency for political parties to 
compete for the “centre” of the political spectrum: 
“…distance, as we have used it for illustration, is only a figurative term for a great congeries 
of qualities….  The tremendous standardisation of our furniture, our houses, our automobiles 
and our education are due in part to the economies of large-scale production, in part to 
fashion and imitation.  But over and above these forces is the effect we have been discussing, 
the tendency to make only slight deviations in order to have for the new commodity as many 
buyers of the old as possible, to get, so to speak, between one’s competitors and the mass of 
customers.”(127, emphasis in original) 
This model demonstrate some key ideas about “game theory”: 
• Two or more competing firms can play a “game” of subsequent strategic moves for 
competitive advantage. 
• A firm is likely to consider its competitors’ responses before making its next 
strategic move. 
We can also see that the model is based on some strong assumptions: 
                                                 
34  There are a number of alternative moves and counter-moves in this “game”.  This is a highly 
simplified version. 
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• Travel cost is the only competitive variable. 
• There is an even distribution of customers along the line.  The competitive “game” 
would be different if the distribution of customers along the continuum is normal, 
skewed, or multi-modal (has more than one “hump”). 
• The competitors can move frictionlessly.  There are no transactions costs or other 
impediments which prevent A and B from moving quickly to any point on the line 
they desire. 
These are important concepts that will help us understand the model of broadcasting 
competition proposed by Steiner (1952). 
Competition and Market Entry 
Steiner argues that a single, monopolistic, broadcaster would provide a greater range of 
programmes than a competitive broadcasting industry.  He uses a simple table to 
demonstrate this proposition.  The model has three groups of viewers (1, 2, 3).  Each 
group is a different size (5000, 2500, 1250), and each prefers to watch a particular type 
of programme (A, B, C).  None will watch another programme type. 
Figure 9: Steiner Model of Audience Choice 
Viewer Group: 1 2 3
Size of Group: 5,000 2,500 1,250
First Preference: A B C
Second Preference: nil nil nil
 
Under competition, the first entrant into the market would produce programme A, and 
get an audience of 5000 viewers.  The second entrant could produce programme A or 
programme B to get 2,500 viewers in either case.  The third entrant will also produce 
either A or B – whichever the second entrant did not produce.  The outcome, with three 
competitors, is that two broadcasters produce programme A and one produces 
programme B, serving 7,500 viewers.  Those who prefer programme C do not get 
served at all. According to Steiner a single broadcaster would produce all three 
programmes, serving a total audience of 8,750.  He concludes, “…a discriminating 
monopolist controlling all stations would produce a socially more beneficial program 
pattern”. 
We can see how this model echoes Hotelling’s argument that the effects of competition 
do not necessarily produce socially beneficial outcomes, and how it uses game theory, 
with sequential strategic moves by competitors, to make the point.  However, Beebe 
(1977) points out the strong assumptions underlying the argument: 
1. Viewer groups are unequal in size. 
2. Viewers watch only their first preferences. 
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3. Channel capacity is strictly limited. 
4. Competitors producing the same programme will equally share the audience group. 
5. Broadcasters equally value all viewers. 
6. Programme costs are ignored. 
Changing any of these assumptions will change the outcomes. Rothenberg (1962), for 
instance, changes the second of these assumptions to show that, if viewer groups 2 and 
3 would accept programme A as their second preference (rather than not viewing at all), 
5,000 viewers would receive their first choice of programme, the remaining 3,750 
would receive their second choice and all viewers would be served.   
Extending the Model 
Beebe (1977) extended the Steiner model by replacing some of the six assumptions with 
a range of options, then tabulating the results, to show that it could be used to argue for 
a variety of policy options, depending on the assumptions chosen. 
Figure 10: Extended Assumptions of Steiner Model 
1:  Audience Distribution A skewed distribution (Steiner) 
A mildly skewed distribution 
An even distribution (Hotelling) 
2:  Viewer Preferences Watch first preference or none (Steiner) 
Watch first or second preference, or none at all 
Watch first, second or common denominator (Rothenberg) 
3:  Number of Channels Limited to three channels 
Unlimited channels 
4:  Sharing audiences Not affected. Assume that, over time, competitors will equally 
share an audience for a particular programme type. 
5:  Audience value Placing different values on audiences is equivalent to changing 
the shape of the distribution.  The options for assumption 1 
accommodate this assumption also. 
6:  Programme Costs Break-even audience size is 1,200 viewers 
Break-even audience size is 800 viewers 
Beebe’s full table of outcomes is large and complex. Owen and Wildman (1992), 
reviewing Beebe’s model, draw a series of conclusions, among which they link 
programme diversity to the value (to advertisers) of minority audiences: 
 “If minority audiences are worth more per viewer to advertisers,… minority programmes 
are more likely to appear under both competition and monopoly, and programme duplication 
is less likely to occur under competition.  If mass audiences are worth more per viewer to 
advertisers (than minority audiences), then the opposite will hold true.” (91) 
 51
In other words, an answer to the question “does competition produce greater 
programming diversity?” depends, critically, on whether small audiences are highly 
valued by advertisers. 
Mixed Public/Private Systems 
The presence of a public broadcaster will change the outcomes of competition.  Noam 
(1988, 1991) argues that a public broadcaster in a competitive environment will have 
negative effects.  Owen and Wildman (1992) summarise Noam’s claims: 
“His analysis of a mixed broadcast system with private and public channels generates three 
predictions.  First, the program biases of commercial broadcasters create political demands 
for publicly sponsored programming targeted to minority audiences not served by 
commercial broadcasters.  Second, private broadcasters may respond to public broadcaster 
programs by becoming even more majoritarian.  Third, a proliferation of private broadcasters 
may undermine the political support for public broadcasting.”(141)   
They demonstrate Noam’s argument using a Steiner/Beebe model with the following 
assumptions: a skewed distribution, limited channels, Group 1 viewers who watch their 
first preference only, and Group 2 and 3 viewers who accept programmes A and B as 
their second preferences respectively, or watch nothing at all. 
Figure 11: Noam’s Mixed System 
 
Viewer Group: 1 2 3
Size of Group: 1,100 400 200
First Choice A B C
Second Choice non-viewing A B
Third Choice non-viewing non-viewing non-viewing
Owen and Wildman show how Noam argues that, under two-channel competition, both 
channels would produce programme A, satisfying the first preferences of group 1 and 
the second preference of group 2, thereby attracting 750 viewers each.  Noam says 
Group 3 would then apply political pressure for a public broadcaster to satisfy their first 
preference for programme C.  If they succeeded, a third commercial broadcaster 
entering the market would also produce programme A, splitting the combined viewer 
groups 1 and 2 three ways (for 500 viewers each).  Group 2’s first preferences would 
remain unsatisfied. Owen and Wildman sum up the outcomes of further entry to the 
market: 
“If the number of commercial channels continues to increase, eventually at least one 
commercial broadcaster will find it profitable to provide type three programs and share the 
type three audience.  In this example, 15 commercial channels are sufficient to guarantee that 
one will provide type 3 programs.  At this point, the political rationale for the public channel 
disappears.” (143) 
This describes the basis of the argument in favour of deregulation and dismantling 
public broadcasting: when there was limited channel availability, public broadcasting 
had a useful role to play.  However, with the increase in channels produced by the 
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arrival of UHF, cable and satellite transmission all audiences could eventually be served 
by private competition. 
Treasury’s use of the Model 
Noam’s article had not been published when Treasury’s (1985) submission to the 
RCBRT relied on a Steiner/Beebe model to make this claim: 
“…a competitive market for broadcasters can be expected to yield greater programme 
diversity than would occur in a monopolistic market.  The tendency of competition to 
duplicate mass audience programme types (when mass audiences exist) decreases 
significantly as the number of channels increases; on the other hand, a monopoly’s tendency 
to produce lowest common denominator programmes does not decrease as the number of 
channels increases.  A competitive system with a reasonable number of channels is likely to 
be much more responsive to first preferences than a comparable monopolistic system” (34) 
We can see that the claim is based on some strong assumptions, which Treasury 
describes as “…more realistic…” (34) and “…most realistic…” (36).  These are not 
explicitly stated, but we can infer that they include: 
• A competitive system with a large number of channels,  
• Low break-even audience size, 
• The presence of relatively small audiences which are valuable to advertisers, and 
• Audiences which tend not to watch their second or lowest common denominator 
choices. 
Treasury did not attempt to assess whether these assumptions did exist, or were likely to 
exist, in New Zealand.  The RCBRT explicitly rejected the idea:  “…it strains belief to 
expect deregulation to yield much more [widespread coverage and service].  Already, 
indeed, the enterprise of private and public broadcasters has challenged if not defied 
economic logic” (253). 
The Effects of Deregulation  
We may usefully test the validity of Treasury’s “most realistic” assumptions by the 
experience of market entry by radio stations since deregulation.  Some radio stations 
have entered the market seeking small-but-lucrative audiences. These include World 
Service Radio, Radio Liberty and Fine Music FM, of which Liberty and Fine Music 
have failed, while (BBC) World Service Radio has struggled. Possible reasons for the 
problems experienced by these services include: 
• These radio stations simply failed to appeal to the target audience due to 
inappropriate programming (i.e. a lack of positive utility produced by the station). 
• The target audiences experience a high level of disutility from advertising, and 
substitutes are available that do not produce this level of disutility (i.e. the Concert 
Programme and National Radio). 
• The target audience are not high consumers of radio, generally preferring other 
media (in Radio Liberty’s case the more authoritative and less ideologically biased 
business newspapers, perhaps). 
• Potential advertisers preferred other media, or other techniques, such as direct 
marketing, to access their target audicences. 
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However, there have been examples of successful market entry for broadcasters 
targeting larger, if perhaps less valuable, audiences that were previously unserved.  
These include Mai FM (for a Māori/Polynesian youth audience), and Channel Z (for a 
“Generation Z” audience). Why did these services succeed, when the others failed?   
Recall the strong assumption underlying Hotelling’s model, that the cost of a strategic 
competitive move is frictionless.  It is possible to hypothesise that the transactions costs 
and risks involved in entering the radio market are significant, and that entry is only 
possible when these can be overcome. An existing mass audience has a track record 
with advertisers, and broadcasters understand the programming that will attract the 
audience. Therefore, a new entrant may prefer to compete for smaller segments of an 
existing risk-free audience than serve the needs of a larger, more risky audience. 
Otherwise, new entrants need to develop a format that will attract the newly identified 
audience, and they need to be able to prove to advertisers that the audience exists and is 
valuable.  This entails significant costs, and a degree of risk to broadcaster and 
advertiser alike. 
In the case of Mai FM, New Zealand on Air underwrote the risk as part of its 
programme for funding Maori radio initiatives.  It became apparent that Mai FM was a 
commercially successful station the funding ceased – in response to mounting political 
pressure – as it was attracting advertisers away from other broadcasters.  In the case of 
Channel Z, students at the New Zealand Broadcasting School undertook an in-depth 
survey of the Christchurch radio market, then operated an eight-week pilot station, 
which targeted the Generation Z audience.  The Broadcasting School underwrote the 
capital risk of the broadcast, and the students’ free labour underwrote operating 
expenses (i.e. risk to working capital). The industry took note of the station’s success 
and some months later Channel Z was launched. 
These stories allow us to hypothesise that entry to the market is risky, and this may 
prevent the rapid entry of new entrants to serve diverse audience needs.  The element of 
risk can be overcome if the entrant has sufficient working capital to stay in the market 
until it can create a viable audience, or if it can use research and/or test marketing to 
convince advertisers that a viable audience exists.   
Modelling Deregulation 
So far we have looked only at the problems facing new entrants to the market.  
However, deregulation may also affect existing broadcasters, as new entrants to the 
market subdivide the already proven, and therefore less risky, audiences.  In this 
section, we develop a model that combines aspects of the Steiner/Beebe models with 
some of the ideas which appear in Noll, Peck and McGowan (1973), Owen and 
Wildman (1992; especially pages 127-129) and Masson, et al. (1990).  This allows us to 
identify medium- and long-term effects of market entry on existing broadcasters.  
The Audience as Commodity 
Our understanding of market entry will be improved if we are clear about the 
commodity that is the subject of the economic analysis of broadcasting. Economists 
have not held a unanimous view on the subject. Owen, et al. (1974) claim that: 
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“The first and most serious mistake that an analyst can make is to assume that TV stations 
are in the business to produce programs.  They are not.  TV stations are in the business of 
producing audiences.  These audiences, or means of access to them, are sold to advertisers.  
The product of a TV station is measured in dimensions of people and time.” (4, emphasis 
added) 
Besen (1976) states categorically that “The basic service that a television station has to 
sell is the use of its time.” (435).  Collins, et al, (1988) opine that “…it can cogently be 
argued that the appropriate unit of analysis is the programme segment, especially that 
segment between two successive commercial breaks, or the channel, or the total 
broadcasting service.”(6) Their preferred definition is: 
“…the total set of broadcasting output which results from the interaction between the set of 
audience needs which broadcasting attempts to satisfy and the historically given set of 
productive resources that the broadcasting industry has at its disposal for the fulfilment of 
that task.” (6) 
Masson et al. (1990), agree with Owen, et al.: “For broadcast television the only true 
‘market’ is the one for sales of audiences to advertisers.” Brown and Cave (1992: 379), 
imply that the programmes shown on broadcast television are the commodities being 
consumed.  They later note that: “Programs are made available ‘free’ to audiences, 
while those audiences are sold wholesale to advertisers… this process involves 
advertisers in an intermediate relationship between consumers and broadcasters” (380).   
Whereas literature expresses a range of views, the prevailing opinion is that the 
fundamental commodity of commercial free-to-air broadcasting is an audience, which 
the broadcaster creates, packages and sells to advertisers.  However, this definition does 
not accurately describe the position in pay television, nor does it acknowledge a role for 
public broadcasting.  It also implies that the audience is a passive subject of the 
broadcasters’ and advertisers’ desires.   
It would be more helpful to define the commodity of broadcasting as audience 
attention.  By doing so, we explicitly recognise the following ideas: 
• Audience attention is a scarce resource, since people have only so much attention to 
devote to any one activity.   
• What the audience chooses to “pay” attention to is what determines the value of that 
audience to an advertiser.   
• Audiences will treat the media as one among a number of substitutes to which they 
may switch their attention.   
• Pay TV services, commercial free-to-air and public broadcasters all compete for 
audience attention, whereas only commercial free-to-air services sell audiences to 
advertisers. 
• Broadcasting regulation may be aimed at preventing the audience from paying 
attention to inappropriate messages (i.e. violence), or toward appropriate messages 
(i.e. party political broadcasts).35  
                                                 
 
35  Section 78 (1) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 (repealed on 10 March 1990), stated that “Every 
election programme broadcast by means of free-to-air television broadcasting shall be broadcast 
 55
This idea can clarify some of the economic analysis of broadcasting. Owen and 
Wildman base much of their analysis on the idea that the marginal cost of supplying a 
programme to the marginal viewer is zero, which gives broadcasting the characteristics 
of a public good.  However, an outcome of regarding audience attention as a scarce 
resource is that the marginal cost of attracting an extra viewer is positive, so the 
production of an audience bears a positive cost. The difference that this makes will 
become apparent in the following chapter. 
Competing for Attention 
If audience attention may be switched between near substitutes, then there is a 
competitive element involved in keeping the audience’s attention.  This is the basis of 
an article by Masson, et al. (1990), which treats advertising as a disutility for the 
audience  “As a firm increases its number of advertising minutes, more viewers move to 
viewing the programs of other firms or not viewing at all.” (7)  They portray 
broadcasting firms as playing a competitive game, in which “If at least some viewers 
choose to switch to the programs of other firms, then increasing the number of ad 
minutes by a firm increases the audience sizes of its rivals.” (7) They then analyse the 
effects of increased competition on the total quantity of advertising minutes offered to 
advertisers, and the price-per-viewer charged to advertisers. 
They conclude that, as more broadcasters enter the market and compete for audiences 
by reducing the number of ads, the total advertising minutes produced by all 
broadcasters may decrease.  If the quantity of advertising minutes falls, the price-per-
viewer paid by advertisers should also rise. This model is interesting as a piece of 
theory because it contradicts the standard assumption of economic theory – that entry of 
firms into a market will result in greater output and falling prices.36 In their model the 
outcome depends on the number of competitors, the structure of the industry and each 
competitor’s expectation of the others’ reactions.  This provides an important key to 
understanding the effects of increased competition on broadcasters’ cost structures.37 
Remodelling Broadcasters 
One of the key omissions from the Steiner/Beebe models has been the effect on 
broadcasters’ cost structures under increased competition, and the consequences of 
those effects.  This is crucial to understanding the medium- to long-term effects of 
deregulation. 
                                                                                                                                               
simultaneously on all free-to-air television broadcasting stations.”, ensuring that the audience would 
have difficulty avoiding these broadcasts.  Cocker (1996) recalls that in July 1979 and October 
1980, Sir Robert Muldoon was granted time simultaneously on radio and television to make 
announcements regarding wages policy. 
36  A less dramatic outcome might be that the number of advertising minutes offered increases at a 
lower rate, and the price-per-viewer falls at a lower rate, than one might normally expect. 
37  It also reinforces Hotelling’s point that competition may lead to socially sub-optimal outcomes; in 
this case by increasing costs to advertisers, which are then passed on to consumers. 
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In the model presented in Figure 12, a broadcaster’s programme output is measured in 
time – in this case, one hour.38  The average cost curve for the hour is the total cost of 
broadcasting for that hour, divided by the number of minutes in the hour.   
Figure 12: Broadcasters’ Supply and Demand Relationships 
 
The average cost curve is labelled AC=S.39 It is also the broadcaster’s supply curve for 
minutes of advertising.  That is, any point on the line AC=S represents a combination of 
prices and quantities of advertising that will produce an adequate return on investment.40  
If the broadcaster can only sell advertising at output/price points below the line, he will 
eventually go broke.  Output/price points above the line represent a “supernormal” 
profit, or return on investment higher than expected for the level of risk involved. 
The demand curve (D*) represents the prices and quantities of advertising that the 
broadcaster is able to sell.  The position of the demand curve is partially determined (in 
the short term), by the results of the last ratings survey.  This is represented by the 
horizontal line P(t-1), which shows the price advertisers are willing to pay for a minute of 
                                                 
Cost, 
38  The graph only shows the 4th to 20th minutes of the hour, which we assume to entail the relevant 
range of advertising minutes-per-hour. 
39  In this case, the cost of production is assumed to be $1000 per hour, and the curve is mathematically 
expressed as AC = $1000/60.  To add realism, it may help to interpret this curve as the cost of 
producing an hour of programming, during a particular day-part, averaged over a few weeks.  We 
can assume costs will be stable over the period, as will demand for advertising, provided the period 
does not span the release of ratings results (in the case of radio), or a change in programme schedule 
(in the case of television). 
40  Profit is regarded as the cost of capital and is therefore included with other costs of the firm.  The 
definition of an “adequate” return depends on the other potential investments available and the 
degree of risk associated with them. 
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the station’s advertising time.41 The position of the demand curve is also partially 
determined by the quantity of minutes of advertising that the broadcaster can sell.  This 
“outer limit” is represented by a vertical line labelled Q(t+1). Following Masson, et al., 
this limit is set according to the broadcasters’ strategy to optimise audience size in the 
next ratings period.42  
Over time, with all other influences held constant, P(t-1) and Q(t+1) will work together to 
produce D*, which is the set of points at which the two lines would intersect.43 The 
broadcaster is unable to charge a higher price, or produce a greater output of advertising 
minutes-per-hour, than the points described by this curve.44  The audience’s dislike of 
advertising and the presence of competing broadcasters determine the downward slope 
and the shape of D*. If the broadcaster reduces the number of minutes of advertising, 
the audience will increase and the broadcaster can command a higher price.  However, 
the curve flattens out as the number of minutes reduces, since advertisers will purchase 
advertising from other radio stations rather than pay a much higher price.  If the 
broadcaster increases the number of advertising minutes sold, audience size will reduce 
in future, so she will command a lower price for advertising. 
The position of the horizontal line P(t-1) is a function of the variables incorporated in the 
Steiner/Beebe model:   
• The number of channels competing for this audience 
• The size of the break-even audience 
• The value placed on particular audiences by advertisers 
• The distribution of audience preferences among programme types 
The position of Q(t+1) is determined by the variables in the model of Masson, et al, and 
the effects of advertising on audience attention.  In particular: 
• The number of channels competing for this audience 
• Industry structure (competitive, oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive or 
monopolistic) 
• Each broadcaster’s expectation of other broadcasters’ reactions to changes in 
advertising output 
• The audience’s tolerance for hearing advertisements 
• The benefits or positive utility enjoyed by the audience due to the programming 
broadcast between advertisements 
                                                 
41  The superscript (t-1) indicates that price is a function of audience attention attracted in the previous 
time period, as reflected in the outcomes of the previous ratings survey. 
42  The superscript (t+1) indicates that quantity is a function of the audience attention it expects to 
attract in the following time period, as reflected in the outcomes of the next ratings survey 
43  The factors to be held constant are: neither the station nor any of its competitors change format, 
competitors do not alter the minutes-per-hour of advertising they broadcast, no new stations enter 
the market, and audience preferences remain stable. 
44  When applied to television broadcasters, the ex post and ex ante effects of ratings on D(t-1) and Q(t+1) 
are less pronounced, as ratings are produced continuously (the ratings period is only twenty-four 
hours), but this does not limit the generality of the model, especially if the quantity of advertising 
affects audience behaviour over a longer term. 
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Having established the model, we can now predict what will happen as more 
broadcasters enter the market and competition increases.   
Broadcasters under Competition 
Our initial model shows that the demand curve D* lies above the AC=S curve.  This 
suggests that this broadcaster is earning a supernormal profit, and therefore has a partial 
monopoly in her market.  This is consistent with the New Zealand radio market prior to 
deregulation, when radio stations generated substantial economic rents.  These rents 
were partially captured by radio “personalities”, who commanded large salaries, and by 
the Broadcasting Tribunal, which imposed costly warrant requirements on 
broadcasters.45  
As additional entrants to the market target the same audience by producing a similar 
format, we expect to observe two effects: a reduction in the market price that advertisers 
pay for audiences and an increase in the willingness of audiences to switch stations. 
This is represented in Figure 13: P(t-1) will move down, and Q(t+1) will move left.  This 
means D* will move inward, ultimately arriving at a point of tangency with the AC=S 
curve, as shown by the curve Dc.46 
Figure 13: Demand under Increased Competition 
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45  Radio stations would also consume some of this surplus by paying for games and prizes to attract 
audiences during ratings periods.  The short-term increase in costs would improve the income of the 
station over the following period. 
46  This is similar the standard model of market entry under monopolistic competition originally 
theorised by Chamberlin (1962).  In fact, increasing number of broadcasters producing similar 
programmes to compete for the same audience means the market will be monopolistically 
competitive by definition. 
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This model above demonstrates the medium-term result (say 2-3 years after 
deregulation).  Up to this point, the Steiner/Beebe model probably predicts an expansion 
in services and increasing diversity reasonably accurately. 
The predicted conditions were observed in the Auckland radio market immediately 
post-deregulation “in less than two years the number of Auckland radio stations has 
doubled from 10 to 20….  Once buoyant and profitable, commercial radio is now highly 
competitive and marginal” (Cocker 1991: 34). The increasing numbers of radio stations 
did not increase radio’s overall share of the advertising market “(Auckland) is a 
declining market but what should concern the radio sector that its 9% share, already 
below the national average of 13%, is declining even faster.” (Pardon, 1991: 28)  
In the longer term, under these conditions, a broadcaster can only increase profits by 
producing the same audience at a lower cost.  That is, by lowering the AC=S curve.  
The outcomes are then opposite to those predicted by the Steiner/Beebe model. 
Cost reduction strategies 
To understand how increased competition impacts on broadcasters’ cost structures, we 
need to understand something about the nature of the broadcasting business.  Hay (1986: 
20) describes broadcasting as a “…distribution service…. A warehousing (and) 
packaging business which gets its components from various sources and assembles 
them in a package to suit its customers’ specific needs.”  The various components that 
go into making up the package are either purchased from outside the station (music, 
sports, and syndicated news services) or made within the station (local news, current 
affairs and investigative journalism). Other elements of the package are “…produced 
within the organisation as part of the packaging.  These include continuity announcing, 
promos and advertisements.”  There are also the off-air costs of promoting the radio 
station in other media, to attract an audience, and the costs of marketing, market 
research and advertising sales – which will all be affected by increasing competition.  
Following Chamberlin (1962), these off-air costs can be described as selling costs: the 
costs of persuading the viewers or listeners to switch to your channel.  The cost, that is, 
of obtaining audience attention. 
Under competitive pressure to reduce costs, a commercial broadcaster will look at any 
or all of the following strategies to reduce its average cost of producing an audience. 
Outsourcing:  It is often cheaper to buy, rather than make, programme inputs – 
especially the labour-intensive inputs like news.  Ready-made products like syndicated 
news services cost less than maintaining a staff of journalists. And indeed, even as the 
number of radio stations has increased, the number of journalists working in radio has 
fallen dramatically since deregulation, as radio stations increasingly take external feeds 
from Independent Radio News or RNZ news, rather than meet the expense of 
maintaining independent newsrooms. 
In the case of television, the cost of making programmes in Britain or the America is 
met by the revenues generated by their domestic audiences, so these programmes may 
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be sold into the New Zealand market at prices that will always undercut the costs of 
local production.47  
A variation on the tendency to buy rather than make programming is the increasing use 
of reality-based programming and sports on television.  In both cases the footage is 
supplied without the need to write scripts, hire actors, or pay other costs associated with 
creating drama.  The “drama” is a characteristic of the events themselves, so the costs 
are limited to the costs of recording the event, obtaining the right to broadcast it and 
packaging it for broadcast. 
Vertical Integration: The proliferation of channels is creating relative scarcity of 
premium television programmes.  That is, the output of programmes is not increasing at 
the same rate as the increase in the amount of broadcast time available.48 The 
broadcasters must compete to purchase libraries of television programmes and films and 
obtain the broadcast rights to key sporting events.  
The international television industry is moving toward global competition among 
powerful oligopolies, vertically integrated from production to distribution, with the final 
delivery, billing and collection of revenue being undertaken through local franchises 
such as Sky TV in New Zealand.49 
Economies of Scope: Economies of scope exist where a group of competing companies 
gain mutual advantage by sharing common resources.50 Radio broadcasters can capture 
economies of scope by sharing costs, especially selling costs, between stations.  The 
ratings survey allows the industry to share the cost of identifying and verifying the 
existence of an audience to advertisers. The Radio Bureau now handles advertising sales 
for most New Zealand radio stations.  There is a possibility that this may lead to a cartel 
or near-cartel situation in the industry, which could increase the cost of advertising. 
Economies of Scale: a stable of channels can broadcast from the same premises, 
sharing the costs of audience research and marketing, buildings, programming costs and 
announcing staff. Radio and television stations can also distribute a single programme 
in multiple markets. A station located in Auckland can produce a programme heard all 
over the country, with advertisements slotted in for local audiences. The advent of 
digital technology and high-speed data transmission capability has greatly reduced the 
cost and enhanced the flexibility of networking in the past decade. 
                                                 
47  Although New Zealand production companies can enter co-production deals with overseas 
broadcasters to make programmes that will sell into overseas markets, in the absence of subsidies 
this would still prevent programming being made locally for strictly local audiences, such as a Maori 
language audience. 
48  An effect of this relative scarcity is that broadcasters will tend to increasingly compete for existing 
mass audiences rather than find new niche markets. 
49  Arguably, the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reflects the desire of multinational broadcasters to protect their 
interests and maximise returns from this trend. 
50  The most common example is Silicon Valley, where a grouping of software companies is able to 
attract and thereby share a pool of talented computer programmers. 
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Volunteer Labour: Some radio stations and television services are able to continue 
making labour-intensive programming by utilising volunteer labour.  In  New Zealand, 
student radio, community access radio and Radio Rhema’s Christian network all rely on 
amateur broadcasters to provide content which they would not otherwise be able to 
afford to either buy or make.  Community television is somewhat inhibited by 
comparison, due to the cost of equipment and the complexity of the production process 
(television production typically requires a co-ordinated effort of a trained team, whereas 
most radio programmes can be produced by individuals working alone). 
Long-Term Outcomes 
In radio, economies of scale are driving the industry toward oligopolistic networks in 
the major metropolitan markets.  Currently, The Radio Network (formerly Radio New 
Zealand’s commercial channels) owns over 50% of the radio industry in New Zealand, 
providing “branded” channels in most main centres and many provincial centres.  The 
other major players are Radio Pacific, with a single national network, Radio Otago, 
which dominates the lower South Island, and CanWest - owners of the TV3 television 
network - which recently acquired More FM’s network of urban and provincial stations. 
This trend was clearly evident by 1994 (Shanahan, 1994). 
The predicted effects on news production were also clearly evident by that time: 
“A sharp 30 percent decline in (Radio New Zealand) news staffing since 1989 to 130 jobs 
overall has led to several sole-charge positions in the provinces and much smaller teams in 
city newsrooms.  All major media players have undergone similar cost-cutting,…  As a 
result, reporters with minimal experience can often find themselves working alone and 
without experienced mentors immediately on hand.  The danger is the development of bad 
habits, low standards and lack of depth in news gathering.  
 “Another consequence is the lack of time to work on investigative pieces or pursue the 
type of contacts work that leads to news scoops.  The majority of stories are done over the 
phone, with RNZ aiming to “Cover the bases” with its news gathering.” (Geary, 1994) 
This was before Radio New Zealand sold the commercial radio stations.   
In television, precisely the same effects are being realised – only on a global level.  The 
advent of CNN News, BBC World, HBO Movie channel and MTV, is indicative of the 
future shape of the television industry.  These branded channels may increase the range 
of services available to New Zealand audiences, but those services will provide 
international, as opposed to local, regional, or national, news and cultural content.  
The recent history of regional television indicates that regional free-to-air television 
cannot capture sufficient economies of scale to survive.  This may change with the 
increasingly rapid spread of cable television, since the marginal cost of distributing one 
of fifty or so channels over cable will be so low as to make local and regional television 
viable.  However, regional television has so far shown itself to be predominantly a 
vehicle for selling audiences to regional advertisers – it has been less successful at 
supplying local or regional programming, including news, to local audiences. 
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Conclusions 
Recall that the Report of the Officials Co-ordinating Committee advised the Labour 
government that “Additional competition should also serve to increase the editorial 
independence and diversity of the media.” (13) 
That advice was incorrect. The model and accompanying explanation presented above 
demonstrate that this will not be the case, either in theory or in practice. Increased 
competition will only increase programming diversity up to a point, in the short-term. 
Precisely the opposite will occur in the medium- to long-term, as increasing competition 
will produce the following tendencies: 
• Less local news and drama, as these are labour-intensive products. 
• Less investigative journalism and current affairs production (i.e. less news that is 
“made” or discovered, rather than bought or delivered in the form of PR handouts 
and press releases). 
• Branded channels providing homogenous services to nation-wide radio audiences 
and global television audiences. 
• An oligopolistic industry structure, which may drive up costs to advertisers. 
These tendencies are driving the industry toward greater homogeneity and reduction of 
audience choice.  The RCBRT (1986: 254), summed-up the issues of scale of 
production economies, diversity and vertical integration in this paragraph: 
“Competing television companies, because of their altogether grander scale of cost than 
radio and therefore their demand for correspondingly greater markets, have shown no 
tendency anywhere, even in markets of continental size, to settle for less than all they can 
seize of the broadest mass audiences available.  Even in radio the United States witnessed 
the rise of three networks, while in television it took the Courts and anti-monopoly 
legislation to make three network companies out of two.  Of the hypothesized segmentation 
and profitable pursuit of minority audiences there are few signs outside the great cities with 
two or more times the population of New Zealand gathered in one conurbation.  Mr Rupert 
Murdoch’s ambitions for a fourth channel, for example, rest not on innovative programming 
for neglected viewers but on rescreening thousands of old films bought up with the company 
that owned them.” 
It can be stated with certainty that officials provided poor advice to the Government, 
based on the following facts: 
• The argument advanced by Treasury, in its submission to the RCBRT, was based on 
a selective use of the assumptions underlying the Steiner/Beebe model. 
• The selective use of the model was not explained to the RCBRT. 
• The assumptions chosen by Treasury to support its use of the model were not tested 
against the real situation in local or foreign radio and television markets. 
• The RCBRT explicitly rejected this aspect of the Treasury submission, preferring to 
rely on its own experience of foreign radio and television markets (the 
Commissioners travelled to Japan, the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom in May 1985). (RCBRT, 1986: 20). 
• Officials ignored the RCBRT’s rejection of this argument, when providing 
subsequent advice to the Government (i.e. in Doug Andrew’s letter to the Minister 
of Finance of 22 February 1988, and in the report of the Officials Committee (13), 
as noted above) 
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• Officials were aware of the economies of scale that deregulation would make 
available.  This was explicitly mentioned in the report of the officials co-ordinating 
committee, in connection with what they saw as the desirable effects of lifting 
restrictions on foreign ownership (11).  
In this discussion so far, “diversity” has been assumed to be somehow important. It is 
necessary to be clear about what diversity entails, and why it is important. One meaning 
is that more diversity will provide audiences with a greater range of choices for their 
personal enjoyment. This is a relatively trivial matter.  The other meaning is the matter 
of real concern, and that has to do with the function of the news media in a democratic 
society. Recall the preamble to the RCBRT’s Terms of Reference, which charged the 
Commissioners with the task of deciding how to: 
 “..widen the choice, and improve the quality, of programmes, to secure independence, 
depth, and impartiality in news and current affairs programmes, and to reflect New Zealand’s 
cultural and social variety…” 
A similar concern is expressed in a statement of the philosophical approach taken by the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal: 
“The Tribunal believes that a broadcasting system… ought to reflect the widest possible 
range of variety, information and opinion.  It should be flexible, diverse, editorially 
independent and accountable to the public.” (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, 1977: 6) 
And a lack of variety in information and opinion should concern us. We have already 
noted that increasing competition will reduce the level of information and variety of 
opinion at local and regional level on radio, and regionally and nationally in television. 
Harking back to our earlier discussion of media effects, a possible outcome of the 
tendency toward vertical integration and monopolistic competition is that the media will 
become increasingly ubiquitous and consonant, (to use the terms employed by Elisabeth 
Noelle-Neumann). That is, networked programming and news sourced from press 
agencies and radio news bureaux will tend to repeat the same stories, in the same 
homogenous manner, across all media.  This may in turn produce increasingly powerful 
agenda-setting and “spiral of silence” effects: audiences fed on an homogenous diet of 
what the media tell them to think about, may tend to suppress their own opinions, in 
favour of mute acquiescence to the social cues they receive. 
Fox (1996) reinforces Atkinson’s (1989) point about mediation and Baudrillard’s 
(1995) notion of “hyperreality” 
 “…there is a consciousness or fleeting-consciousness about things political and 
governmental.  It is not that the people are dumb, it is that too many passively consume 
symbols, like any TV offering, without sustained intellectual effort to make any sense of it; 
not dumb but ignorant.  The decline of unions, political parties, ethnic neighborhoods and 
other mediating institutions leaves voters and citizens without mooring lines, so to speak, 
adrift in hyperspace with sensory overload.  Remember, an entire industry has grown up of 
pollsters, focus group facilitators, media consultants, and political advertising artists whose 
efforts are directed not toward disseminating truth but so construing some concatenation of 
Babel as to deliver victory to their employer.” 
 “The symbol or logo becomes more important than the functional product.  Similarly in 
politics symbols, often deliberately misleading, replace deliberation over policy. Willie 
Horton becomes a logo for Massachusetts penal policy, “read my lips” for a fiscal policy, 
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and Clinton a modifier signifying “Big-government-tax-and-spend” when attached to “health 
plan” or “welfare reform”.51 
We shall return to explore this theme in more depth in the final chapters. Other than the 
diversity argument, officials presented the beneficial outcomes of deregulation in terms 
of improved economic welfare and efficiency.  It is to those concepts that we now turn 
our attention. 
                                                 
51  Page numbers are omitted, as the article was downloaded as a text file from a database. 
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Chapter 7 Welfare and Consumer Preferences 
The discussion in the previous chapter demonstrated that an increase in the number of 
broadcasters would not necessarily increase diversity of programme content in the short 
term, and may well produce the opposite effect in the medium or long term. However, it 
is possible that the increase in radio and television stations could be managed in such a 
way as to prevent this from happening. If that were the case, would a competitive, 
deregulated media environment still produce better outcomes than a regulated one?  
The argument presented by Treasury says that commercial competition in free-to-air 
broadcasting will tend to produce the range of programmes demanded by audiences.52  
This is the “consumer sovereignty” argument. It contends that the aggregation of 
individual consumers’ preferences, expressed by their willingness to pay for goods and 
services, will call into supply the goods and services that society requires, given that 
markets operate efficiently.  More than that, the market will also ensure that society’s 
scarce resources are put to the best use, as the market will allocate scarce resources to 
the production of goods and services in the proportions that reflect consumers’ 
demands.  This allocation of resources and outputs will maximise society’s well-being, 
or welfare. 
This concept has its flaws.53  However, it has a powerful intuitive appeal, and can be 
robustly demonstrated in economic theory.  Such is the power of this idea that, if one 
suspects there may be an exception to its rule, the burden of proof lies with the 
challenger.  In this chapter, it is proposed that none of the existing systems of funding 
broadcasting meet the conditions required for allocative efficiency – at least, that is, as 
far as radio and television audiences are concerned, rather than advertisers.  What is 
more, the consumption of electronic media does not conform to one of the fundamental 
simplifying assumptions that underlies the notion of consumer sovereignty. 
In the first section of this chapter, we explore different methods of funding broadcasting 
services and test whether (or how), each of them is responsive to consumer demand.  
This clarifies the circumstances under which the various funding mechanisms may fail 
to provide broadcasting services to some audiences, and introduces the idea of “merit 
goods”. 
In the second section, we review the concept of consumer sovereignty, as it applies to 
the consumption of mass media – especially the assumption that consumers’ preferences 
are exogenous and therefore determine which programmes are broadcast. 
                                                 
52  Assuming, that is, that the entry risks noted in the previous chapter are a relatively short-term effect 
that the market may overcome in time. 
53  Not the least of which is that future generations cannot express their demands for products which are 
produced with depletable resources, leading to over-consumption of those resources in the present 
(O’Connor, 1991). 
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In the third section, we extend the ideas of welfare economics and allocative efficiency 
to incorporate the distribution of externalities.  This raises some issues regarding the use 
of subsidies and quotas to fund broadcasting services. It also illuminates one of the most 
important issues addressed in this thesis: the nature of the rights to broadcasting outputs 
that New Zealand’s citizens hold, explicitly or implicitly. 
Audience Welfare  
Television provides satisfactions to those who watch it.  It increases their utility, or 
happiness - but by how much?  And what is it worth to them?  It is impossible to 
directly measure every consumer’s utility, or state of happiness.  However, one can 
observe that a consumer prefers one (affordable) set of goods to another and assume that 
the preferred set of goods provides greater utility—it makes them better off, or 
happier—than any other affordable set of goods.  To define a numeric measure of 
utility, economists use a proxy: the consumers’ “willingness-to-pay”: 
“Given two situations represented by the two consumption bundles… we want to measure 
how much the consumer would be willing to pay (or be paid) to be in one situation rather 
than the other.  The resulting number turns out to be closely related to certain ways of 
measuring utility and is useful for evaluation of proposed policy changes.” (Varian, 1987: 
243) 
In Figure 14(a), an individual chooses to consume a particular amount of good G (G*), 
and a particular amount of all other goods (A*).  This is their preferred consumption 
bundle, at point X. 
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Figure 14: Consumer Choice and Economic Welfare 
(b) Aggregate Consumption and Welfare (a) Individual’s Consumption Choice 
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Passing through this point, we see a sloped line, representing the relative price of A and 
G.54 We also see a curved line, which represents a set of trade-offs that would keep the 
consumer equally happy.  This is the constant utility curve, which needs to be carefully 
interpreted: 
• To persuade this consumer to purchase a combination of A and G that was at a point 
left and upward along the curve, thus giving up some of G while remaining equally 
content, one would have to offer her more A (money) than the market price. 
• To persuade her to purchase a combination of A and G that was at a point right and 
downward along the curve, thus consuming less of A while remaining equally 
content, one would also have to offer her more G (the good) than the market price. 
• If her income increased she could consume more of G and A, her overall utility 
would have increased, so her constant utility curve would lie somewhere above and 
to the right of the one shown here. 
• If the price of G increased she would consume less of G relative to A.  The slope of 
the price line would become steeper (while the point at which it intersects the 
vertical axis would not change), and her utility curve would move to the left. Thus, 
an increase in the price of G represents a decrease in their total utility, and an 
effective cut in overall income. 55 
This person’s consumption choice is a function of three things: their total income, the 
price of good G, and the utility or satisfaction that they obtain from consuming G.  The 
model shows us how the consumer has chosen to maximise her utility, given the income 
she has and the price of good G relative to all other goods. 
                                                 
54  If they spend their entire income, then Income = (PA x A) + (PG x G)  By manipulating this equation, 
we obtain the function A = (Income/ PA) – PG/ PA.G  The coefficient – PA /PG is the slope of the line. 
55  This is a very simple example, for explanatory purposes only. Any good intermediate level 
microeconomics textbook (e.g. Varian, 1987), will explain the finer points of this type of model.  
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In Figure 14b, we see what might happen to the total consumption of good G as its price 
changes, aggregated across a whole economy.56  At price pG1, only a few consumers 
will be able to afford G, and the amount G1 will be consumed.  As the price falls (pG2, 
pG3), more of G is consumed (G2, G3).  Theoretically, we could raise the price until 
none of good G was consumed, or lower it until we knew how much was consumed if 
the price were zero.   
The line through these points is the demand schedule for good G.  The area under the 
demand schedule is a way of representing the total value of good G to all consumers.57 
This area can be regarded as good G’s total contribution to the welfare of society, 
relative to the welfare provided by all other goods, expressed as a monetary value. It is 
intimately linked to the concept of the utility or happiness provided to each consumer 
by their consumption of G, and therefore to the utility of all consumers. 
As Varian has said, this concept can be used to evaluate proposed policy changes. It can 
be used in one of two ways: one compares the relative contribution to welfare of 
different policies, in order to show which is policy is preferable to others.58  The other 
estimates the absolute contribution to welfare of a policy initiative, in order to decide 
whether to proceed with it.59 
Welfare and Market Failure 
The key ideas were demonstrated by Treasury (1985), with a model similar to Figure 
15. The audience for Police Stop! 60 is large, but viewers place a relatively low value on 
the programme: if they were charged for watching it, audience numbers would decrease 
rapidly, and fall to zero when the price rose to $1.00.61   
The audience for People’s Century62 is much smaller, but viewers place a relatively 
high value on the programme. If they had to pay for watching it, audience numbers 
                                                 
56   Assuming all other prices remained constant. 
57  Demand curves can actually be known for quite small ranges of price and output, in reality.  
58  Spence and Owen (1975) use a formal mathematical model to compare the relative contribution to 
welfare of four polar cases: advertiser-supported TV or pay TV, with either limited or unlimited 
channels. At the time, the Federal Communications Commission forbade per-program charges for 
most programs (103), so the key policy question was whether, by allowing pay-per-view television, 
economic welfare would be improved. 
59  Noll, et al., (1973) estimated that, at that time, households consuming free-to-air television valued it 
at 4% of after-tax household income.  This amount was about seven times the advertising revenues 
generated by the industry at that time. They argued from this basis that providing more television 
channels would improve economic welfare. 
60  A programme comprised of video footage of police chases and examples of bad driving, with an 
admonitory narration provide by a retired racing driver.  This was shown weekly in prime time for 
much of 1998. 
61  We assume the price charged to viewers is zero - as is generally the case in commercial free-to-air 
radio and television. 
62  A BBC documentary exploring some of the important events of the 20th century, through the 
recollections of “ordinary” people that were present at these events.  This was shown in a late 
evening timeslot in 1998. 
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would fall to zero when the price rose to $5.00. Calculating the total welfare on this 
basis, we see that the Peoples Century produces twice the social benefit of Police Stop! 
Figure 15: Comparative Welfare of Programmes 
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This does not tell us that viewers should be charged a price for viewing television, in 
order to decide which programmes should be shown.63 It tells us that People’s Century 
is more intensely preferred by its audience, than Police Stop! is preferred by its 
audience. This intensity of preference means that Peoples Century produces a greater 
contribution to social welfare than does Police Stop!. 
Note that we are talking as if there are two different audiences.  This implies that, if 
only one programme could be shown, the interests of the Police Stop! audience should 
be sacrificed in favour of the People’s Century audience.  It is also worth noting how 
this model relates to the analysis in the previous chapter: 
• The Steiner/Beebe model predicts that if there were two channels one would show 
Police Stop! and the other a programme of a similar type for an audience of 250,000 
viewers each. Steiner correctly assumes that the intensity of audience preference is 
not reflected in a broadcaster’s programming choices. 
• Noam would argue, on the basis of audience numbers alone, that the public 
broadcaster would show Peoples Century to its smaller audience in response to their 
political demands. However, the idea of total welfare provides a stronger 
justification for public broadcasting to show the programme than Noam’s “squeaky 
hinge” principle.  
                                                 
63  The Peacock Committee on financing the BBC saw this as an inevitable outcome of technological 
development.  Its first recommendation was that all television sets sold in the UK market be required 
to be fitted with a “peritelevision socket” in anticipation that the broadcasting license fee would 
eventually be phased out by pay-per-view television. (Peacock Committee, 1986: 136) 
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So far we have talked only of the gross social benefit.  However, resources are 
consumed in the production and distribution of programmes.  These resources could be 
consumed elsewhere in the economy, so the production costs should also be 
incorporated, in order to reflect net social benefit.  Say an episode of Police Stop! costs 
$20,000 to produce.  The programme cannot be on-sold and the cost is borne entirely by 
the broadcaster, therefore the net social benefit of Police Stop! is $230,000.  An episode 
of Peoples Century costs $100,000 to produce – but the BBC has recouped its cost in 
the UK and sells it to the broadcaster for $5,000.64  The net social benefit of Peoples 
Century (to New Zealand) is $445,000.  Clearly, the equation favours Peoples Century 
even more. 
However, this is not how things work in reality, for free-to-air commercial broadcasting.  
The decision whether to broadcast Peoples Century or Police Stop! depends on three 
things: 
• The cost of the programme 
• The size of the audience it attracts (which may be unrelated to its cost of production) 
• The advertisers’ valuation of the audience 
Figure 16 shows how a broadcaster might decide which of the two programmes to 
show, given that advertisers were willing to pay 10c per viewer, per programme.  This 
clearly demonstrates the issue of market failure on the demand side: the market 
acknowledges the size of an audience, but not the intensity of its preferences. Under 
these circumstances market failure could be overcome if: 
• the cost of People’s Century was subsidised by $15,000 
• advertisers valued the audience for People’s Century at 17.5c per viewer, and the 
audience for Police Stop! at 10c per viewer.  
In either case, the broadcaster would acquire equal benefit from either programme.65 
                                                 
64  While the social benefit figures are entirely fictional, the costs are based on those reported by 
Horrocks (1995; 88-89), and the 1995 NZoA funding schedule for “low-budget” documentary 
series. 
65  Note, however, that the cost of ‘producing’ the audience:  the additional cost to the broadcaster of 
establishing the value of the audience, through audience research, promotion and so forth (the 
“selling costs”), would have to be added to the programme costs. 
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Figure 16: Accounting vs Welfare Analysis of Programme Choice 
This analysis does not apply in the same way to the demand of advertisers for 
audiences.  The advertisers’ intensity of preference is taken into account in deciding 
which programmes will be shown, and advertisers’ welfare may also be taken into 
consideration. We may infer from this analysis that, if a government chose to pursue a 
policy that encouraged commercial free-to-air broadcasting, it was also accepting that 
the total welfare of society should be measured primarily by the welfare that would 
accrue to advertisers.  There is nothing inherently “wrong” about such a choice. Indeed, 
it could easily be argued that improving the welfare of advertisers oils the wheels of 
commerce and improves the welfare of society as a whole in other ways.  However, it is 
wrong to argue that this policy would significantly improve the welfare of the 
audiences.   
Accounting analysis 
Programme Audience size Price per 
Viewer 
Audience 
Value 
Programme 
Cost 
Net Margin 
Peoples Century 200,000 $0.10 $20,000 $5,000 
$15,000 
Police Stop 500,000 $0.10 $50,000 $20,000 $30,000 
Economic welfare analysis 
Programme Audience size Total Social Benefit Programme Cost Net Social 
Benefit 
Peoples Century 200,000 500,000 $5,000 
$445,000 
$230 000500 000 250 000 $20 000Police Stop
Licence Fees and Welfare 
If audiences could pay directly for the programmes that they wished to watch, their 
preferences would be better reflected. However, rather than looking at Pay TV next, we 
will have a look at how the level of the license fee affects audience welfare. 
Fraser (1996) provides a formal model for the payment of broadcasting licence fees. In 
it, broadcasting is treated as an excludable public good.  That is, if someone purchases a 
television, it is assumed that they will also pay the licence fee.66  The license fee is a 
lump-sum tax on television owners, where payment of the fee entitles the purchaser to 
consume the total output of the public good.67.  Because consumers are self-selecting 
they have a choice of paying the fixed price or not consuming at all. Some consumers 
are forced to pay for more than they would ideally consume, in order to consume any at 
all; others consume less than they want, since they are unable to purchase more or 
different outputs at the stated price.  
                                                 
66  Fee evaders are excluded from the model. 
67  It may help to think of this model as applying in Britain before the advent of the independent 
television channels: the BBC funded by the licence fee, and no other services available. 
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Figure 17: Welfare and Level of Licence Fee 
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Figure 17 demonstrates one of the key ideas discussed in Fraser’s article. With a licence 
fee set at $150, there will be 100,000 subscribers providing revenues of $15m.  This 
sum also represents the total welfare of the society derived from television viewing.  
We want to know how consumers will respond if the licence fee is raised or reduced.68  
In this Figure 17 it is halved, to $75. One possible outcome, shown here by the line D1, 
is that the drop in the licence fee leads to an increase in the number of subscribers to 
150,000.  While this means a television service becomes available to a larger audience, 
revenues fall to $11.25m in total, and society’s total welfare therefore also falls.  In the 
other cases, shown by the line D2 and D3, the number of subscribers increases to 
200,000 but revenues remain the same ($15m), or the number of subscribers increases 
to 125,000, but revenues fall. 
Fraser finds that important considerations to be taken account of in the model are the 
economies of scale in production of the good, and the society’s concern for 
egalitarianism.   
• The presence of economies of scale means that lowering the fee in order to attract 
more consumers, if it reduces the total licence fee income (D3), might decrease the 
level of programme output by a greater amount (in hours of broadcast time), than 
the fall in revenue.  It would therefore reduce the total social benefit by more than 
the fall in revenue, since the output of programming would also fall.  
                                                 
68  The economic concept being outlined here is known as the “own-price elasticity of demand”, which 
refers to consumer responses to a change in price for one good, while the prices of all other goods 
are held constant. 
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• A more egalitarian society, with a more equal dispersion of income will naturally 
increase the number of potential subscribers, whereas a less equal income dispersion 
will restrict the number of subscribers, and may also reduce welfare overall.   
• By contrast to this model, with its self-selecting consumers, mandatory taxation 
could be used to provide the good.   This may increase the welfare of society 
overall, but reduce welfare for the poor (depending on the regressiveness of the tax 
system). 
• Fraser’s model reminds us that license-fee funded public broadcasting services are 
not a free good, except to fee-evaders.  Every viewer is charged the average cost of 
providing the broadcast service, regardless of the amount they consume, or the 
intensity of their preference for the programmes provided.  Some viewers obtain 
greater-than-average benefits, while others gain less.  Importantly, the overall social 
benefit of the service will depend on the level at which the license fee is set, and the 
efficiency with which programmes are produced. 
The idea of a license fee presumes that the broadcaster will be a discriminating 
monopolist, of the type proposed by Steiner (page 50, above), on the assumption that a 
discriminating monopolist will seek to serve all audiences. If the monopolist also takes 
into account the intensity of consumers’ preferences it would also provide a programme 
mix that produces the highest net social benefit.  
The paradigm falters when consumers are able to privately purchase programmes. 
Rather than paying a licence fee, consumers might prefer to decide for themselves 
whether to spend the money on cable, satellite or pay TV services, in order to receive 
the programmes they want. In New Zealand, people who are able to receive a free 
television service (free, that is except for the cost of watching advertisements), are 
legally obliged to pay a broadcasting licence fee which subsidises the cost of services 
they may not wish to consume.  Unless they do so, they are supposed to forego 
watching (colour) television at all.   
Pay TV 
Fraser’s model provides a basis for modelling the provision of pay TV services.  The 
only difference is that payment of the subscription fee is voluntary for pay TV, and the 
service is excludable – so there is no possibility of “free riders” obtaining the service 
and not paying for it. Most consumers of pay TV in New Zealand currently do not pay 
on a per-programme basis.  Rather, they pay a monthly fee to receive an entire 
programme of sport, or news, or movies.69  This effectively excludes some audiences 
from receiving particular programmes (such as live All Black test matches).  However, 
it begs the question of whether the welfare loss to those households is so significant that 
government intervention should be required to mitigate it. 
                                                 
69  Cable services are often “bundled”, meaning that one pays a higher price for a bundle of services, 
but a lower price than paying for each of the services separately. Sometimes one pays a lower price 
than paying for any of the services separately.  This practice requires viewers to over-consume, 
relative to their actual preferences. 
 74
In Figure 18, we see how pay TV channels price a live test match.  The AC=S curve 
tells us that the cost of supplying the programme (including the cost of purchasing the 
live broadcast rights) is $400,000.  The viewers’ demand schedule lies above part of the 
AC=S curve, implying that some viewers are willing to pay more than the average 
supply cost.  The broadcaster maximises his profits by charging $3.00 per subscriber for 
this match, which provides him with a tidy profit of $200,000.70  There is a loss of 
welfare to viewers who would like to watch the live match, but who cannot or will not 
pay the asking price of $3.00. 
Figure 18: Pay TV and Welfare - mixed systems 
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When delayed coverage of the match is replayed on free-to-air television, it attracts the 
residual audience of 300,000, who pay no money to receive the broadcast.71 There will 
only be a welfare loss if the residual audience is not large enough, or not valuable 
enough, for advertisers to meet the supply cost. 
This model predicts that many, if not all, of the programmes that are intensely preferred 
by large audiences will tend to migrate to pay TV.  Free-to-air television will therefore 
increasingly tend to broadcast less intensely-preferred programming which attracts large 
audiences, and is relatively cheap to produce.  People who would willingly pay to watch 
their most-preferred programmes, but who cannot afford to, will be disadvantaged. 
Advertising and Welfare 
Wildman and Owen (1985), developed a model that incorporates the welfare effects of 
advertising.72 In this, advertisements are treated as a disutility, and therefore 
                                                 
70  The profit maximising point is found at the maximum vertical distance between the AC=S and 
Demand curves, which is where both curves have the same slope, as shown. 
71  Wildman and Owen (1994: Chapter 2) discuss the practice of “windowing”, which is the practice of 
staggering the release of a “text” in various media as a form of price discrimination. 
72  Their incentive for doing so was the American Justice Department’s successful challenge, in 1981, 
to the National Association of Broadcasters’ rules capping the amount of advertisements that 
members could broadcast (Owen and Wildman, 1992: 125). 
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“…commercial time may be treated as a non-monetary price that viewers pay to see 
programs supported by advertising.” (126) 73 
Figure 19, which appears in Owen and Wildman (1992: 126), demonstrates the general 
proposition that advertising minutes can be incorporated in a welfare model.  The model 
shows how the number of viewers decreases as the number of commercial minutes 
increases, creating a welfare loss for those viewers unwilling to pay the “price” of being 
bombarded with advertising.74   
At some point on the schedule, the loss of revenue from diminishing audience minutes 
will exceed the gain in revenue from increasing advertising minutes.  However, the 
power of this restraint on broadcasters will depend critically on the own-price elasticity 
of demand for audience minutes in advertising markets, the shape of the audience’s 
willingness-to-pay (that is, withstand advertising) schedule, and the expected reactions 
of other broadcasters.75   
Figure 19: Demand as a Function of Advertising 
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Advertising diminishes the net benefits received by viewers, even though it increases 
the net benefits received by advertisers. One could measure the relative welfare benefits 
quite easily.  Say the audience for one hour of prime-time television is 100,000 viewers, 
                                                 
73  The concept of treating advertisements as an explicit cost to the user of media services is spreading. 
The Economist (23/8/97: 15), notes that a Swedish telephone company offers free calls to callers 
willing to be interrupted by brief commercial breaks. 
74  They assume that, because the marginal cost of supply is zero, the marginal viewer should pay 
nothing, rather than the average cost (hence the presence of a marginal cost curve).  This is a 
theoretical error, which renders their treatment of Pay TV, in the same book,  nearly 
incomprehensible. 
75  The last point is that which Masson, et al. (1990) theorised, and which was incorporated into the 
analysis of supply-side market failure, above. 
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and in that hour they watch 15 minutes of advertising.  If we priced that time at $10 per 
hour, the value of those audience minutes would be $250,000 – a measure, in other 
words, of the price that the audience is “paying” for watching that hour of television. 
This might be compared to either the price paid by advertisers for those 15 minutes, or 
the net social benefit of the programme being broadcast, as a means of determining 
whether there are “too many” ads on television.76 
Horrocks (1995) also reports that some critics of the Broadcasting Act wanted “…the 
broadcasting fee to be used to buy BBC programmes directly or to fund the removal of 
advertising from some days of the week.” (98)  Inevitably, however, if viewers prefer 
not to have any advertisements, they must be prepared to pay for broadcasting by some 
other means – a higher licence fee, higher personal taxes, or by subscribing to a pay TV 
service. 
Treasury’s use of Welfare Economics 
This section has introduced the concept of welfare economics and demonstrated how it 
may be used in a number of ways to analyse the broadcasting industry. We have also 
used it to demonstrate that free-to-air media are not really “free” at all; consuming 
advertisements is simply one among a variety means of paying for broadcasting 
services, each of which has implications for the way the benefits of viewing (or not 
viewing) will be distributed. We have used it to demonstrate that commercial free-to-air 
broadcasting could optimise the welfare of audiences – although they may optimise the 
welfare of advertisers.   
This was acknowledged by Treasury in the part of its submission dealing with welfare 
and advertising-supported television (1986: 31, 36).  However, the submission then 
goes on to employ the Steiner/Beebe model reviewed in the previous chapter to argue 
that: “With a more efficient spectrum allocation system,… and with no unnecessary 
regulatory constraints on the development of alternatives such as cable TV and UHF… 
there is no reason why an advertising-supported system with a competitive structure 
should not provide a large degree of programme diversity” (36).   
The submission then acknowledges that this would not meet the needs of all audiences, 
especially smaller ones with intense preferences: “Some gaps in programming where 
audience benefits exceed costs might still remain however, and it is to private methods 
of dealing with these that we now turn” (36). There follows a brief review of club or 
subscription-supported broadcasting and pay TV.   
The submission then turns its attention to tax-funded broadcasting, with a lengthy 
explanation that the government would have difficulty assessing consumer preferences 
in the absence of an explicit price mechanism.  It concludes that tax-funded 
broadcasting will generally be less efficient than pay TV unless: 
• Pay and subscription broadcasting fail to produce net welfare benefits, due to high 
transactions costs, and 
                                                 
76  The presence of supernormal profits (that is, profits that are higher than expected for the investment 
risk involved in broadcasting) would suggest a prima facie case for undertaking such an analysis. 
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• The benefits of tax-funded broadcasting outweighed all relevant costs, including the 
cost of raising taxes and the information costs of discovering audience preferences. 
This part of the Treasury submission is not an assessment of the welfare costs and 
benefits of public broadcasting, vis-à-vis other means of funding radio and television.  It 
is an argument against tax-funded broadcasting, based on the idea that the information 
costs would probably be too high.  However, the radio and television industries do in 
fact meet the costs of obtaining information about audience preferences (through ratings 
and market research), and seem to do so efficiently. In principle it would not be more 
difficult or expensive to assess the intensity of audience preferences. 
There is, however, a more fundamental issue regarding the application of welfare 
economics to media audiences, which flows from one of its fundamental assumptions: 
the idea that consumer preferences are exogenously determined.  This was not addressed 
at all in the Treasury analysis. 
Welfare and Endogenous Preferences 
The basic concept of welfare economics is that the market will supply what the 
consumer desires, rather than the consumer demanding what the market supplies. In the 
model presented in Figure 14a, we started with an observation of a consumer’s preferred 
bundle of goods. We did not enquire what sort of psychological satisfaction (utility) the 
consumer obtained from the goods, nor did we lift the veil to discover how consumers’ 
preferences were formed.  Therefore we assumed that the consumer’s preferences were 
exogenous (determined outside the model). This is an assumption that underpins welfare 
economics models because consumers’ revealed preferences (i.e. what they actually 
choose to consume), are observable and therefore provide a factual foundation for the 
theory.  The consumers’ motives for purchasing goods, and the psychological 
satisfactions they obtain from their consumption, are not observable.  As we attempt to 
discover these, we move from objective fact to subjective assessment – and the 
economic theory rapidly starts to lose its pseudo-scientific gloss. 
Clearly, exogenous preference formation ought not be assumed, in discussing media 
economics, unless one also assumes that the media has little or no influence over 
audience preferences.  As we have already seen in Chapter 1, the nature and extent of 
media influence is a matter of considerable debate in the social sciences.  Although 
there is no agreed view on the matter, it is possible to use some of the ideas about media 
influence that we have reviewed to investigate the issue of endogenous vs exogenous 
preference formation, as it relates to consumption of media itself.  
Figure 20 presents a four-quadrant model of some possibilities regarding media 
influence and the formation of consumers’ media consumption preference.  The top left 
quadrant assumes that the media does influence audiences (in the long-term), and that 
media consumers will develop a taste for the products supplied by the market.  This 
reflects what is known as the Lord Reith’s “BBC knows best” principle, which Treasury 
repeats in its submission:   
“It is occasionally [pointed out] to [the BBC] that we are apparently setting out to give the 
public what we think they need – and not what they want, but few know what they want, and 
very few what they need”(49).   
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Much has been made, in debates about broadcasting policy, of the “BBC knows best” 
view.  It is often condemned for its elitism, and for its implicit support of a particular 
view of what constitutes “quality” culture.  However the idea of endogenous preference 
formation need not be linked to “elite” broadcasting only.  John McCready, as head of 
programming for TVNZ, introduced New Zealand to Australian rugby league by 
playing it every Friday night. He also refused to accept New Zealand on Air funding for 
Shortland Street until NZoA agreed to support it for an entire year, on the grounds that 
it would take the New Zealand audience that long to develop a taste for home-grown 
situation drama of this type.  His assessment that the audience would form a preference 
for these programmes was correct; Shortland Street is now an institution on our screens, 
and Rugby League is so popular that it is now screened predominantly on pay TV. 
The top right quadrant hypothesises that media consumption choices are exogenous and 
the media influences the choice of media consumed.  At the extreme, this might be 
logically impossible. However, it is also possible that media consumption choices could 
be initially shaped by external influence (such as ethnic culture or religious belief), and 
that the audience only consumes media messages that fit with – and subsequently 
reinforce – those preferences. They are rational utility maximisers in the strict sense 
proposed by Steiner’s model: they watch their first preference or nothing at all.  
In the lower right quadrant, we have media consumers who fit Fiske’s neo-Marxist 
mould: their media consumption preferences are shaped exogenously, and the media is 
not influential.  This is the “active audience” who co-opt media messages and their 
meanings into their own world view.  These are also the rational utility-maximising 
media consumers proposed by Treasury, in defiance of the notion that the media are 
influential in forming consumers tastes for media itself – whereas economic logic would 
dictate otherwise. 77 
                                                 
77  That is, as proposed in the “economic” argument presented under the heading Economics and Media 
Effects, page 20, above. 
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Figure 20: Preference Formation and Media Influence 
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In the lower left quadrant, we have media consumers whose tastes for media 
consumption are formed by the media, but where we presume the media are not 
influential in forming those tastes.  Again, this may be logically impossible at the 
extreme.  However, it is conceivable that the media contribute to the formation of a 
social environment or atmosphere that is influential. In that case the media may 
influence peoples’ preferences, even though it is not directly influential. 
It is probably possible to identify individuals who fit any or all of these categories.  It is 
also likely that these ‘pictures’ of the audience will be used in policy debates, depending 
on the position of the person making claims about media influence and policy 
outcomes.  
However, if we accept that the media does have an influence on consumer choice, then 
we must assume that audience taste formation is at partially, if not predominantly, 
endogenous. The clearest picture we have of media influence, is that media is influential 
in a socially mediated context.  That is, the media has a weak direct influence on 
audiences, but a pervasive indirect influence, which is mediated by peoples’ peer groups 
and other sources of social “cues”. Also, media is likely to be more influential in a 
cultural climate that supports conformism, and where the media are both ubiquitous and 
consonant.  The strength of these effects will therefore depend to some extent on the 
broadcasting policy environment, as well as other cultural and communications policies 
– and the extent of their congruence with other policies and social institutions.78 
                                                 
 
78  The debate raised by Steiner, Beebe and others about diversity of broadcasting outputs revolves 
around an implicit presumption that the media should offer a diverse range of programmes.  This 
could be taken to mean that the media ought to satisfy a wide range of exogenously-formed 
preferences (i.e., satisfy the consumers in the right two quadrants of ).  On the other hand, Figure 20
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Obviously, the idea that consumer preferences are endogenous undermines the whole 
notion of consumer sovereignty.  Whereas the Treasury analysis ignores this issue, the 
Peacock Committee (1986) gives it serious consideration:79 
“ (if) consumers’ tastes are not formed by consciously conducted trial-and-error processes 
but by “outside” forces, notably by advertisers who can manipulate consumer choices…. 
(this) implies that replacing the license fee with advertising revenue for the BBC would not 
be in the interests of listeners of viewers.” (28)  
It also addresses the “BBC knows best” argument: 
“The principle behind this argument clearly appeals to those who regard broadcasting as a 
public service designed to influence and not merely to reflect the public’s preferences for 
programmes…(if this were accepted) a free market in broadcasting services, if technically 
possible, should not be encouraged.” (28) 
The committee goes on to say that different ways of funding broadcasting embody value 
judgements, which it could not avoid taking a position on.  In its conclusions and 
recommendations, it recognises that consumer sovereignty is imperfect, and that some 
people may come to enjoy what they do not already, or “…will accept guidance or 
stimulus from others where they perceive that their knowledge or taste is limited.” 
(128).  In short, the Peacock Committee’s recognition that preference formation might 
be endogenous led it to support an ongoing role for public broadcasting. 
Direct Benefits 
To finish off this chapter, we will return to one of the issue of “deadweight losses” is 
created in some circumstances, when a consumer cannot, or will not, consume a product 
because the price (psychological or monetary), is too high.   
They divide the possible rationales for public television into two categories: those that 
provide direct benefits (which accrue to the viewers of public television), and those that 
provide external benefits (which accrue to people who do not watch public television).  
The next chapter deals with the notion of external benefits. 
Noll, et al (1977) state that government intervention that produces direct benefits to 
viewers can be justified on either of two grounds:   
(1) When the benefits to the viewers exceed the costs of providing the service, or  
(2) When society desires to redistribute income to viewers by subsidising their 
television viewing.   
                                                                                                                                               
it could be argued that the media should provide diversity in order to prevent it from having undue 
influence on the population’s political and other preferences (mitigate the media’s effects on 
consumers in the left-side quadrants of ). Figure 20
79  It is unclear whether the committee was referring to endogenous formation of consumer preferences 
for media itself. 
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However, they take the view that discussion of such matters is really outside their 
purview: “The best measure of the value of public television to (viewers) is the amount 
they are willing to pay for it.” (215).  This position is explained in a footnote: 
“This is the conventional view of economists that consumers are rational.  Alternatively, one 
could take the position that most viewers do not know what they like - or what is good for 
them - and, therefore, that a group has to be empowered to make programming decisions “in 
the public interest”.  This view is not only elitist and undemocratic, but also permits no 
further examination of the proper role and scope of broadcasting.  We ignore the “BBC 
knows best” approach simply because, as economists, we have little of substance to say 
about it.” (215; footnote 8) 
They follow this statement with an explanation of how the expansion of programming 
choices with the arrival of cable TV would “…increase viewing options so much that 
public television will no longer serve a worthwhile purpose.” (216) This is Noam’s 
“mixed systems” argument, which is explained above (page 52).  
Treasury agrees that government should not pay for goods which people cannot, or will 
not, pay for themselves:   
“The proposition that Government should fund programmes for which people would not be 
willing to pay the supply costs even if they could, is usually referred to as a “merit good” 
argument.  This is best seen as a non-economic proposition, because economics usually 
assumes that consumers are sovereign – individuals judgements of the benefits they receive 
from consuming goods or services are the appropriate criteria for assessing consumer 
welfare.” (48) 
This argument attempts to draw a boundary around what is and what is not 
“economics”. It is very clearly an ideological statement, which seeks to define and 
protect the boundaries of a “closed system” of thought.  It consigns social, legal, 
cultural considerations to the realm of political (and therefore irrational and inefficient) 
decision-making processes. 
Summary 
We began this chapter by stating the general assumptions linking the idea of consumer 
sovereignty to economic welfare, and the optimal allocation of society’s scarce 
resources.  The first section then showed us that: 
• Commercial free-to-air radio and television will respond to the advertisers’ demand 
for different audiences to consume.  This will increase social welfare to the extent 
that it increases the welfare of advertisers.80   
• Alternative means of paying for broadcast services have different welfare impacts: 
the license fee will exclude some audiences, as will pay TV.  The existence of 
mixed pay and free-to-air systems will tend to divide audiences into “haves” and 
                                                 
80  The analysis in the previous chapter, however, also suggests that an oligopolistic media market, 
which will tend to emerge as increasing numbers of frequencies are made available, could make this 
market inefficient, compromising advertisers’ potential welfare gains. 
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“have-nots”. Audiences pay for “free-to-air” commercial broadcasting by suffering 
the negative welfare impacts from advertising. 
The second section showed us that the presence of endogenous consumer preferences 
should encourage a cautious approach to the application of welfare economics and its 
methods when discussing broadcasting policy. 
It is not possible to make a detailed critical assessment of the manner in which the 
Treasury submission to the RCBRT treats its approach to welfare economics because it:  
• Ignores the welfare impacts of advertising on audiences. 
• Does not seriously consider the welfare impacts of tax-funded broadcasting – 
preferring instead to put forward a rhetorical argument about the information costs 
of discovering audience preferences.   
• Ignores the possibility that the media may influence consumers’ preferences for 
media outputs.  
Finally, it dismisses the notion that audience welfare could be improved by government 
provision of direct benefits, by refusing to contemplate that such considerations are 
worthy of economists’ attention.  
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Chapter 8 Rights and Property Rights 
Deregulation does not necessarily mean the removal of regulation.  It may also refer to a 
process whereby goods or services are allocated by the market, which had until then 
been allocated by the authority of the state or by common law (the polity). Brian Easton 
(1997: 29), quotes this passage from Pusey (1993: 15): 
“A first assumption of social democrats everywhere is that nation societies (and federations 
such as the emerging Europe) have not one co-ordinating mechanism but two.  On the one 
side they have states, bureaucracies and the law, and on the other, economies, markets and 
money. It is with these structures we collectively coordinate our relations with the rest of the 
world, our work, our social interactions, and most other aspects of life we understand as 
‘civil society’ and normatively define with notions of citizenship, democracy and human 
rights.” 
In order for market regulation to take effect, it is necessary to specify, create and 
allocate property rights.  This may take one of two forms: the creation of property rights 
where no rights previously existed, or the transformation of rights, which had been 
created within the polity, into property rights. 
A primary purpose of broadcasting deregulation was to create property rights out of the 
right to broadcast, so that the difficulties of the Broadcasting Tribunal process could be 
overcome.  Treasury claimed this would also lead to greater allocative efficiency: 
“Open competitive access to the radio spectrum will tend to promote the development of 
efficient broadcasting systems… (resulting) in a more efficient pattern of resource use and 
consumption than the existing or alternative developments because it will be based more 
directly on consumer preferences and opportunity costs.” (from points ix and x, Treasury 
1985: 2) 
The piece of economic theory that proposes and justifies the creation of well- specified 
property rights, their allocation and their efficient exchange is known as the Coase 
Theorem.   
The Coase Theorem and Allocative Efficiency 
The Coase Theorem was first outlined in an article by Ronald Coase titled The Federal 
Communications Commission (Coase, 1959). He developed it further in The Problem of 
Social Cost (Coase, 1961). The Coase Theorem is often misunderstood. Veljanovski 
(1982) identifies five interpretations of its meaning in the literature of economics, and 
notes that: 
 “...there is a continuing controversy among economists surrounding the validity of the 
Coase Theorem.  No year passes without several articles in the most respected journals 
refuting the theorem and a corresponding number reaffirming it.” 
The theorem therefore needs to be handled with some care.  We will describe it first, 
then look at its meaning as it applies to broadcasting rights.   
 84
The Coase Theorem can be demonstrated in the model presented in Figure 21.  Recall 
the diagram in the previous chapter that shows how an individual chooses to maximise 
her utility given her income and a set of prices (Figure 14a, on page 68).  If you 
duplicate that diagram then rotate the copy so that its corner (origin) is at the top right, 
then fit the two diagrams together, you have an Edgeworth box. This represents a two-
person economy (although it may equally represent two groups of people).  We will call 
them person A and person B.81   
Figure 21: Edgeworth Box Depiction of the Coase Theorem 
In this example, the economy has only two goods: wealth and smoke. Person A is a 
smoker and prefers to be able to smoke more. Person B is a non-smoker, and prefers 
that there is less smoke (therefore that person A will smoke less). The right to smoke is 
a property right specifying the total amount of smoke that may be produced, which A 
and B must somehow share. In this little economy there is also fixed amount of wealth 
(representing “all other goods”). This is how the model works: 
• Initial allocations of wealth and smoke are set at point X. 
• Both A and B have utility curves (UA and UB), convex to their respective origins (at 
bottom left and top right of the box), representing their constant utility trade-offs 
between wealth and smoke.  These must both pass through point X. 
• It is possible for A and B to trade with each other, to any point within the “lens” 
shape created by these initial utility curves. In this case they trade to point X*.  
                                                 
81  In a two-dimensional diagram, we can only have two people in this economy.  Using mathematics, 
we could create a multi-dimensional “space” with as many people as we please.  Conceptually, this 
could represent an entire economy.  
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• At X* their new utility curves (UA* and UB*), are both “higher”, or further from their 
respective origins, than they were before. This means both are better off than before. 
• The curves UA* and UB* are at a point of tangency. This means that now neither can 
be better off without making the other worse off.  If A moves to a “higher” utility 
curve, B must move to a “lower” utility curve and vice-versa. 
• The point of tangency lies on a line running from A’s origin to B’s, which is called 
the ‘contract curve’. This represents all the possible points of tangency between 
their respective sets of utility curves. 
• In the little insert box, you can see the slope of the straight line running through 
points X and X* represents the agreed price, or the amount of wealth A has paid and 
the amount of smoke A has gained for it. In this type of model, the line always 
slopes downward to the right, as you must give up some wealth in order to gain 
more property. 
The most important thing to remember from this, is that it describes precisely what 
economists mean by allocative efficiency.  That is, an efficient allocation has been 
achieved when people can buy and sell property, in a free market, to a point where none 
can be made better off without making others worse off. It also demonstrates the link 
between consumer sovereignty and allocative efficiency: it shows that individuals, who 
are the best judges of their own needs, are able to freely contract with each other. These 
contracts will decide what gets produced, in what amounts, and therefore how society’s 
scarce resources can be allocated without any intervention by the state. Indeed, 
intervention by the state would “distort” this efficient allocation. 
The most widely accepted definition of the Coase Theorem is: Where adequately 
specified property rights exist in any good, and in the absence of transactions costs, any 
initial point of allocation will allow an efficient allocation to be achieved.  
This is one of the most powerful and elegant arguments in economic theory (more so in 
its mathematical form), and it is the foundation stone upon which broadcasting 
deregulation rested.  However, the theorem it is not as straightforward to apply as it first 
seems, and it needs to be treated with a great deal of care, especially when applied to 
broadcasting. 
Creating property rights 
In order to create a market in tradable rights to smoke, certain conditions have to be 
met.  In the model presented above, these would be: 
• Total amount of smoke: Someone has to decide how much smoke will be produced 
in total (perhaps measured in cigarettes per hour). 
• Divisibility:  The property right must be adequately divisible. If we specified the 
amount of smoke as in packs of cigarettes per day, then the unit of rights might be 
too large for A and B to trade within the “lens” and no trade would be possible. 
• Alienability: In order to sell something, you have to be able to transfer your right to 
that thing to someone else, or alienate it.  That means you must also have an 
unambiguous right that is “…assigned to one identifiable person, the ‘owner’, rather 
than a vague collection of people, as common property….” (Fountain, 1988: i) 
• Specification of property right: Someone has to decide precisely what we mean by 
“smoke”.  Does it mean only cigarette smoke, or does it include cigar smoke? 
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Should high-tar cigarettes are counted as equal to low-tar cigarettes? If the amount 
of smoke is measured in cigarettes per hour, should the size of the room that A and 
B share be included in the specification of the rights? 
• Enforceability: Someone needs to decide who will monitor the output of smoke 
and, if there is a dispute over the amount of smoke in the air, someone will have to 
judge whether person A or person B is correct in claiming that their rights have been 
violated. 
• An acceptable initial allocation: Someone has to decide where the initial allocation 
point is.  
• Legitimacy: For the initial allocation to be accepted by A and B, as well as all the 
other matters, both will have to accept that the decision-making process is 
legitimate. That means someone also has to decide (or A and B have to agree) how 
the decision should be made. 
All of these decisions are legal and political matters, or matters of policy.82 They are not 
made in the market, but by society’s other co-ordinating mechanism: the law, the 
Government, and the Government’s advisors. Given that all these decisions can be 
made, it is possible to create a market that will efficiently regulate the production of 
smoke. 
Initial Allocation 
One interpretation of the Coase theorem is any initial allocation point will produce 
equally efficient outcomes.  This claim is dangerously wrong, and it is important to 
understand why.  
The point is demonstrated in Figure 22, below. Let us say the initial allocation of rights 
was entirely in favour of person A, the smoker, at point XA. This means A has rights to 
all the smoke (A and B have equal wealth). Given that both have “normal” utility 
curves, they will trade along a downward-sloping line, to a point represented as point 
X*A. This indicates that person B has paid person A to smoke less. 
If the initial allocation of rights was entirely in favour of person B, the non-smoker, at 
point XB, then B has rights to all the smoke. A and B will trade along the other sloping 
line, to a point represented as point X*B, indicating that person A has paid person B so 
they can smoke. 
As the diagram shows, the different initial allocation produces very different outcomes, 
in terms of the wealth and the right to smoke (or not-smoke) of the two people. 
                                                 
82  Coase argues that statutory regulation of radio frequencies was unnecessary and, given time, the 
Courts would have developed a body of law delimiting property rights, that could have been later 
supplemented by regulation (Fountain, 1988: 3).  He is essentially claiming that common law has 
greater legitimacy than the law-making capacity of an elected legislature. 
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Figure 22: Initial Allocations 
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X*B 
X*A
If A gets the initial allocation, A ends up both wealthier and with a greater amount of 
property rights than B.  Furthermore, A suffers no loss (and possibly some gain) in 
utility after the two parties have traded, by definition. The only case in which an equal 
allocation could be reached after trade, is if both A and B were utterly indifferent as to 
the amount of smoke created – in which case smoke would have no value at all, by 
definition. 
The decision as to initial allocation is probably the single most important aspect of 
deregulation, as it has significant impacts on the equity and wealth of affected parties. 
Transactions Costs 
When the government created property rights out of the right to broadcast, it could have 
allocated the rights equally to every citizen (person A) or it could have allocated all the 
rights to broadcasters (person B).  If broadcasters wanted to have a right to broadcast, 
they would have to pay the audience.  If, on the other hand, citizens wanted to have the 
right to broadcast, they would have to pay the broadcaster for it. 
The first option might incur high transactions costs. Fountain, outlining the work of 
DeVany et al. (1969), mentions the possibility of allocating “interference” rights to the 
audience, but notes that “…the transactions costs involved in negotiating with large 
numbers of broadcast receiver owners would be prohibitive, thereby reducing the value 
of transmission rights.” (16, footnote 30) The idea of transactions cost is important: if 
the cost of making a contract were too high, neither party could move from X to X* and 
allocative efficiency could not be achieved.  However, Fountain is wrong in one respect: 
it is not necessary for “broadcast receiver owners” to hold their property rights severally 
and individually.  
We can demonstrate this with the model in Figure 22, above. Under the first allocation, 
in favour of person A, the audience could collectively engage an agent who would 
negotiate with broadcasters over the price they had to pay to acquire the right to 
broadcast. This was in effect the role played by the Broadcasting Tribunal, prior to 
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deregulation.  If the rights were allocated in the second manner, in favour of person B, 
the audience could collectively appoint an agent to purchase broadcasting rights from 
broadcasters on their behalf.  This is the role currently played by New Zealand on Air. 
Allocative Efficiency 
Prior to deregulation, the Broadcasting Tribunal had some power to control the content 
of broadcasts. It imposed conditions on warrants that compelled broadcasters to produce 
particular outputs, such as local news and current affairs. The effect was similar in 
theory to the effect of a fixed quota, which is demonstrated by the model in Figure 23, 
below.  
Figure 23: Efficiency and Quotas 
A (Audience) 
B (Broadcaster)
UB 
 XQ: Fixed Quota 
Indifferent to impact on Broadcaster’s Revenue 
100% 
UA 
0%  
Prefers more Net Revenue ($) 
Y %  
Prefers 
NZ  
content. 
Indifferent 
to NZ  
content. 
Uncertain revenue impact 
As one can see, this quota dictates the amount of New Zealand content produced, but it 
is indifferent to the effect on broadcasters’ revenue.  It cannot answer the question is an 
efficient allocation of society’s resources being spent on New Zealand content?  
The next model, in Figure 24, shows what situation under the current scheme for 
subsidising particular outputs through New Zealand on Air. How much New Zealand 
content A obtains is dependent largely on the amount B wants to acquire, and the price 
they agree. However, B is under no obligation to produce any output of New Zealand 
content at all (being indifferent).83  A is obliged to spend the entire license fee, which 
means that B has power to set the terms of trade in his favour. 
                                                 
83  Quite literally, in Television New Zealand’s case, as the State Owned Enterprises Act requires it to 
maximise its return to shareholding Ministers unless they specifically request otherwise. 
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Figure 24: Efficiency and Subsidies 
This means we know how much money is going to be spent, but we are uncertain about 
the amount of output that will be created. Theoretically then, the subsidy scheme is no 
more allocatively efficient than the quota scheme, because it cannot answer the question 
is the amount of resource being spent on New Zealand content sufficient to produce the 
desired outcome?  
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B (Broadcaster)
UB 
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This tells us more about the concept of allocative efficiency than it does about the 
relative merits of subsidies and quotas.  Recall in the last section of Chapter 2 we 
outlined the difference between synthetic and analytic statements. A synthetic statement 
is true by definition “…the statement that all men are animals does not really make any 
assertion about the facts about men, but only reveals part of what we mean by the word 
‘man’.”(Stevenson, 1987: 19).  To say allocative efficiency has been achieved does not 
make a meaningful assertion about whether the proper amounts of society’s scarce 
resources are being applied to producing particular goods and services. It simply means 
they can be bought and sold in a market.  It also implies that market value is the only 
reliable measure of value. 
The Coase Theorem is normative, in the sense that it suggests as many rights as possible 
ought to be allocated and exchanged in the market because then, and only then, can 
society establish their “true” value.   In short, the Theorem is an argument in favour of a 
political philosophy that prefers regulation by the market to regulation by the polity.  It 
is not a prescription for good governance per se.84 
                                                 
84  Allocative efficiency does not create economic growth (it does not make the “box” bigger), although 
was purportedly one of the purposes of introducing microeconomic reform. Greater allocative 
efficiency in input markets could lead to greater productivity.  However, this could equally mean 
producing a constant amount of output with fewer resources - likely to lead to economic contraction 
- or greater output with the same resources - which would accompany, but not necessarily lead to, 
economic growth. 
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Political Rights and Property Rights 
The choice between regulation by the polity or by the market touches on a very 
important issue: the need, when developing policy, to distinguish between property 
rights and other sorts of rights, such as social or political rights. We will review two 
cases: the creation of property rights where no rights previously existed, and the 
transformation of rights, which had previously existed by the authority of statute or 
common law, into property rights. 
We begin with the case where no specific right exists – such as the implied right to bear 
children – and we wish to consider regulating the rate of childbirth. James Tobin (1970) 
gives an example of how property rights could be created where previously this liberty 
had existed.85 Suppose, for instance, the Government sought to follow China’s lead and 
restrict population growth: 
“Should each and every mother be limited to two children or less? Or should each woman be 
issued two – or two and a fraction tickets, whatever is consistent with zero population 
growth – and be allowed to transfer whole or fractional tickets to other women?  Or should 
the government fix an annual quota of births and auction the tickets to the highest bidders?
  
 “The first system is the most egalitarian, but excludes many voluntary transfers of ‘birth 
rights’ that would in principle increase the utility of all parties concerned.  The second 
system allows such transfers, but also opens up the possibility that rights to have children 
will be concentrated in the rich.  At least the poor and others who give up their rights will be 
well compensated.  This is not the case under the third system, the auction, where the rich 
can still buy up the rights but to the benefit of the general taxpayer rather than of would-be 
mothers who lose out in the auction.” (271) 
The first of Tobin’s options implies a form of state regulation, the second and third 
options are varieties of market regulation: one makes an initial allocation of rights to 
mothers, makes an initial allocation to the state. 
No doubt some readers will find the very idea of trading in birthrights offensive, and 
argue that these rights can only be held equally by all mothers. Tobin coined the term 
specific egalitarianism to describe the idea that “…certain scarce commodities should 
be distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them.” Among these 
“commodities” he counts votes:  
“There are some rights and privileges, and some duties, which the society desires to 
distribute precisely equally among its members,… The distribution is supposed to be wholly 
independent of income and wealth.  Furthermore the distribution is supposed to be 
independent of individuals’ preferences; society would not approve of an individual’s 
voluntary assignment of his share to someone else even if the assignee were of equal or 
lower income….  Allowing a free market in votes could not augment the power of the 
electorate as a whole; it would only serve to distribute it differently.” (269) 
                                                 
85  Using liberty in Hohfeld’s (1961) sense; a liberty being a right each person holds equally and which 
confers no obligations on others to observe it – unlike a claim-right, such as a property right, which 
imposes an obligation on others not to interfere with one’s property. 
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This is clearly a case where a political right should not be converted from a political 
right to a property right: it is a founding principle of representative democracy that the 
right to vote is inalienable – it cannot be transferred to another person. 
There is a special case of inalienable possessions that we must pay particular attention 
to in this country – the rights of Maori under article two of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Under the second article of the Treaty, the Crown guaranteed Maori tino rangatiratanga 
over their taonga (among other things). This was taken by the Waitangi Tribunal to 
mean “…fullness of control…” over “…all their valued customs and possessions…”. 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1986: 20, 22).86  The Waitangi Tribunal decision in 1986 found that 
te reo Maori (the Maori language), was a valued possession in this sense.  A subsequent 
report established that fullness of control over te reo Maori implied “a secure place in 
broadcasting.” (1990: 41) Thus the Tribunal finds that  te reo Maori is a taonga that 
belongs to Maori and it must not be ‘taken’ from them either deliberately or by acts of 
omission.  The Privy Council underpinned that interpretation in 1994: 
 “With the passage of time, the ‘principles’ which underlie the Treaty have become much 
more important than its precise terms.  Foremost among those ‘principles’ are the 
obligation which the Crown undertook of protecting and preserving Maori property, 
including the Maori language as part of taonga, in return for being recognised as the 
legitimate government of the whole nation by Maori.” (517)  
With all due respect to the Privy Council it is incorrect on one point – taonga are not 
property; at least, not in the way that English law and economic theory implies. The 
following explanation is quoted in Mauss (1925), which Elsdon Best (1909), attributes 
to Tamati Ranaipiri: 
“Suppose you have some particular object, taonga, and you give it to me; you give it to me 
without a price.  We do not bargain over it.  Now I give this thing to a third person who after 
a time decides to give me something in repayment for it (utu), and he makes me a present of 
something (taonga).  Now this taonga I received from him is the spirit (hau), of the taonga I 
received from you and which I passed on to him.  The taonga which I receive on account of 
the taonga that came from you, I must return to you....  I must give them to you since they 
are the hau of the taonga which you gave me.  If I were to keep this second taonga for 
myself I might become ill or even die.  Such is the hau, the hau of the of personal property, 
the hau of the taonga, the hau of the forest...”  
Mauss (1925), O’Connor (1991), and Weiner (1992), all elaborate on and discuss the 
paradigm of exchange invoked by taonga, hau and utu (Hay, 1996). The essence of their 
findings is that taonga are “inalienable possessions”, as Weiner puts it. Treating taonga 
on Maori terms, rather than as property, implies that they cannot be exchanged for cash. 
Nor can Maori be compensated in cash if the Crown has failed in its duty to protect a 
taonga.  The only possible recourse – and the only way the Crown can restore its 
legitimacy – is to restore mana Maori by restoring the taonga itself (in this case te reo 
Māori). 
                                                 
86  Under international law, the native language version of such treaties carries greater weight in legal 
interpretation than a version in the language of the non-indigenous party. 
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Market Regulation 
Although certain political and social rights may be inalienable, the method of market 
regulation may by used to protect them. Let us take the example the right of Maori to 
receive Maori language broadcasts.   
Hay (1996) proposes that a secure place in television broadcasting for Maori could be 
created by endowing an allocation of Maori language content on television broadcasters. 
These endowments could conceivably be tradable, so that the broadcaster who regards 
the endowment as a disutility can pay another broadcaster to take his share.87  All the 
conditions for the establishment of an effective market can be met: 
• Amount to be produced: The total amount of Maori language programming should 
be sufficient to produce a certain number of hours per evening overall.  The amount 
has to be sufficient to play an effective role in restoring te reo Māori. 
• Divisibility:  Channels should be able to trade in segments of time or programme 
type.  One may choose to retain Maori language sports commentaries while selling 
off drama, for instance. 
• Alienability: It is the ability of broadcasters to transfer rights among themselves 
this refers to, not an ability to diminish the right itself. 
• Adequate specification: The fundamental specification, driven by the Waitangi 
Tribunal’s findings, is that programmes shall be in te reo Māori.  Further division 
into categories of documentary, drama, news, light entertainment, sport, etc., would 
present some specification difficulties - but these should not insurmountable. 
• Enforceability: The output of television channels is sufficiently observable for 
competitors and consumers to monitor broadcasters’ performance.  Thus, the costs 
of monitoring would be relatively low.  Adequate sanctions for non-performers 
would be relatively simple to determine. 
• An acceptable initial allocation: all television channels, including cable and UHF 
pay TV channels could be required to broadcast a certain number of minutes-per-
evening of Maori language content in prime-time. There would inevitably be 
arguments about how this should be apportioned according to the size of the 
population, or size of Maori population, that a channel reaches. 
• Legitimacy: Such a system would be legitimate within the terms of New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements, and would increase the legitimacy of the Crown in 
Maori eyes.  Broadcasters, and non-Maori audiences, might not agree. 
Such a scheme is not the only means of restoring te reo Māori, of course. Non-
transferable quotas, regulation or direct funding for Maori broadcasting from the public 
purse are other options. However market regulation could equally be applied to 
broadcasting outputs to protect the rights of other ethnic groups, children, women or 
citizens generally. It might also be used to regulate things such as excessive advertising, 
gratuitous violence or explicit sexual content. The major constraint would be the time 
and effort involved in establishing each and every one of these rights as property rights, 
                                                 
87  The endowment in this case takes the form of an obligation, or duty, rather than a right.  However 
one is simply the correlative of the other, so no significant difficulty should arise. 
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deciding the initial allocations, and the subsequent transactions costs of negotiating 
trades between broadcasters, which would impose enormous efficiency costs on the 
broadcasting market. 
External Benefits 
The Coase Theorem can be used to discuss a special case where property rights are 
created to regulate the allocation and production of externalities.  An externality is a by-
product of a production process which imposes burdens (or supplies benefits), to parties 
other than the intended consumer of a commodity.    For example, both air and water 
pollution are “negative” externalities, which impose burdens on society and the 
environment. The producer, and the consumer of the commodity he produces, does not 
directly bear the cost of pollution. It is a cost borne by society as a whole.  As Tobin 
suggests, overpopulation is a negative externality, which may outweigh the private 
rights or liberties of would-be parents. Excessive levels of violence on television might 
also affect society as a whole in detrimental ways. 
Externalities can also be positive. Apple orchards and beehives provide mutual positive 
externalities to the producers of honey and apples.  They each supply an external benefit 
to the producers and consumers of both products.  The idea of positive externalities, or 
“external benefits” is mentioned in the Treasury submission, only receives three 
paragraphs in the Treasury submission, in three paragraphs. First, Treasury sets out the 
economic concept of externalities-based justifications for tax-funded broadcasting: 
“A possible justification for not taking audience preferences as given is if the benefits or 
costs of broadcasting particular programmes fall on non-viewers or non-listeners as well as 
on the programme audience.” (42) 
Treasury then summarises three categories of externality that may be employed in 
defence of public broadcasting 
“ The external benefits that are sometimes held to exist from certain programme types 
include the ‘contribution to cultural heritage’ that radio and television can make (this 
argument is made in terms of the interests of future generations), the ‘experimental value of 
public radio and TV’ (which is held to provide spill-overs into better quality commercial 
broadcasting), and ‘diversity in public affairs programming’ (the idea that, for example, 
viewers of a wide range of social and political viewpoints make ‘better’ or more-informed 
voting choices, such that non-viewers benefit from more desirable social or political 
outcomes).” (42, Treasury’s parentheses) 
The submission does not elaborate. We, however, shall digress and return to Treasury’s 
third paragraph below. The categories of external benefit outlined above are taken from 
in Noll, et al. (1973: 213-215).  It is instructive to explore these justifications for 
government intervention greater depth.  
Noll, et al., when setting out these justifications, sound a note of caution about taking 
external benefits arguments seriously: 
“Regardless of the merits of a primarily non-commercial system, the stakes of the 
commercial broadcasters in maintaining their current paramount position are too great to 
make undermining their position a viable policy alternative.  The remainder of this chapter 
deals with the narrow issue of a modest expansion in the present non-commercial system.” 
(210)   
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They later argue that it would be “…presumptuous and disingenuous for the fanciers of 
public TV to argue that a broader social welfare is served by pleasing them.” (213) In 
keeping with this view, they set out a series of arguments dismissing each justification 
for public television.  These are set out below, along with a counter-argument to 
demonstrate that none of their dismissals is inarguable. 
Contribution to Cultural Heritage 
Noll et al. say one form of external benefit is that which accrues to future generations – 
their cultural inheritance.  Just as present-day lovers of drama benefit from 
Shakespeare’s plays, “If public television supports and extends the production of culture 
in the present, future generations will benefit.” (213) However, this holds for any 
medium that produces culture, and television is “…a relatively expensive medium for 
augmenting the cultural legacy.  Only if certain culture unique to television is highly 
valued would support for public television be an efficient way to increase the cultural 
inheritance of future generations.” (213) This point is repeated in the Treasury 
submission: 
“…it seems difficult to argue that a cultural service delivered via broadcasting –say 
television drama – is any more “cultural” or publicly beneficial than, cultural services 
delivered by other media – say live theatre.” (43) 
In response to the first part of this argument, we might say that television is not 
relatively expensive if its power and reach are taken into account.  The contribution that 
a programme like Tangata Whenua or Kenneth Clark’s Civilisation can make to one 
generation of viewers is enormous because, and only because, the programmes were 
broadcast on television.   
The second part of the argument is breathtakingly specious: Noll, et al. and Treasury 
both deny McLuhan’s dictum that the medium is the message. How could Fred Dagg 
have become part of New Zealand’s cultural legacy without television?  Why else is 
New Zealand’s cultural heritage used to sell Japanese utility vehicles and McDonalds’ 
“Kiwiburgers” on television?  A nation’s cultural legacy is self-evidently dependent on, 
and contiguous with, the means available for its transmission and dissemination.  
Experimental Value 
There may be an argument that public television’s lesser dependence on commercial 
success can lead to greater experimentation and risk-taking.  Noll, et al dismiss this 
argument on the grounds that “No public broadcasting programme has switched to the 
commercial system…  Moreover, the commercial system has yet to copy from the 
American public system…”  (214)  
We have already explored the possibility that a commercial media environment will 
tend to be risk-averse, in the section titled “Competition and Market Entry”, on page 50.  
In this case, there is a potential role for public funding to underwrite risk, as New 
Zealand on Air has done for Shortland Street, and for Mai FM.  
Setting a Standard 
This is a justification Noll et al only imply, within a footnote to their argument on 
experimentation. They note that public TV may have provided a “comparative norm” 
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for commercial programming: “One example is the influence the popularity and 
technical success of Sesame Street may have had on commercial children’s programs.” 
(214: footnote 5).88  In New Zealand, Easton (1994a), argues along similar lines for 
public news services:  
“…public-owned radio and television set a standard for reportage not only for broadcasting, 
but in the printed media…. they are constrained and encouraged to separate opinion from 
fact.  Otherwise we turn to Radio New Zealand and TVNZ.”   
The presence of a public broadcaster therefore causes other broadcasters to lift their 
game, and this is an external benefit to consumers of the media other than those who 
tune in to the public broadcaster. 
The counter-argument to this is that Government provision of a good prevents private 
entrepreneurs from entering the market, which creates a self-justifying claim for 
continued government provision (i.e. Noam’s argument, page 52 above). This is 
sometimes described as the government “crowding out” private investment. However, 
crowding-out may be deliberately undertaken by the government to prevent private 
sector suppliers from providing goods of an unacceptably low standard. Housing New 
Zealand might thereby crowd-out slum landlords from the housing market, for 
instance.89 
Diversity in Public Affairs Programming 
A public broadcaster, being less concerned about audience maximisation, can give 
alternative and non-mainstream views more attention.  Allowing a greater range of 
views improves the democratic process by enabling citizens to make better informed 
judgements when choosing governments.  Noll et al provide two counter-arguments to 
this proposition:  
“First, only viewers will receive the entertainment (sic) value of the programs. Second, if 
political or social change does come about because public television provides a forum to a 
hitherto unrepresented view, the broadcasts must have caused the distribution of opinions on 
the issue among viewers to shift in favour of the change… However, since nonviewers 
presumably made a conscious choice not to view the programming… and since their 
distribution in terms of political values and socioeconomic characteristics is unlikely to be 
identical with that of the viewers, the two groups need not reach identical conclusions about 
the benefits to be derived from the social change that resulted from the new programming.”  
(214) 
Both of these arguments ignore the fundamental proposition that the benefits of an 
improved democratic process may accrue to non-viewers, which was the original 
hypothesis. The last part of their argument assumes that viewers’ political proclivities 
and viewing choices are directly correlated, and that they only prefer to watch 
programmes that reinforce their political views.  This places the viewer in the top right 
                                                 
88  Their footnote admits that their earlier argument, regarding experiment and risk, may not be entirely 
true. 
89  This would make Housing New Zealand the biggest slum landlord in the country – but at least the 
Government would guarantee its slum meets minimum conditions.  
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quadrant of Figure 20 (page 80), where the audience’s viewing preferences are entirely 
exogenous, and the media is powerfully influential. 
What Noll et al have failed to recognise is the fundamental difference between news 
production and news distribution.  Hay (1986), describes media as a kind of warehouse 
operation, where various elements are brought together, repackaged and refined, and 
sent out for distribution.  News is a very good example: many radio stations take a pre-
produced news feed from a bureau service, and all news rooms and bureaux take the 
bulk of their stories from press releases and other media.   This means that very little 
news is produced, in an economic sense, other than a relatively small output of 
investigative journalism. A story that is broken by one broadcaster will bring it to bring 
it to the attention of other news programmes, and place it on the media “agenda”.   
Palmer also makes a claim that the mere existence of the news media service produces 
external benefits: 
“Despite the fact that the mass of people are not interested in the political process, or 
informed about it, the media do perform the function of keeping the politicians on their toes.  
The media are an important linkage in the political system and therefore of constitutional 
significance.” (1992: 202) 
He is saying that the media can produce external benefits for society because politicians 
believe it has influence, regardless of how powerful that influence really is, or who 
consumes the news (perhaps a form of “Third Party” effect). 
Θ Θ Θ 
It is worth noting that Noll et al were rebutting the findings of the Carnegie 
Commission (1967), which proposed the formation of a federal Corporation for Public 
Television. A minor point, but Treasury’s submission did fail to mention it. Clearly, 
these justifications for the government to intervene in the broadcasting market are 
worthy of some consideration, notwithstanding the dismissive treatment they suffer at 
the hands of Noll et al.   
Treasury did not apparently think they were. Its third paragraph on the subject of 
external benefits simply cautions against the wisdom of investigating them further: 
“The justification for government intervention on the basis of such spill-over benefits should 
be evaluated with caution.  Information on the extent of such positive externalities is difficult 
and costly to obtain with any precision, and if the level of benefits is not substantial the costs 
involved in the government intervening to support such activities may outweigh the benefits 
of doing so.” (43) 
This reinforces the point made at the end of the previous section: because there are no 
property rights in externalities there can be no market for them and therefore their value 
cannot be “properly” assessed.  It is a restatement of Coase’s tautology. 
The Right to Broadcast 
Coase (1959) built his concept of externalities and property rights on the concept that 
radio signal interference is a negative externality that can be regulated by the market, 
providing adequate property rights can be defined in “interference”. Coase’s original 
 97
conception had been along the same lines as the smoke example that opened this 
chapter: he believed one could somehow establish a total quantity of “interference”, and 
allow the market to regulate the amount of interference created. 
This notion has generated a considerable literature in the economics journals, which 
Fountain (1988) summarised for the Department of Trade and Industry. In the event, 
this proved to be nonsensical, and the interference problem was dealt with by the careful 
specification of Time, Area, Spectrum (TAS) packages. The Radiocommunications Act 
1990 defines TAS packages which broadcasters purchase when they acquire the right to 
transmit radio signals.  The right to broadcast was thus defined in the act as a right of 
non-interference.  That is, a right that prevents other broadcasters from transmitting 
signals in the same time and place, and on the same frequency, as the holder of the right.   
Although Coase’s original idea could not be put into practice, the economics profession 
has adamantly stuck with Coase’s other argument: that the radio frequency spectrum is 
a form of property that, like any other input to a production process, can and should be 
allocated by a market.  Coase’s argument to this effect is eleoquent: 
“Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to believe that federal regulation is needed because radio 
frequencies are limited in number and people want to use more of them than are available.  
But it is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the economic system 
(and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, in that 
people would like to use more than exists.  Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of 
itself, does not call for government regulation.  It is true that some mechanism has to be 
employed to decide who, out of many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce 
resource.  But the way this is usually done in the American economic system is to employ 
the price mechanism, and this allocates resources to users without the need for government 
regulation.” (Coase, 1959: 14) 
Coase’s article is a wonderful example of economic rhetoric, which appears to wilfully 
misrepresent two of the fundamental issues at stake: the nature of the right and the issue 
of scarcity. Discussing what is really ‘owned’, when one has acquired the right to 
broadcast, and comes up with this: 
“What does not seem to have been understood is that what is being allocated by the Federal 
Communications Commission, or, if there were a market, what would be sold, is the right to 
use a piece of equipment to transmit signals in particular way….” (1959: 33) 
We have already recognised that the right to broadcast is in fact the right to make a 
claim on the scarce attention of the audience. This right in turn could imply that the 
audience’s interests should be taken into account. Coase’s argument is made in response 
to a passage from the judgement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in National Broadcasting 
(NBC) v. United States, 319 U.S. (1943), which he quotes this passage from: 
“The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.  
Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply. And since 
Congress could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission. 
 “The Commission was, however, not left at large in performing this duty.  The 
touchstone provided by Congress was the ‘public interest, convenience or necessity’. 
 …The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; they cannot be left to 
wasteful use without detriment to the public interest…” (Quoted in Coase, 1959: 13) 
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It is not just that rights to broadcast are scarce relative to the demand for them.  It is that 
the right to broadcast is also a privilege, because it allows one person to do something 
that others cannot. Stoljar gives this definition: 
“(a privilege is) ...a special or exceptional advantage, granted or belonging only to certain 
individuals or classes of individuals: an advantage, in short, which ordinary persons do not 
normally have.  
 “…privileges are best seen in relation to… individuals who instead of the common run 
rather represent the select few.” (1984: 68) 
One of the determining characteristics of a privilege then, is its relative scarcity.  In the 
case of broadcasting, it is the privilege of being able to select and transmit particular 
ideas, views and information.  It is a social and political right, which confers on its 
holder much greater powers than to the right to freedom of speech shared equally by all 
citizens.  
One minor point, before we end this section, but one worth mentioning: in the case 
NBC v. US, the Supreme Court was being asked to declare illegal certain regulations 
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had implemented to restrict and 
manage the practice of “chain broadcasting” (networking). As the Judge notes, after an 
extensive process of public enquiry the FCC found that some networking practices were 
contrary to the public interest, including having the effect of preventing “…station 
licensees from exercising their statutory duty of determining which programs would 
best serve the needs of their community.” (NBC v. US 319 US: 199).  That is, precisely 
the effects of deregulation and competition which were outlined in Chapter 6, above.  It 
appears the Coase finally won his argument on behalf of the monopolists, nearly fifty 
years later and almost half a world away. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the ideas of the Coase theorem, which says that the 
market can regulate externalities, when it is possible to:  
(a)  adequately specify property rights,  
(b)  make an equitable initial allocation of those rights, and  
(c)  ensure subsequent trades can be made with low transactions costs. 
Applying this concept to broadcasting policy, we saw that: 
• Property rights should not be confused with social or political rights. 
• It is possible to transform social or political rights into property rights in some 
circumstances, however it is by no means a straightforward task and the 
transformation may have important equity effects. 
• Other than Māori, and those who have purchased broadcast frequencies, New 
Zealand’s citizens have no right to broadcast, nor any right to receive broadcasts, in 
either a formal or de facto sense. 
• The subsidy scheme, which exists to provide socially desirable broadcasting 
outputs, disadvantages New Zealand on Air in its negotiations with broadcasters on 
the audience’s behalf  
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• The Radiocommunications Act effectively gives broadcasters the power of veto over 
any programme New Zealand on Air may think beneficial. 
• Property rights cannot be created in broadcasting externalities, where they cannot be 
accurately and completely specified as rights.  
• The Treasury submission makes only passing reference to the idea of externalities; 
briefly mentioning the justifications for public broadcasting then dismissing them as 
being difficult to measure (presumably meaning to assess their value in ‘welfare’ 
terms, which is, by definition, impossible for externalities).    
• Noll et al go to greater length to dismiss the Carnegie Commission’s justifications 
for public broadcasting, but their arguments are far from compelling. 
• Finally, the Treasury submission showed insufficient knowledge of the historical 
background for the Coase Theorem and its application as an argument in 
broadcasting policy.  A simple check, using the widely available electronic legal 
databases of U.S. court decisions, would have been useful. 
The chapter has sought to demonstrate some of the issues that arise when applying 
economic theory to the creation, specification and distribution of rights as they relate to 
broadcasting policy. Broadcasting deregulation in New Zealand, following Coase’s 
original argument, treats the right to broadcast as a property right to a scarce economic 
resource, not a political and social privilege.  
This chapter began with the statement “Deregulation does not necessarily mean the 
removal of regulation.”  We have focused predominantly on how property rights can be 
created, or how rights created by the polity can be transformed into property rights. 
There is another possibility is that deregulation could mean certain rights created by the 
polity are extinguished altogether – implying that they provided no social or private 
benefit.   
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Chapter 9 Broadcasting Policy and Law 
In the previous chapter we saw how the Radiocommunications Act 1990 treats the right 
to broadcast strictly as a scarce economic resource, following the argument of Ronald 
Coase (1959) and a considerable body of economic literature since (Fountain, 1988). 
However, the right to broadcast can also be described as a scarce right, or privilege, that 
permits the holder to convey information to an audience.  These privileges confer on 
their holders a far more powerful right than the ordinary citizens’ right to freedom of 
speech and opinion.   
In this chapter we discuss what the citizens’ right to free speech implies, whether New 
Zealand’s citizens have such rights, and the extent to which the government could be 
obliged to protect them.  This leads to some important conclusions about the outcomes 
of broadcasting policy in New Zealand, and the quality of broadcasting policy advice 
offered by officials in 1986-88 and since. 
Free Speech and Discourse 
John Stuart Mill made the definitive statement why people should have a right to 
freedom of expression, and the nature of the external benefit it produces: 
“Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed 
in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury; it would make some difference whether 
the injury was inflicted on only a few persons or on many. The peculiar evil of silencing the 
expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; those who dissent from the 
opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a 
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.” (1972: 85) 
He is clearly saying that freedom of speech is not simply a matter of private 
consumption choice. It confers a strong ‘external benefit’ on society’s members. He 
later implies that freedom of thought and opinion is not merely a negative right, but one 
which needs to be given effect, as a positive right, in order for society to enjoy its 
benefits: 
“Unless opinions favourable to democracy and aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-
operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to 
liberty and discipline, and all other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with 
equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance 
of both elements obtaining their due;…” (115) 
Also, immediately after that, he proposes this is how society can overcome its “bounded 
rationality”: 
“Truth, in the practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and 
combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to 
make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough 
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.” (115) 
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Mill’s ideas have been influential in the development of representative democracy 
around the world, including New Zealand.  His ideas about freedom of thought and 
expression are reflected in the right to freedom of expression and communication New 
Zealand citizens possess, which appears in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: 
“14. Freedom of expression—Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including 
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.” 
(Chen and Palmer: 471)  
This implies citizens have a negative right, which permits them to enjoy freedom of 
thought and opinion unconstrained by the actions of either the state or other citizens. 
This negative right may be a necessary condition for the existence of a free society, but 
it is not sufficient to fully encompass the role of the media in a representative 
democracy.   
Agency Theory 
To do this, we can turn to Principal-Agent theory and the idea of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), which were outlined in Chapter 2. The idea of a contract is one way 
of explaining representative democracy: at a general election, citizens enter a “contract” 
with the political party they vote for, based on what they know of its politicians and 
their policies. In a liberal democracy, we might describe citizens as the principals in this 
transaction, and their parliamentary representatives as their agents. Recall the 
fundamental assumptions of TCE: 
• Agents are prone to opportunism, or “self-interest seeking with guile”. 
• A contract incurs transactions costs. Ex ante costs are those of negotiating and 
specifying a contract, which fall before the contract is agreed.  Ex post costs are 
those of monitoring, enforcing and altering contracts once they are in place.   
• Ex ante and ex post information bears an explicit cost, which may be a transaction 
cost for either party. 
• Both parties enter the contract with limited information (or “bounded rationality”).  
• Either party may possess information the other does not, which they may use 
strategically to extract benefit from the transaction at the expense of the other.  
The role of the media is critically important in this political contracting arrangement. 
Citizens have very little direct contact with politicians, other than through the media, 
therefore the information with which they make their voting choices is a function of the 
media to a very large extent.  In the late 20th century, the reality is that the electronic 
media – television in particular – has an extraordinary influence over how people make 
their voting choices. 
Public Choice theorists would go further than this, and claim that the political parties 
generally have their own interests, or the interests of their supporters, at heart, and thus 
have a general tendency toward opportunism and the strategic use of information.  This 
tendency might be revealed in the form of false or vague election promises, omitting to 
describe or declare policies prior to an election, or – in an MMP environment – failing 
to declare potential coalition partnerships, for instance.  This would suggest that 
television news and current affairs programmes have an important role to play in 
assisting citizens to understand their voting choices by investigating and explaining the 
parties’ policies in the lead up to an election. 
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Voters do not make their decision purely on the basis of proposals and promises in the 
lead up to an election.  They also pay attention to the performance of the government 
and of Her Majesty’s loyal opposition during the term of a Parliament.  One could say 
they monitor their representatives, whether in government or in opposition, to see if 
they are performing in accordance with the terms of the contract made at the time of the 
previous election.   
The need to produce valuable ex ante and ex post information for citizens goes well 
beyond Mill’s concept of a general right to the freedom of expression. It implies there is 
a twofold need for the media to act as an agent on behalf of citizens: first, to scrutinise 
the policy proposals of parties and candidates prior to an election, in order to make a 
well-informed voting choice. Second, to hold elected representatives to account in the 
court of public opinion during the term of a Parliament. In order for a representative 
democracy to function properly, government policy should ensure that the media 
function effectively in both these roles.   
Media and the Constitution 
The notion that a particular country is a representative democracy (as opposed to a 
dictatorship, monarchy or other form of political arrangement), is embodied in its 
constitutional arrangements. In a chapter of Sir Geoffrey Palmer’s (1992) New 
Zealand’s Constitution in Crisis a chapter is devoted to the subject of the media in 
politics. The diagram in Figure 25 demonstrates the centrality of the media to New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. 
Figure 25: Media in the New Zealand Constitutional System 
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reproduced from Chen and Palmer (1993: 708) 
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Palmer focuses especially on the role of television news: 
“All news reporting involves oversimplification of reality but television political news in 
New Zealand involves the most distortion. TV decides what the most important news is, 
decides how to present it, selects which parts to emphasise.  Everyone in New Zealand 
politics knows the television news is the most important factor in moulding opinion of 
government policy and politicians.  That is the reality of modern representative politics.  
Journalists are more than gatekeepers. Their activities help to determine what people think.  
That is why the media has constitutional significance.” (1992: 213)  
There are a variety of means for ensuring media fulfils its constitutional function.  
These might include quotas, laws, regulations, the specification of the property rights 
held by broadcasters, and direct ownership of broadcasting organisations by the state.  
In any of these cases a potential conflict of interest arises, as Palmer points out:  
“If it is not the media’s responsibility to provide the material to keep the public well 
informed about their government, then it must be responsibility of the government itself.  
That immediately raises a conflict of interest for the government.”(1992, 202) 
In determining broadcasting policy, the government can create legal responsibilities that 
the media must conform to, or it can assume those responsibilities itself, or it can 
employ some mixture of these means to achieve the desired ends.  In any case, it is 
faced with a potential conflict of interest. 
The government is not simply an agent of New Zealand’s citizens; it is in the position of 
a fiduciary (that is, an agent that holds considerable power over its principal, as is the 
case with doctors, lawyers or accountants).  Where a fiduciary relationships exists, there 
is the almost inevitable possibility that agents can abuse their power, or will be prone to 
conflicts of interest.  It is very often desirable that an independent party is able to 
protect the rights of the principal, and most often it is the courts that offer this 
protection.  In the case of the fiduciary relationship between citizens and the state, it is 
the doctrine of the separation of powers and the constitutional power of the courts to 
review government policy and actions, which provide this protection. 
The Australian Case 
That New Zealand citizens have right to political information and public debate, and 
that this right can and should be protected by the courts, can be inferred from the 
judgement of the Australian High Court in Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth (1992) 108 ALR 577. 
The case arose in 1991, when the Australian Government enacted an amendment to the 
Broadcasting Act 1942. The amendment placed a ban on political advertising in the 
lead-up to an election.  It obliged broadcasters to provide free air time, which the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal would allocate to political parties under rules 
specified in the Broadcasting Act.  The amendment did not apply to news and current 
affairs programmes. 
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The intention of the amendment was to limit the excessive influence of political parties 
who could afford more television and radio advertising in the run-up to an election than 
poorer parties.90  It also intended to limit the vulnerability of political parties to the 
potentially corrupting influence of the need to obtain large sums of money to pay for 
television advertising, which is necessary to get elected or re-elected.  
The amendment was declared illegal by the Australian High Court. Although the judges 
saw merit in its intended purpose, they held that it interfered with the Australian 
citizens’ right to freedom of political discourse by effectively excluding any person or 
body, other than an elected politician or political party, from the ability to purchase 
political advertising during an election period: 
“Employers organisations, trade unions, manufacturers’ and farmers’ organisations, social 
welfare groups and societies generally are excluded from participation otherwise than 
through (news and current affairs programmes).”  (Per Mason CJ, 589) 
An interesting feature of this case is that there is no express right to freedom of 
expression in the Australian Constitution, along the same lines as section 14 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Court’s decision was built on two principles: first, 
the requirement in the Australian constitution that Senators and members of the House 
of Representatives be “directly chosen by the people” implies that Australia is 
constitutionally a representative democracy. Second, the judges reasoned, it is in the 
nature of representative democracy that citizens have a constitutional right to convey 
and receive opinions, arguments and information concerning matters intended or likely 
to affect voting in an election for the Senate or the House of Representatives: 
 “The notion of a free society governed in accordance with the principles of representative 
parliamentary democracy may entail freedom of movement, freedom of association and, 
perhaps, freedom of speech generally. But as far as free elections are an indispensable 
feature of a society of that kind, it necessarily entails, at the very least, freedom of political 
discourse.  And that discourse is not limited to communication between candidates and 
electors, but extends to communication between members of society generally.” (Gaudron, J: 
562)  
“Absent such a freedom of communication, representative government would fail to achieve 
its purpose… government would cease to be responsive to the needs and wishes of the 
people and, in that sense, would cease to be truly representative.” (Mason, CJ: 594) 
“Freedom of communication in the sense just discussed is so indispensable to the efficacy of 
the system of representative government for which the constitution makes provision that it is 
necessarily implied in the making of that provision (Mason, CJ: 596) 
In other words, the right did not have to be expressly mentioned in the Australian 
constitution, as it was clearly implied by its authors.   
                                                 
90  The amendment implemented the recommendations of a report of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters, titled Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune (Report No 4, June 1989). 
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The court was also saying that it is a defining characteristic, or necessary condition, of a 
representative democracy that its citizens have this right, that it is protected by law and 
policy and given effect in practice. 
It is only because Australia has a written constitution that the court assumed the power 
to declare the amendment illegal. The extent and limitations on this power were stated 
in another Australian case regarding the freedom of the press:  
“The courts cannot assume a jurisdiction which the constitution does not confer. A court 
cannot hold a law invalid merely on the ground that the law is not for the peace, order and 
good government as the court sees it.  The only foundation for judicial review of legislation 
is the subjection of both the Parliament and the courts to the supreme law of the Constitution 
and the Constitution reposes the function of determining whether a proposed law is for the 
peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth in the Parliament exclusively.” 
(Brennan J: 44) 91 
New Zealand does not have a written constitution, and the New Zealand courts have 
never had justification for declaring an Act of Parliament illegal. They may declare an 
action intended or undertaken by the government to be illegal, where it is not expressly 
or implicitly permitted by statute.92 
The New Zealand courts have used this power sparingly, as the court is quite properly 
loath to restrain the powers of the citizens’ elected representatives. However, in any 
case where the Crown is acting as the citizens’ fiduciary and a conflict of interest exists, 
there is arguably a greater burden placed on the courts to intervene to protect the rights 
of citizens against potentially unconstitutional actions taken by the executive. 
The New Zealand Case 
The reasoning of the Australian High Court can be applied to describe the nature and 
extent of the right to freedom of political discourse implied in New Zealand’s unwritten 
constitution: first, section 10 of the Constitution Act 1986 states that: 
10. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- 
(1) There shall continue to be a House of Representatives for New Zealand…. 
(4) The House of Representatives shall have as its members those persons who 
are elected from time to time in accordance with the provisions of the 
Electoral Act 1956, and who shall be known as "members of Parliament". 
Second, the intention and entire effect of the Electoral Act 1956 is to ensure New 
Zealand has a system of representative democracy.  
If the reasoning of the Australian High Court were accepted by the New Zealand courts, 
they would agree that New Zealand citizens also have a right to engage in and to receive 
                                                 
91  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 
92  Most famously, in Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 
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political discourse and public debate. This right is more specific than that implied in the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, and it implies the existence of a fiduciary relationship between 
the government and New Zealand’s citizens. It is a relationship that the courts could 
intervene in, to protect citizens’ rights from actions or policies of the government that 
may be interpreted as unconstitutional.   
Diminished Protection 
The Broadcasting Act 1976 implied that New Zealanders had certain rights to political 
discourse and information, and the provisions of the Act protected those rights in a 
variety of ways. When broadcasting was deregulated in 1989, these protections were 
significantly diminished.  In principle, and quite possibly in effect also, this eroded the 
implied rights themselves.  
Broadcasting Act 1976 
One protection created by the Broadcasting Act 1976 resided in the conditions that the 
Broadcasting Tribunal was able to attach to broadcasting rights (warrants). Section 80 
provided for the Tribunal, in determining who should be allocated a warrant, to have 
regard to:  
“(a) The extent to which the proposed service is desirable in the public interest:…”  
“(b) The needs of New Zealand or the locality or localities proposed to be served, in 
respect of broadcasting services:…” and 
“(h) The requirement that frequencies be best utilised in the public interest:” 
These protections were eliminated when the Radiocommunications Act 1990 created 
property rights out of the right to broadcast, and provided for the Government to auction 
these rights without attaching any obligation to serve the interests of New Zealand’s 
citizens. This occurred in spite of the RCBRT noting in its report that it would be 
possible and even desirable to attach such obligations to broadcasting rights prior to 
auctioning them (RCBRT, 1986: 260-261). This would have been a simple and effective 
means of avoiding the difficulty and expense encountered by applicants for the TV3 
warrant. As we saw in the last chapter, this was simply a matter of adequately 
specifying the property right. 
The Broadcasting Corporation 
The Broadcasting Act 1976 also set out powers and functions of the Broadcasting 
Corporation that required it to protect the citizens’ right to public discourse, in the 
following sections:  
17 (1)(a); “To carry on public broadcasting services, and to develop, extend and improve 
those services in the public interest..”,  
22(a) “To ensure that each Service operates as a public service to provide and produce 
programmes which inform, educate and entertain”   
(b) To establish a system for the gathering of news for radio; and to make such news 
available for the Services.”,  
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24(1); “[The Corporation shall have regard to]   
(a) “The provision of a range of programmes which will cater in a balanced way for the 
varied interests of different sections of the community”,…  
(d) “The accurate and impartial gathering and presentation of news, according to recognised 
standards of objective journalism.”,…   
(e) “The principle that when controversial issues of public importance are discussed, 
reasonable efforts are made to represent significant points of view either in the same 
programme or in other programmes within the period of current interest.” 
When the 1976 Act was repealed (by section 89 of the Broadcasting Act 1989), these 
protections of the public interest were extinguished or significantly diminished, 
especially in respect to television. The Radio New Zealand Act 1995 has subsequently 
restored some of those protections for listeners to the National Programme and Concert 
Programme, but not to other radio audiences.  
Television New Zealand is required by section 4 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 
1986 to have as one of its principal objectives to operate as a successful business and to 
be as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses which are not owned by the 
Crown.  This implies that it is private sector broadcasters who should set the standard 
for Television New Zealand to meet – not the other way round. 
Section 7 of the Act permits the Crown to buy particular broadcasting outputs 
(programmes) directly from TVNZ.  However, that power could not be used to purchase 
news and current affairs programming, if it were held to be in conflict with section 7 
(1)(b) of the State-Owned Enterprises Amendment Act 1988.  That section prevents any 
Minister from giving directions to TVNZ regarding “the gathering or presentation of 
news or the preparation or presentation of current affairs programmes”. 
Essentially, the government has little or no power to give effect to citizens’ rights to 
receive political debate through its ownership of Television New Zealand. In fact, the 
SOE Amendment Act could be interpreted as rendering it illegal for the government to 
use such power. 
The Broadcasting Commission 
The only avenue left for the government to protect the citizens’ right to receive public 
debate is through the funding allocated by New Zealand on Air (NZoA).  However, 
section 36 of Broadcasting Act 1989 only empowers NZoA to fund programmes that 
“..reflect and develop New Zealand identity and culture” and that “…provide for the 
interests of women children, persons with disabilities and minorities in the community.”  
There is nothing that permits it to fund programmes of news, current affairs or 
investigative journalism. 
Even if it had such a power, the unfettered nature of the broadcasting rights created by 
the Radiocommunications Act 1990 means that broadcasters effectively have the ability 
to veto any programme that NZoA might wish to provide funding for, as it is required 
by section 39 (e) of the Broadcasting Act to only fund programmes which “…if 
produced, would be broadcast.”  The broadcasters also  have complete power to decide 
when a programme will be broadcast, and whether it will be shown at a favourable time. 
In summary, the public’s rights were supposed to be protected predominantly by the 
diversity-increasing effects of competition, which did not exist in theory or eventuate in 
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practice,93 and by funding through NZoA. It therefore appears that a citizen’s right to 
receive and participate in public debate was severely eroded when the Broadcasting Act 
1989 and Radiocommunications Act 1990 were passed, and Broadcasting Act 1976 was 
repealed.  
However, would the courts see it that way? What might the courts have done at the time 
to prevent this from happening? And what might they do to prevent the government 
from further eroding that right? 
Judicial Intervention 
It is easy to imagine that a group of citizens, fearful the Crown would be unable to 
protect their right to receive public debate about political issues, could take a case to the 
High Court to prevent the sale of Television New Zealand. They could cite the 
judgement in ACTV v. Commonwealth and claim that the sale would be in breach of 
the New Zealand constitution. We do not have to imagine what the response of the 
Court would be.  That is evident from the decision of the Court of Appeal in New 
Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General [1992] 2 NZLR 576.  
As part of the corporatisation process, the assets of the old BCNZ were transferred to 
the Crown for a brief period of time. Before they could be transferred into the 
ownership of Television New Zealand Ltd, the New Zealand Maori Council sought a 
High Court declaration that the proposed transfer was illegal. The appellants contended 
that the transfer would diminish the Crown’s ability “…to fulfil its obligation to protect 
the Maori language and culture through broadcasting and without establishing any 
adequate system or process to achieve the protection…”(576).  
There is clearly a parallel between this actual case and the hypothetical one proposed 
above.  To review the arguments, and assess the court’s probable decision in this 
hypothetical case, one has only to read the decision of the Court of Appeal in NZMC v 
A-G, replacing references to the Treaty with “constitution” and references to the Maori 
language with “public debate” (and so forth).  The following paragraphs are reproduced 
from the opinion and judgement of Mr Justice McKay: 
 “The aim of the appellants was to ensure a [public debate] content in mainstream 
broadcasting, this being argued to be essential if the if [public debate] was to be preserved.  
The concern was that if the assets were transferred, the Crown would no longer have the 
same options available to it, and would no longer be able to discharge its duty under the 
[constitution] in respect of the protection of [public debate].  (590:18) 
“(the appellants submitted that)…these policies had at no time, either before or after the 
decisions were taken, been assessed or reassessed in terms of the Crown’s [constitutional] 
obligation to protect [public debate].  The risk to [public debate] was in its absence from 
mainstream services.  It would not be heard in prime time without either the establishment of 
a public broadcaster, or a power in either the (Broadcasting Commission) or the Crown to 
impose a quota.  Both of these possible solutions had been considered by the government but 
                                                 
93  According to the analysis in Chapter 6, and to Cocker (1993), Comrie (1996), Atkinson (1989, 
1994) and others. 
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rejected for doctrinal reasons relating to the commercial operation of State enterprises.  They 
had never been measured against [constitutional] obligations.  (597: 25) 
“It was submitted that the deregulation of broadcasting in New Zealand had been shown by 
the evidence filed on behalf of the appellants to be an experiment without parallel in other 
countries, and one which was likely to fail, and which entailed unacceptable risk for [public 
debate] programming. Local and overseas broadcasters, including a number with experience 
in the broadcasting needs of [representative democracy], had reviewed the practices in other 
jurisdictions and concluded that the New Zealand broadcasting system would not deliver 
protection to [public debate].  (598: 1) 
“(the Solicitor-General, in reply)… stressed that the taonga is [public debate], not 
broadcasting.  The Government had to recognise that broadcasting had other major functions 
in our society, in addition to the protection of [public debate].   
 He submitted that [public debate] programmes could only be of mass appeal or interest 
to a minority group.  The Government’s position on the mainstreaming issue was that it had 
considered and rejected a number of possible options for increasing [public debate] 
programmes on mainstream television, including the use of quotas…  Quotas were regarded 
by officials as expensive, inefficient and inequitable…. (600: 24) 
“(the Solicitor-General) pointed out that… the shareholding Ministers had the power under 
section 13 (of the SOE Act) by written notice to direct the Board of Directors to include 
certain provisions in its Statement of Corporate Intent, these including provisions relating to 
its objectives, the nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken, and any activities for 
which the Board would seek compensation from the Crown.  Treasury’s view was that this 
power should be used sparingly because it would necessarily reduce the accountability of the 
Board.  The power is also limited by section 7 of the State-Owned Enterprises Amendment 
Act 1988 which precludes any direction as to a particular programme, and as to the gathering 
or presentation of news or current affairs. There is also power under section 7 to enter into an 
agreement for the provision of particular services by a state enterprise in return for payment 
by the Crown.  These mechanisms, it was submitted, meant that that Crown retained a 
capacity to ensure that it satisfied its [constitutional] obligations in areas where these 
required the use of broadcasting…(600: 50) 94 
“(the Solicitor-General) also drew attention to the functions of the Broadcasting Commission 
under section 36 of the Broadcasting Act 1989. As already mentioned, that section in its final 
form included as one of the functions of the Commission the promotion of [public debate]. 
By section 44 the Commission must comply with any directions given to it by notice in 
writing by the Minister.  One such direction was the requirement that the Commission apply 
at least 6% of the broadcasting fee revenue to [public debate]. (601: 11) 
Decision 
“….(TVNZ) is required under section 4 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 to have as 
one of its principal objectives to operate as a successful business and to be as profitable and 
efficient as comparable businesses which are not owned by the Crown. Such an enterprise is 
unlikely to include [public debate] broadcasts in prime time.  It will be more profitable to 
devote that time to programmes which will maximise the viewing audience, not only for the 
programme being shown but also for the programmes which follow…. (601: 49) 
                                                 
94  Naturally, the Solicitor-General would refrain from making either this argument, or the argument in 
the following paragraph, in our hypothetical case.  Neither argument would support the Crown’s 
claim that it had the power to protect citizens’ rights to public debate on prime-time television. 
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“The only way in which [public debate]… programmes are likely to be included in prime 
time under the Crown’s proposals is if the privilege is paid for by the Broadcasting 
Commission….  Even if the company were compensated for the loss of viewers and of 
advertising revenue…  (it) may well prefer to forgo the short term profit that might be 
achieved by a generous payment by the Commission because of concern at the longer term 
effects. (602: 1) 
“The option of a quota has been rejected as a matter of policy….  Quotas would seem more 
likely to be effective if applied to all channels so that none would be unfairly disadvantaged 
in comparison with the others.  Each would then have an incentive to present its [public 
debate] broadcast in the most attractive manner so as to hold both Maori and non-Maori 
viewing audiences.  However, there is no longer any power to impose quotas on private 
broadcasters. (602: 22) 
“There is a great deal in the evidence to support (the criticism of Mr Justice McGechan, in 
the High Court) of the Crown’s approach to the restructuring of broadcasting, and his 
conclusion that there had been a failure to observe the [constitution] in the lack of proper 
enquiry and consultation.  There was a failure to assess the proposed changes from the point 
of view of their impact on [constitutional] obligations. (602: 39) 
“The Court is being asked to pass judgement on the on the …question whether the Crown 
has adequately performed its [constitutional] obligations in respect of [public debate], and to 
offer guidance to the Crown in this wider area….  As has been pointed out earlier in this 
judgement, [constitutional] rights cannot be enforced in the courts except so far as they have 
been given recognition in statute.  If the proposed transfer of assets would be contrary to the 
principles of the [constitution], then it can be restrained.  It cannot be restrained merely 
because the Crown has already restructured broadcasting in a way which may have 
diminished its capacity to comply with the [constitution], and as a means of putting pressure 
on the Crown to adopt policies regarded as more appropriate for achieving such compliance. 
(603: 16).” 
The Mr Justice McKay was saying that it was not proper for the court to direct the 
government in matters of policy. In NZMC v. A-G, the majority of the bench deferred to 
McKay’s opinion and submitted much briefer opinions of their own in support.  The 
appeal was dismissed, and the transfer went ahead – largely on the basis that promises 
made by the Crown to fulfil its Treaty obligations must to be accepted by the court in 
good faith.95  
In the hypothesised case presented above, it is conceivable that the bench would have 
supported the dissenting opinion of (now) Lord Cooke of Thorndon, who said: 
“…I cannot avoid the unwelcome conclusion that the present television policy, which is 
carried out partly by statutes and partly by administrative decisions, is inconsistent with the 
principles of the [constitution]. (584) 
“In essence the present broadcasting assets are subject to a major [constitutional] claim: 
namely that they should be retained for use consistent with [constitutional] principles, rather 
than being disposed of to implement a policy providing no realistic way of protecting [public 
debate]. (585) 
                                                 
95  The amount of Maori language programming available on primetime television, seven years later 
(nil), might well give the courts to reassess the crown’s promises in future cases. 
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“Plainly [section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, section 10 of the Constitution Act and the 
whole of the Electoral Act were] enacted as a guarantee and a protection to the [citizens of 
New Zealand].  Previous cases have shown that the [these Acts are] not impotent to prevent 
action inconsistent with [constitutional] principles.  The fact that the action is legislative or 
administrative pursuant to legislation does not affect whether or not it is inconsistent with 
those principles. (585) 
He later notes that Part VI of the Broadcasting Act 1989 makes provision for political 
parties to meet the cost of broadcasting political advertisements in the lead up to an 
election and says, in making his judgement: 
“These particular provisions (in part VI) are justified in the interest of democracy.  They 
might not be suitable as a pattern for [public debate] broadcasting, but they suggest that 
some special arrangements for such broadcasting would likewise be feasible and justified in 
the interest of honouring [constitutional] obligations.  
 “Beyond any dispute counsel for the appellants were right in at least one of their 
assertions. They spoke of the court’s task in this case as “ungrateful”.  So it is, but for the 
reasons given I would see no alternative but to allow the appeal and grant the relief sought.” 
(568) 
In ACTV v. Commonwealth the issue at hand was whether an action of the legislature 
restricted the freedom of communication in a manner that was not sufficiently justified 
by an Act, no matter how worthy its intentions.  The Chief Justice of the Australian 
High Court noted that the Court has the task of balancing competing interests: 
“Whether… restrictions are justified calls for a balancing of the public interest in free 
communication against the competing public interest which the restriction is designed to 
serve, and for a determination whether the restriction is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
competing public interest….   
 “In weighing the respective interests involved and assessing the necessity for the 
restriction imposed, the Court will give weight to the legislative judgement on these issues.  
But, in the ultimate analysis, it is for the Court to determine whether the constitutional 
guarantee has been infringed in a given case. And the Court must scrutinize with scrupulous 
care restrictions affecting free communication in the conduct of elections for political office 
for it is in that area that the guarantee fulfils its primary purpose. (per Mason, CJ: 598) 
In NZMC v. A-G, the issue at hand was whether the legislature had failed to protect a 
freedom of communication guaranteed by the Treaty. The Solicitor-General had 
presented the appellants as a minority interest group, who were holding the Crown to 
ransom to get their own way.  The court effectively sacrificed the interests of a minority 
in favour of a policy adopted by the representatives of the majority.  However, had the 
case been taken in the manner hypothesised, it is entirely conceivable that the bench 
might have followed Lord Cooke’s opinion and prevented the transfer.  A policy which 
affects the interests of all New Zealand citizens should surely be scrutinised more 
thoroughly by the Courts, and with less reliance on the Crown’s expression of good 
intentions, than a policy that affects a small minority of Maori language speakers. 
It is interesting to speculate whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion 
it did, if Maori had claimed that it was their rights to receive political discourse and 
debate, as British citizens under article three of the Treaty, that the Crown had failed to 
protect. That might well have provided the courts with sufficient justification to deny 
the transfer of assets.  
 112
One might also speculate whether this case could have been taken against the whole of 
the Broadcasting Act 1989 and the Radiocommunications Act 1900, and if the courts 
might be sufficiently provoked to do as Lord Cooke implied they might, and take the 
unprecedented step of declaring an Act of Parliament illegal. 96 
Acts of Omission 
The issues we are concerned here do not involve the constitutional role of the courts.  
We are concerned with the outcomes of broadcasting policy, the quality of the policy 
advice on which the government relied when it deregulated broadcasting, and therefore 
the constitutional role of the public servants that proffered that advice.  
The analysis presented here clearly indicates an answer to one of the questions asked at 
the beginning of this thesis; ‘What should be the outcomes of broadcasting policy?’.97 It 
must surely be uncontroversial to say that one of the outcomes of broadcasting policy 
must be the protection of New Zealand citizens’ rights to receive and participate in 
public debate and political discourse. One might go further and argue that broadcasting 
policy should endeavour to guarantee, or give effect to, the exercise of those rights. 
It is for the government, as the representatives of the people, to decide what should be 
the outcomes of broadcasting policy.  However, it is entirely proper for public servants 
to advise the government as to what the outcomes of policy might be, when those 
outcomes are expressed or implied by the laws that Parliament has already passed.   
Officials would be derelict in their professional duty if they did not advise the 
government – in the strongest terms – what the outcomes of policy should be when 
those outcomes are implied by New Zealand’s constitution, or by documents such as the 
Treaty that are a foundation of the Crown’s legitimacy. 
We asked the question ‘Was the Treasury submission to the RCBRT good policy 
advice?’ at the beginning of this thesis. For our answer, we need only consider that the 
advice neglected to consider an issue as fundamental and self-evident as the protection 
of the citizens’ right to freedom of political discourse.  The quality of broadcasting 
policy advice offered subsequently can be judged by the following facts: 
• Officials failed to incorporate into their advice the findings of the Royal 
Commission, which established to determine the will of the people and advise the 
government accordingly.  
• Acting on official advice, Parliament has passed legislation that could conceivably 
have been judged illegal, creating an unwelcome constitutional precedent. 
• A situation now exists in which the courts could quite possibly restrain the 
government from selling Television New Zealand Ltd or its assets. 
                                                 
96  Sir Geoffrey Palmer kindly provided his personal opinion on this analysis while it was at an earlier 
stage of development than that presented here. He believed the court’s decision would depend on 
whether the judges of the bench were inclined toward judicial activism.  Only by presenting the case 
to the court could one know for certain. 
97  Section 2 (1) of the Public Finance Act states that “ ‘Outcomes’ means the impacts on, or the 
consequences for, the community of the outputs or activities of the Government.” It is this meaning 
that is intended here. 
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• Officials evidently did not deem the change of electoral system, from first-past-the-
post to mixed-member proportional representation after the 1993 referendum, 
sufficient cause to review the constitutional role of broadcasting policy. 
We must recall that none of this apparently intended by the government. The 
government depends heavily on the advice of its officials, and a great deal of policy 
depends on officials’ professional ability.  Citizens also depend on officials to act as 
“public servants” and offer the government advice that reflects the public interest, (to 
the extent it can be clearly defined). There is a constitutional convention that public 
servants will offer the government’s Ministers politically neutral advice, without fear or 
favour.  This is one means by which our system of parliamentary democracy protects 
the fiduciary relationship between citizens and state.  However, constitutional 
conventions have little legal force. Joseph (1993) describes thus: 
“(conventions)…coordinate the practices of government and provide means for co-operation 
between the organs; ‘[they]…provide the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they 
make the legal Constitution work; they keep it in touch with the growth of ideas’.  
Constitutional convention acts as a restraining influence on legal power.  The most important 
conventions promote responsible government; they ensure public affairs are conducted in 
accordance with the people’s wishes expressed through their representatives in 
Parliament.”98 
He goes on to imply that they offer only weak protection to the citizens’ interests: 
“Conventions, not being laws, are unenforceable in the courts.  They are obeyed for a variety 
of reasons: sheer inertia, habit, the desire to conform, or the belief that it is right and proper 
to obey them, or because politicians wish the machinery government to go on.   
 “Their application can be a matter of intense debate. Conventions seek to restrain 
political adventurers.  Their very existence may be denied and their relevance disputed. And 
when the dust settles, no one may be the wiser.” (238-239) 
If official advisors fail to observe the constitutional conventions regarding neutrality, 
balance and integrity, or fail in their professional duty, the government may be none the 
wiser.  If officials respect the democratic process and ensure that their advice 
incorporates the views of bodies such as the RCBRT, the government can at least be 
assured that they will gain what J.S. Mill called “…the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth…” as a result of “…the rough process of a struggle between 
combatants fighting under hostile banners.” 
In the case of broadcasting policy implemented in 1988 this was not the case, and in the 
next chapter we see how this could eventually bring the system of representative 
government into disrepute and compromise the legitimacy of the Crown. 
Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed some of the economic theory of property rights. 
We focused especially on how the creation of property rights might imply that rights 
                                                 
98  The internal quote is from Sir Ivor Jennings’ (1959) The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed pp 81-82 
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could be created where none existed, or social and political rights might be transformed 
into property rights with adequate specification.  We barely mentioned the idea that 
certain rights might also be extinguished or the government’s protection of them may be 
diminished as part of the deregulation process. 
In this chapter, we have seen that New Zealand’s citizens do have an express right to 
freedom of expression.  This appears to be a negative right, making it illegal for the 
government to restrict that freedom.  We have also seen that the Broadcasting Act 1979 
imposed requirements on the BCNZ and private broadcasters to have regard for the 
public interest.  This gave effective protection to the New Zealand citizen’s right to 
receive and engage in political debate and discourse, suggesting that this was a positive 
right.  When broadcasting was deregulated, this protection was diminished in principle 
and, as many commentators have claimed, also in effect.99 
Recall the basic proposition of Agenda-Setting theory: “The press may not be 
successful in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about.” (Cohen, 1963: 13) Recall also, that what the media omits 
from the agenda often produces the most important effect (Leitch, 1992; Fox 1988).  In 
this chapter some profoundly important issues for New Zealand’s future have been 
traversed:  
• The erosion of protections for New Zealand citizens’ fundamental right to freedom 
of political discourse. 
• The constitutional role of the Treaty of Waitangi and the meaning of claims brought 
before the Waitangi Tribunal. 
• The ability of the courts to protect a citizen’s fundamental rights and the proposal 
that New Zealand should have a written constitution. 
We might legitimately ask why the media has failed to place these issues, among many 
others, on the ‘agenda’ for public debate.  For our answer, we need look no further than 
the institutional arrangements for broadcasting created by the Broadcasting Act 1989, 
the Radiocommunications Act and the State Owned Enterprises Act.  More particularly, 
we must look to the advice of the officials who proposed and developed these 
arrangements, and later defended them before the courts. 
If the reader feels a sense of outrage or despair at this situation, there is one source of 
solace this analysis can offer. As matters stand, any citizen of New Zealand could bring 
an injunction to prevent the Government from selling Television New Zealand Ltd with 
some confidence that they would succeed. 
                                                 
99  Comrie (1996: 382) cites Atkinson (1989, 1994), Palmer (1992), Edwards (1992), Campbell (1989, 
1992) as examples. 
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Chapter 10 Policy and Social Control 
The previous chapter led us to some conclusions about what the outcomes of media 
policy might be, in respect to the relationship between the citizens and the state. A 
subtler and possibly far more important issue is the way media policy influences the 
relationship between the state, society and the market, and the sorts of external benefits 
and harms it might create in doing so. 
Social Control 
Recall what the original “media effects” researchers found, when trying to determine 
the influence of the media on individuals: 
“….mass communication ‘ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of 
audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and 
influences,’ including selective perception, exposure, attention and retention; group 
dynamics; and opinion leadership.” (Lasora, 1992, quoting Klapper, 1960) 
Elisabeth Noell-Neumann’s research explored the way media creates social “cues” 
about appropriate behaviour, which influence the way people interact with each other 
and with society as a whole (pg 6, above). She took as a starting point the idea of 
Ferdinand Tonnies (1922: 138) that “Public opinion always claims to be authoritative.  
It demands consent or at least compels silence, or abstention from contradiction”.   
These findings all reflect a principle known in organisational psychology known as 
social control. Tushman and O’Reilly emphasise the importance of organisational 
culture in this regard:    
“In the same way that… formal control processes guide behaviour, culture serves as a social 
control system.  If we care about others, for instance, we like them and want them to like us, 
and if we have some agreement about what is important, we are under their control.  That is, 
if I care about you and we agree about what is important and how to act, whenever we are 
together, we effectively control each other.” (103) 
This idea of “social control” is well developed in the literature on organisational 
behaviour, particularly in regard to small-group behaviour and teamwork.100 It may be 
contrasted with the idea of “formal control”, which relies on rules, regulations and the 
implicit or explicit use of coercive power.101 
                                                 
100  Tushman and O’Reilly’s bibliography is good starting point, as is any undergraduate text book on 
Organisational Behaviour.  For an insightful demonstration of how social control has affected some 
critical political decisions, see Irving L Janis (1989) “Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for 
Consensus at any Cost” 
101  The contrast stands between what Althusser describes as the respective roles of “ideological state 
apparatuses” and “repressive state apparatuses”. 
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The creation and maintenance of social control depends on two things: the degree of 
consensus among team members about what “what is important and how to act” and the 
intensity or commitment with which those values and beliefs are held. As the grid 
diagram in Figure 26 shows, if both consensus and intensity are high, social control can 
be effective.  If both are low, only formal control and (actual or implied) coercion can 
be effective – otherwise there would be no possibility of society at all.102 
Figure 26: Social Control and Formal Control 
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Recall the model employed in Chapter 4 to describe changes to New Zealand’s policy 
framework in the 1980’s. Tushman and O’Reilly used their model to explain the idea 
that a firm, which seeks to pursue its business strategy effectively, should attempt to 
create ‘congruence’ between its internal organisation, its organisational culture and it 
human resource management policies. This congruence creates a cognitive environment 
that motivates incentivises and even compels the firm’s employees to fulfil its business 
strategy. The term cognitive environment is not Tushman and O’Reilly’s, it has been 
coined here to emphasise the importance of individual perception and shared perception 
in creating social control: 
• Cognitive, because cognition consists of two parts; the sensory stimulus which is the 
material or physical element of perception, and the interpretation and attribution of 
meaning to the stimulus, which is the psychological or ideological element of 
perception. 
• Environment, because an environment affects – and sometimes determines – the 
way we live, but we can also manipulate it and control it to some extent. The 
greatest influence we have on the environment is the en masse sum of many 
individuals’ actions or inactions, which may be affected by government policy. 
                                                 
102  Anarchists or Anarcho-syndicalists might disagree, however the reality is probably that both types of 
utopia would rely on strong social control in practice. 
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What we mean when we use the word ‘society’ is exactly this; a cognitive environment 
within which we exist, comprised of laws, rules, norms, practices, values, beliefs and 
symbols, which the people living in a given time and place share in common.  
An example might help to illuminate this idea: every one of us carries money. These 
pieces of paper, metal and plastic have no value, in “reality”. That is, if one were lost in 
the bush, they would be useless and therefore worthless.  Yet in our daily reality, money 
is the very signifier of value.  This is because the perception that money has value is 
reinforced every time we get it or spend it.  Because we make laws to prevent money 
from being forged, or defaced, or devalued. Because we create songs, stories, television 
programmes and magazines that reinforce the idea.  Ultimately, money has value 
because, and only because, we share a common belief that it does. Therefore we have 
high level of consensus. Our cognitive environment constantly reinforces this belief – it 
“demands consent or at least compels silence, or abstention from contradiction” and 
therefore ensures that the belief is held with high intensity.   
The cognitive environment creates and sustains a whole range of such shared beliefs: 
the law must be obeyed, people have rights, we should drive on the left.  It also creates 
and sustains less obvious characteristics of a society, such as the extent of trust and 
mutual co-operation, which Fukuyama (1995) calls social capital.103 There is little 
possibility of opting out, except retreat into the life of a hermit, emigration (if only to a 
different cognitive environment), or suicide. Failure to share this commonly-held state 
of what Marx called ‘false consciousness’ could result in referral to the mental health 
system or imprisonment (Ignatieff, 1984: 50). The cognitive environment is therefore a 
public good, in the sense that everybody in society consumes it, and there is little 
private choice in the matter. 
Constructing Control 
The cognitive environment is not natural.  It is an artificial construct, which can be 
manipulated to change society or defend the status quo. This idea echoes Louis 
Althusser’s (1971) conception of the role played in society by Ideological State 
Apparatuses and Repressive State Apparatuses referred to in Chapter 2. However, 
where Althusser sees effects of these apparatuses as always oppressive, the concept 
expressed here is that the cognitive environments they create are the natural, or if one 
prefers inevitable, condition of humankind.  
One has to be a little careful about the use of the terms natural and artificial in this 
context.  Althusser seems to imply that people could or should live in a society which 
does not employ the regulatory mechanisms of either formal control or social control.  
This would imply that the ‘natural’ condition of humankind is the state of war, as 
famously described by Thomas Hobbes in 1651: 
                                                 
103  Fukuyama presents social trust as instrumentally valuable: it reduces social transactions costs and 
therefore increases economic efficiency.  However, it may be necessary for people to believe trust 
and other social virtues are intrinsically valuable, in order that have the effects he indicates. 
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“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, 
against every man.” ([1651] 1942: 82) 
It is simply inconceivable that a modern society, with a sophisticated division of labour 
and ubiquitous market, could exist without the regulatory mechanisms of formal and 
social control to hold people “all in awe”.  That is, they are inevitably required for the 
good functioning of society.  John Locke expressed a similar sentiment, using the 
language and concepts of his era to propose that this is the natural condition of 
humankind (believing that what is natural essentially reflects the will of God): 
“If he find that God has made him and all other men in a state wherein they cannot subsist 
without society, and has given them the judgement to discern what is capable of preserving 
and maintaining that society, can he but conclude that he is obliged, and that God requires 
him to follow those rules which conduce to the preserving of society?” (1960: 49) 104 
Althusser seems to oppose the idea that society can employ the regulatory mechanisms 
of formal and social control, but he does not offer a viable alternative (except, perhaps 
to substitute those that support capitalism with those that support communism).  Locke 
implies that these mechanisms are available for the good management of society, and 
that it is within the bounds of human reason to decide how they should be employed. 
More than that, he proposes that we have a responsibility to do just that.  The argument 
in this chapter follows that line of reasoning, although the author believes the obligation 
is to society itself and one’s fellow citizens, rather than to God. 
Government and Social Control 
Tushman and O’Reilly argue that organisational polices should seek to manipulate the 
values, beliefs and behaviours of employees in order to create social control.  This 
reduces the transactions costs involved in forming and monitoring contract-based 
agency relationships.105 
In the same way, social, economic and cultural policies can be manipulated to affect the 
cognitive environment of a society, and thereby reduce the need for the state to use its 
coercive (or repressive, to Althusser) powers. If we use the model as a metaphor for 
social and political organisation, we need to make explicit our assumptions about the 
constitutional arrangements and governance roles that apply within the society in 
question. The model could be used to describe the policy elements of a state that is a 
liberal democracy or a regime that is based on the principles of monarchy, communism, 
Islamic law, or apartheid, for example. In any society, with any given form of 
constitutional arrangements, the media is an important agent in the formation and 
maintenance of social control, along with other “ideological apparatuses”, including the 
society’s religious, educational and cultural institutions. The cognitive environment 
                                                 
104  The quote was not published in Locke’s “Two Treatises”.  It appears in Laslett’s introduction to this 
edition, where it is quoted from Locke’s journal for 1678, pp 201-2.  The language has been 
modernised. 
105  Social control, or mutually agreed and reinforced behaviour, may be what Oliver Williamson (1985) 
means, but does not fully explain, when he refers to “relational contracting”. 
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constructed by these will largely determine that society’s acceptance of (or support the 
state’s justifications for), full employment, ethnic cleansing, inflation, purdah, 
compulsory unionism, carless days, biculturalism, solo motherhood, homosexual, paid 
parental leave, or sex and violence on television, for instance.  
Each would imply different conceptions of what should be the ultimate outcomes of 
strategy, how the leadership is chosen, and on what basis the society distributes benefits 
and harms to its members. The extent and influence of social control is therefore 
connected to the legitimacy of the state and the fundamental assumptions that create and 
sustain that legitimacy. Scruton (1982) provides the following definition of legitimacy, 
which neatly makes the connection between social control and legitimacy, by placing it 
in opposition to formal control and repression: 
“What makes people believe a government to be, or accept it as being, legitimate? This is a 
question to which a politician, however sceptical or indifferent… will always give his 
attention.  If a people have the rooted belief that only democratic election, say, or only 
hereditary succession, confers legitimacy, they can be governed in some other way only by 
force.” (264) 
We can continue to develop the metaphor along these lines: Tushman and O’Reilly 
propose that a firm should shape its organisational culture to aid the pursuit of business 
strategy.  While the legitimacy of this sort of manipulation may be offensive to some 
people, employees who find a firm’s “social control” system oppressive may ultimately 
seek employment elsewhere.  In some cases, where the firm’s culture condones 
antisocial behaviour such as sexual harassment, for instance, employees may seek 
remedy in the courts. 
Applying the metaphor to society as a whole, the formal control of the law probably 
does not influence a person’s behaviour nearly so powerfully as does their response to 
the values, beliefs and behaviours of other people.  The state does attempt to influence 
social behaviour quite explicitly, through television campaigns about drink-driving, safe 
driving, finding employment, dobbing in beneficiaries, enrolling to vote and so forth, 
and many of these appeal to peoples existing values and beliefs. (Andreasen, 1995; Kotler 
& Roberto, 1989).106 People do flee from their countries of origin to seek asylum, or 
simply emigrate, if the political or social environment is hostile to their beliefs and 
values.  In some countries – especially those with a written constitution – citizens do 
have recourse to the courts if the government performs acts or passes legislation that 
offend the values and beliefs entailed in the constitution. 
There is, of course, a crucial difference between a business and a liberal-democratic 
state. A business creates congruence between the means for formal and social control in 
order to pursue the strategies of the firm, in the interests of its shareholders.  A 
country’s citizens might not want the state to pursue strategies of its own, or to reflect 
the interests of a minority of society’s members.  More than that, they may not wish the 
state to be involved in creating and maintaining ‘social control’ at all, unless they accept 
                                                 
106  In New Zealand, Colmar Brunton Research has developed expertise in this area, which has been 
applied in some of the State-sponsored television advertising campaigns mentioned here – the Land 
Transport Safety Authority and the Department of Labour. 
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it as a legitimate activity of government. In a liberal-democratic society, the legitimacy 
of government rests on the assumption that it is elected by the people to represent their 
interests. It follows, logically, that there would be a conflict of interest if the 
government were actively involved in manipulating the cognitive environment to its 
own ends.  It therefore also follows that a sustainable liberal democratic society requires 
the existence of a media that is independent of the direct influence of government 
policy.107 
The Domain of Freedom 
In a liberal democratic society, the media provides the arena in which people can voice 
competing claims about the nature and extent of social control. This is, of course, the 
essence of the idea proposed by Mill at the beginning of this chapter: every ideology, 
even his own version of liberalism, should be subject to constant scrutiny and challenge 
in order to determine the ‘truth’. However, the contemporary liberal perspective is that 
nobody should compelled to agree to one version of ‘truth’ about what is good for 
society.  The struggle is not to discover truth, it is to determine what should be the 
fundamental set of shared values and beliefs people consent to, which form the basis of 
social control.  
At the beginning of Chapter 8, we noted Pusey’s comment that “…(social democratic) 
societies…have not one co-ordinating mechanism but two.  On the one side they have 
states, bureaucracies and the law, and on the other, economies, markets and money.” 
(1993: 15).  This analysis suggest that in fact they (and all other societies) have a third 
regulatory system: the system of social control.  This form of regulation resides in the 
set of shared beliefs, values, history and culture that comprises the peoples’ cognitive 
environment. 
Tobin (1970) proposed that the market is the “domain of inequality” and that the polity 
was the domain of equality – in the sense of an equality of rights.  In a liberal-
democratic society, it is a fundamental assumption that the domain of social control is 
also the domain of freedom: freedom of thought, opinions, religious beliefs, cultures.  
At the bare minimum, this freedom is a negative right; it is a freedom from the 
interference of the state.  However, it is not a domain of absolute freedom; it implies a 
freedom from the harmful interference of others, which rightfully places limitations on 
the freedom to express thoughts and opinions, or to broadcast messages, that could harm 
others.  This concept, and its relation to broadcasting policy in liberal democracy, is 
demonstrated in Figure 27. In this diagram we see the interaction of the three domains, 
the notions of sovereignty that each implies, and some of the information each uses or 
depends on to function effectively.  
                                                 
107  It also follows that other institutions, such as universities and the judiciary,  should be beyond the 
direct interference of the executive, to provide a critique of and a restraint on the way in which the 
state constructs and maintains social control. Peter Lambley, in The Psychology of Apartheid (1980), 
describes how these institutions might not be all they seem in some societies. Sham democratic 
institutions created by the Broederbond in apartheid South Africa gave the illusion of respectability 
to the outside world and solace to the English-speaking whites, while “...it was possible they served 
a pathological function quite different from the role the played in other countries.”(55) 
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The state is the domain of equality because each citizen has an equal right to vote, and 
because all citizens are equally subject to the rule of law. The state formally obtains 
legitimacy by combining the individual sovereignty of each citizen, but less formally by 
governing in the public interest. The government depends on policy advice, opinion 
polls, and such public debate as appears on the media agenda to govern effectively. The 
courts rely on law and legal precedent, but they are also sensitive to the prevailing 
climate of public opinion.  Both rely on the media as sources of information about the 
world, and as a means of communicating policies and decisions that contribute to the 
creation and sustenance of social control.  
The market is the domain of inequality, because where a market economy exists, one 
does not expect each person will have equal shares of income and property. Each 
consumer is sovereign in the sense that they are free to make choices regarding their 
purchases, within the constraints imposed by their wealth.  Prices provide much of the 
information they require to make their purchase decisions, but advertising and 
marketing are also influential.  Producers do not simply observe consumers’ purchasing 
decisions in order to manage production, they also rely on market research and social 
trends.  Both producers and consumers therefore rely on media in important ways to 
ensure the efficient functioning of the market. 
Figure 27: Three Domains and Broadcasting Policy 
Market 
Domain of inequality 
Consumer Sovereignty 
Prices, advertising 
(consumers). Demand, 
market research , social 
trends (producers). 
State 
Domain of equality 
Sovereignty of Crown 
Policy advice, opinion polls, 
public debate (government).
Law, legal precedent 
(courts).
Society 
Domain of freedom 
Personal Sovereignty  
Public debate, culture, 
history, values, education, 
religious belief. 
B d ti P li
Society is the domain of freedom, because a liberal society resists the notion that any 
ideology (particularly the ideology of the Church, as Mill was arguing), should have 
absolute dominion over people’s thoughts, beliefs and culture.  People must therefore 
have freedom of thought, opinion, religious belief, cultural expression and values 
(within the constraint that none should compromise any other person’s freedoms). It is 
in this domain that liberal political theory assumes each individual is sovereign in 
respect of deciding their own values and beliefs, and in respect of their voting choices. 
It here also, that liberal economic theory implies people might “exogenously” decide 
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their lifestyle and consumption choices. In both cases, freedom requires diversity of 
choice and diverse sources of information. 
Finally, the domain of freedom is also the fountainhead of social control. In order for 
society to regulate itself freely, some fundamental values and beliefs must be commonly 
shared. The process of working out the extent of consensus and the intensity of 
acceptance can only occur freely through open conversation and public debate.  Liberal 
ideology dictates that this process should not be restricted by the state, nor should the 
governing party or coalition use the power of the state to promote its own ideology 
within this domain.  Likewise, the profit-maximising motives of producers in media 
markets should not override the rights of individuals to obtain access to public debate, 
or to contribute to the conversation. Protection against the intrusion of the other two 
domains must also be an outcome of broadcasting policy. 
The Role of Policy 
There are considerable dangers entailed in the notion of social control and the act of 
explicitly shaping society’s cognitive environment.  One is that the policies that shape 
and control society’s ideological apparatuses may be captured by a self-interested 
subset of society, who turn them to their own ends. That subset may be a religious or 
political group, the state, or the bureaucracy.  This is perhaps the most familiar form of 
ide ch we normally ass gimes. The other 
danger is that the cognitive environment might become so congruent, and the social 
control it exercises so ubiquitous and self-reinforcing, that the society blinded to the 
possibility or necessity of change.   
ological despotism, whi ociate with totalitarian re
Arguably, there were elements of both these dangers apparent in New Zealand by the 
1980s, which the Tushman and O’Reilly model was used to demonstrate. There was a 
“tight” congruence between policy elements; the BCNZ had captured broadcasting 
policy advice and dominated the media market. This was undoubtedly a difficult 
deadlock to break and it might not have been broken without the efforts of some 
crusading “change agents”.  
But was that change of a desirable type, and did it support and maintain liberal 
democracy of the sort on which New Zealand society is ostensibly based? Recall that 
Richard Mulgan described the 1984-1990 Labour Government’s attempt to reconcile 
economic libertarianism (or neo-liberalism) and social-democratic liberalism. 
Liberalism is an ideology that promotes the freedom of the individual from the 
despotism of the state. In New Zealand’s political arena era, however, that idea is 
expressed in two distinct forms. Each entails a normative or prescriptive view of the 
relationship between the individual and society. Most importantly, for a discussion of 
broadcasting policy, each implies fundamentally different conceptions of what media 
audiences are, what their relationship with the state is, or should be, and how they 
acquire and use information. The contrast between them can be demonstrated most 
clearly by setting out their elements side by side. 
Figure 28: Economic and Political Liberalism 
neo-liberalism  (economic) liberal democracy (political) 
The audience is comprised of sovereign 
consumers in a market society. 
The audience is comprised of citizens in a  
liberal society with representative democracy. 
The essence of freedom resides in the 
consumer’s ability to purchase what goods and 
services they please, in a free market. 
The essence of freedom resides in each citizen 
having rights, obligations and liberties equal 
with those of every other. 
Consumers act on their personal judgement of 
their own best interests. The aggregation of 
individual’s preferences w ll determin the best 
allocation of society’s scarce resources.  This 
will create a far better allocation of scarce 
resources than the arbitrary decisions made in 
the political arena. 
Citizens are capable of making informed 
judgements as voters. They are willing to and 
ble to make choices about what is best for 
society as a whole, and to see their self-interest 
in that context. Their representatives in 
Parliament will govern on their constituents’ 
behalf. 
The state is “neutral”, and has only a minimal 
role to play in society. It is largely concerned 
with the creation and maintenance of a system 
of property rights and enforceable rules of 
exchange. 
The state is the embodiment of the collective 
will of the people, and is expected to play 
whatever role the people choose for it. 
 
Sovereignty resides in the market. The market 
ex rcises ts influence hrough the actions of the 
“invisible hand”.  
Sovereignty resides in Parliament.  It is the 
executive, comprised of Governm nt Ministers, 
which exercises the will of Parliament. 
It is principally economists and lawyers who 
understand the function and ultimate purpose of 
the invisible hand. It is they who should reate  
and maintain the rules within which it functions. 
It is the citizens’ representatives who should 
understand and scrutinise the activities of the 
executive. It is they who pass laws that formally 
regulate society and the economy. 
The consumer can access information in one of 
two ways: either by making sequential trial-and-
error choices, thereby basing their consumption 
only on the material element of cognition, or by 
purchasing information from other sources.  
The citizen must have access to information and 
the ability to use it – they should be informed 
and educated. They should have access to a 
range of views and information, on which they 
can and should make an informed voting 
decision.   
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Information is a private good, obtained on the 
basis of a personal utility maximising decision. 
Its consumption is a matter of personal choice, 
and its production and distribution should be 
governed by the market. 
Information is a public good; its production, 
distribution and consumption are matters of 
constitutional importance, and should be 
guaranteed by the polity. 
Figure 28 sets out the basic ideological conflict that underlay broadcasting deregulation 
in the mid-late 1980s. 108 
The right column represents the liberal democratic view held by the RCBRT, which 
sought to promote the ideals of liberal democracy both in the conduct of its enquiry and 
in its determinations.109 The left column reflects the view of Treasury and the 
Department of Trade and Industry officials who advised the government. It was their 
neo-liberal view of what constitutes a good society that has decisively structured the 
broadcasting policy framework.  
There is nothing intrinsically ‘wrong’ with the view expressed in the left column, or 
‘good’ about that presented in the right.  The neo-liberal view is one valid explanation 
of the way people can and should choose to consume products offered to them by the 
media industry.  What might be ‘wrong’ with the policy framework it has created, is 
that it compels audiences to behave in the way implied by one ideology, and prevents or 
restricts their ability to behave in the way implied by the other. It therefore constructs 
the cognitive environment in a way that reflects a particular ideology, one that discounts 
the value of social capital and could compromise the legitimacy of the Crown.  
It discounts the value of social capital because if supports the idea of a neutral state 
which, as Mulgan (1989) complained, if one looks to its policies “…one usually 
searches in vain for their vision of who we are or where we are going.” The neutral state 
provides no leadership, in other words, and is ineffective at creating consensus about 
values and beliefs, relying instead on the attempt to crudely impose them from above. 
It could compromise the legitimacy of the Crown because of its effect on the cognitive 
environment and peoples’ perception of politicians.  Politicians’ views and behaviours 
are constantly misrepresented on television news; as “arrogant” (Tau Henare, when 
dropped from the Maori Affairs portfolio after a policy conflict), or “very naughty” (Ian 
Revell, attempting to use his position as Deputy Speaker to subvert the rule of law).  As 
Atkinson (1994) demonstrates, sound bites are becoming shorter, which means that 
politicians are increasingly represented as people with (literally) very little to say.  It is 
reasonable to presume that citizens wish to be governed by people they respect, who are 
capable of articulating and defending their ideas, beliefs and policies.  If they are 
prevented from perceiving their representatives in this way, the credibility of democratic 
political institutions will inevitably be eroded. 
Finally, by creating a cognitive environment in which people increasingly see 
themselves as consumers, rather than citizens, the whole idea and practice of 
representative democracy could be eroded: people may begin to perceive participation 
in the democratic process as a state-imposed obligation, to be resented or even resisted. 
                                                 
108  There could easily be a third column representing the Maori perspective. Its omission here is 
deliberate, in the sense that the conflict expressed was between two conceptions of the audience that 
derive from English political and legal philosophy, and neither took proper account of Maori 
cultural beliefs and values. 
109  This is perhaps more evident in the preamble to the RCBRT’s Terms of Reference (see page 36, 
above) than it is in the body of its report. 
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Unhappily, the government’s policy advisors may not have been fully conscious of the 
ideological and rhetorical nature of their advice, and the effect it could have on the 
legitimacy of the Crown. 
Rhetoric and Ideology 
This chapter – and indeed, much of this thesis – has been a pains to present ideas about 
society as if they can and should be spoken of in the language of business and 
economics (hopefully with some success).  However, to only speak about society in this 
way would be to ride roughshod over people’s right to speak about society and their 
beliefs and values in their own way and in their own language.110 
The reason for employing the language of business and economics in this thesis betrays 
its rhetorical strategy.  The intended audience is policy analysts and advisors working in 
the public sector.  In order to persuade these people of the importance and validity of 
certain ideas the author has thought it necessary to address them in their own language 
in order to overcome the peculiar deafness economists, especially, appear to have when 
addressed in other ways: 
“Economists are deaf on the job to history or philosophy; most of them yawn at talk of 
geography or psychology; they do not take seriously the incantations of anthropology or 
sociology; although they want to talk to law and political science they do not want to 
listen….  The suggestion that the study of literature or communication or even the 
nonliterary arts might speak to them would be regarded by many economists as absurd.” 
(Klamer & McCloskey, 1988: 4) 
Keohane, a political scientist by training, makes the same point, and connects the idea 
of economists’ “deafness” to the way economic theory can be unselfconsciously 
ideological: 
“Most mainstream economists do not converse with other social scientists; they preach to 
them. And they do so in two ways: 
1. By instructing us about the form of explanation that we should use: that is, deductive 
accounts, beginning with individual interests and the structure of constraints, using the 
axiom of rationality to derive equilibrium behaviour and outcomes. 
2. By prescribing social and political (as well as economic) policies to us, allegedly on the 
basis of their economic analysis.” (Keohane, 1988: 240-241) 
Heilbroner (1988) apologises for economists who do this. He says many genuinely 
believe they are doing something valuable and necessary; that they think their views are 
rarely wrong, but often misunderstood. They therefore believe they are making: 
“…an earnest and sincere effort to explain society as (they) themselves perceive it: an effort 
to speak the truth at all costs.  What is ‘ideological’ about such an effort is not its hypocrisy 
but its absence of historical perspective, its failure to perceive that its pronouncements are a 
                                                 
110  It is for this reason precisely, that this thesis has used Maori broadcasting issues to illuminate some 
points of the analysis, but has refrained from presenting a detailed analysis of Maori claims in 
broadcasting and their effect on Maori society during the period under examination. 
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belief system, conditioned like all belief systems by the political and social premises of the 
social order.” (1988: 41) 
It is when economists working in government hold these beliefs rigidly, as a closed 
system of belief (per Stevenson, in Chapter 2 above), or when they refuse to 
acknowledge the limited application of economic ideas, that they endanger the practice 
of representative democracy.  Nelson (1987) says that economists working in the policy 
process rarely have an opportunity to undertake detailed and comprehensive analysis.  
They are more often required to apply economic concepts intuitively, to rapidly 
changing situations or in response to urgent requests for input. 
This might go some way toward explaining the rhetorical and ideological use of 
economic theory in Treasury’s submission to the RCBRT, but it is not intended to 
excuse it.  It is the professional duty of a policy advisor to take into account a range of 
theoretical and conceptual perspectives when developing policy advice. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We have covered a considerable amount of ground in this chapter, and it is worthwhile 
summarising the key points. These are: 
• Societies have a third regulatory system, beside the polity and the market; it is the 
system of social control, or shared values, beliefs and culture. This distributes 
significant benefits and harms to members of society – some can be gauged in 
monetary terms, many only in pleasure or misery.  
• People in society live within a cognitive environment that creates positive and 
negative externalities for society’s members.  Positive externalities might include 
the level of social trust and co-operation, neighbourliness, honesty, respect for the 
law and tolerance of others’ opinions (these increase social capital).  Negative 
externalities might include racism, sexism or other forms of bigotry, the acceptance 
of violence as a legitimate means of solving disputes and intolerance of others’ 
social and political claims (these decrease social capital). 
• Liberal democratic societies imply that there should be a domain of freedom, which 
entails a negative freedom – freedom from interference with their political, cultural 
religious and other beliefs.  It also entails a positive freedom – the freedom and the 
ability to engage in the “social conversation” in which people discuss and debate the 
values and beliefs they might share, and which create the social and formal control 
to which they are all subject. 
It is not the intention of this thesis to bend and push and force broadcasting policy into 
the shape required for economic analysis and public administration. It has been written 
to persuade a very small community of broadcasting policy advisors, and a wider 
community of policy analysts, that there is a great deal more to broadcasting policy than 
the narrow pursuit of allocative efficiency.  Hopefully, it has also demonstrated to non-
economists that the concepts of economics and public administration can provide 
powerful tools for describing and analysing broadcasting policy issues.  The power of 
economic thinking is increased, rather than diminished, when it acknowledges its own 
limitations and defers to the insights provided by other ways of talking and thinking 
about the world. 
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The story of broadcasting deregulation is, sadly, a story about economists preaching to 
others and not listening. When officials refused to acknowledge that their insights might 
have been understood, and understood only too well, they went away and used their 
position of power to implement their ideas anyway. This could only happen because 
New Zealand had an ‘elective dictatorship’ at the time.  
Lord Cooke says in NZMC v. A-G: “(Mr Justice McGechan) appears to me to have 
refrained from carrying his reasoning to its logical conclusion…”(579) There are some 
conclusions of this analysis we should not shy away from, nor the ‘ungrateful task’ they 
impose. Cocker (1996) accused officials of capturing the development and 
implementation of broadcasting policy in the years 1986-88. There must also be a prima 
facie case that the Ministry of Commerce’s Broadcasting Policy Unit has “captured” 
broadcasting policy advice since 1988. A proper evaluation of the Broadcasting Policy 
Unit’s performance since the broadcasting reforms were implemented would require 
more attention than this thesis can afford. However, over a span of ten years, it 
apparently has not expressed to the government any doubts or reservations about the 
integrity of the current broadcasting policy framework, or its social or constitutional 
impact. This despite the persistent challenge from Maori and numerous critiques of the 
broadcasting system presented in academic and other literature, some of which have 
been referred to here. 
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Chapter 11 Public Broadcasting 
In the conclusions to Chapter 9, we noted that the government is likely to be unable to 
sell Television New Zealand Limited, as deregulation has so significantly eroded some 
of the protections previously offered to the public interest.  It could continue to operate 
this State-Owned Enterprise to maximise its financial return, or it could consider re-
establishing it as a public broadcasting channel. If it were to pursue the latter option, 
then it will be necessary to create new institutional arrangements and possibly new 
legislation. In order to do this effectively, we need to have some principles to work 
from, and perhaps first even define precisely what we mean by public broadcasting. 
The Government currently owns two advertising-funded television channels, which are 
not expected to pursue social as well as commercial objectives.  Perhaps, therefore, the 
two state-owned television channels should not be regarded as public broadcasters, even 
though they are publicly owned.  Hugh Rennie expressed his frustration with the way in 
which the issue is debated: 
“Our public broadcasters call their competitors private broadcasters.  Our private 
broadcasters call themselves independent broadcasters, and snipe at the public broadcasters 
as state broadcasters.  Services which take money in return for time in their broadcasts are 
commercial.  Those which take money from (the) government or audience are non-
commercial.  
 “By implication, non-commercial broadcasting is the same as public broadcasting.  
Commercial broadcasting is everything else, and in the thinking of some, inferior. What 
nonsense. Good broadcasting is not about ownership, or the presence or absence of 
advertising.  It is about what goes to air.” (1990: 19) 
This chapter explores the meaning of the concept of Public Broadcasting, using some of 
the tools provided by economics and public administration theory. The first section 
outlines Eli Noam’s ideas about government intervention, based on public choice 
theory.  These demonstrate particular ideas about what we will call “State 
Broadcasting”.  The second section uses Principal-Agent theory to propose a definition 
of the essential characteristics of public broadcasting. The third section reviews the 
BBC definition of public broadcasting, and tests it against some of the economic 
theories and concepts traversed in earlier chapters. The fourth section summarises the 
discussion on broadcasting economics and policy.  
State Broadcasting 
New Zealand has a rich history of government intervention and control of broadcasting 
(Gregory, 1985).  It could be argued that New Zealand has never really had “Public 
Broadcasting”, rather, it has had “State Broadcasting”. This section employs Eli Noam’s 
(1988, 1991), public choice model to explore what that term might mean. 
Public choice theory, which we summarised in the section titled Public Administration, 
in Chapter 2, gives an economic explanation of why politicians and would 
administrators take decisions that distort market allocations. Eli Noam has produced a 
model that is similar to those of Hotelling, Steiner and Beebe, but which also allows 
him to discuss public choice theory in the context of programme diversity.  He talks of 
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the “pitch”, or range of programmes a broadcaster might provide, across a continuum 
from low culture to high culture  “In radio these pitches are often referred to as formats, 
such as all-news, classical music and ‘easy listening’.” (47). Viewers are ranked by 
pitch preference along this continuum.  He notes one could imagine a variety of such 
continuums, all of which simultaneously influence each viewers choice, but the analysis 
can simplified to one without losing the essence of the argument. 
Noam assumes a normal distribution of audience numbers around the centre of the 
continuum, and that there is a limit to the spread of the pitch any one broadcaster can 
manage.  Therefore, each pitch has a centre, P, and a distance from the centre of  ±B. 
Figure 29: Eli Noam’s concept of “Pitch” 
Scanned Image: from Noam (1991:46) 
 
The profit-maximising pitch for a single channel will be set at the centre of the 
distribution (i.e. slightly to the right of where it appears in Figure 29).  Subsequent entry 
of channels into the market will be placed to maximise the audience within their pitches, 
and may lead to a reduction in B, and a narrowing of the triangle representing the 
audience which the pitch attracts.  The result is very similar to the results of the 
Steiner/Beebe model, but the model is less rigid about the concept of programme type 
(i.e. viewers may prefer a range of programmes, rather than a single type). It also 
acknowledges that channels may adapt their range of programming in response to 
competition. 
Noam uses this framework to describe a continuum spanning a spectrum of political 
opinion, from left-wing to right-wing, with a population of voters that are normally 
distributed around a preference for the political centre. Given a single channel, operated 
by a government-controlled broadcasting organisation, programming choices may 
follow various goals of the government.  The possibilities given by Noam are: 
• Public Benefit: The government aims to please the maximum number of citizens, 
by providing programmes the citizenry like.  The pitch will be identical to the profit-
maximising pitch, at the centre of the distribution. 
• Vote Maximisation: The party in control aims to maximise its own votes. In a two-
party system, both parties will promise a centrist pitch, hoping to maximise their 
own votes.  With multiple parties the outcomes are less definite, however coalitions 
will tend to promote a centrist position.  Unstable solutions are also possible. 
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• Spoils System: The government rewards its supporters with programmes of their 
preference.  The pitch will be set to satisfy the maximum number of supporters of 
the victorious party. 
• Propaganda:  Television could be used as a means of widening and securing the 
voter base of a party.  However, a straight “party line” programme will alienate 
opposition voters, who will become non-viewers.  Therefore the pitch will be 
sufficiently near the interests of opposition viewers to attract their attention. 
Noam says that, under the Public Benefit or Vote Maximising assumptions, the 
government will provide a stable diet of programming for a majority audience.  Under 
either the Spoils or Propaganda assumptions, a change of government will lead to 
programming instability, as changes of government bring about changes of 
programming policy unless, that is: 
“…parties may agree to a form of broadcasting that they will never fully control, even if they 
have an electoral majority; however, the other party will never control it either.  This attitude 
is more likely where the strength of voting blocs is relatively similar, majorities change 
periodically, and the ideological differences between parties are bridgeable.” (Noam, 1991: 
50) 
Another possibility, which Noam does not predict, is that politicians may collude, 
explicitly or otherwise, to create a broadcasting system that is unable to effectively fulfil 
its role as the fourth estate and hold them to account in the court of public opinion. 
Although Noam’s model does not add much, if anything, to the Steiner/Beebe model in 
terms of analytical sophistication, it does provide another, perhaps more intuitively 
understandable, description of the basic issues surrounding programme types and 
audience preferences. Its treatment of the way political (rather than policy) decisions 
might influence broadcasting output is fairly crude, but it at least recognises that 
viewers’ preferences can be expressed through direct lobbying.  It also makes explicit 
the idea that the political motives of politicians may also be a consideration in 
determining what broadcasting outputs will be produced.111   
Noam’s model describes “state broadcasting”, because it presumes that the state 
intervenes in broadcasting markets to pursue policy outcomes that are deemed desirable 
by the government of the day, or to the advantage of the political party which controls 
the executive.  
Public Broadcasting 
If what Noam describes is state broadcasting, then what do we mean by public 
broadcasting? The idea of principal-agent relationships applied to the relationship 
between citizens and state in Chapter 9 is a very useful starting point. 
                                                 
111  The influence does not need to be as crude and direct as the examples given by Noam.  In Australia 
recently, vote-maximising decisions were undoubtedly the primary motivator for passage of “anti-
siphoning” legislation, which prevents some sports events from being shown solely on Pay TV. 
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Principals and Agents 
If the idea of public broadcasting means anything at all, it is that it is an institution that 
should serve the public rather than the state or other interested parties. We can do this 
using Principal-Agent theory.  However, we must first extend the theory we have 
outlined so far include the idea of a client. There is the unstated assumption of 
Principal-Agent theory, which is that the end of every chain of Principal-Agent 
relationships there must be a third party or subject, to whom the principal’s intentions 
refer.  This insight arises from a special instance of the principal-agent relationship in 
which the principal is simultaneously the subject, and at the mercy of the agent. That is, 
the principal is the client of his or her agent. Badian offers this definition:  
“The client may be described as an inferior entrusted, by custom or by himself, to the 
protection of a stranger more powerful than he, and rendering certain services and 
observances in return for this protection…. There are many ways of forming this relation of 
trust, some resting on status and some on contract (in the widest sense of these terms).”112 
Thus the patient is a client of her doctor, or the litigant the client of his lawyer.  The 
principal re-enters the principal-agent relationship as a third party: the subject. The 
agent is also referred to as a fiduciary of the principal in such circumstances. 
If citizens are principals and the Government their agent, then a Minister is a principal 
and a departmental Chief Executive is his or her agent. The Chief Executive is then a 
principal and the departmental employee an agent, and at the end of this chain of 
relationships is the citizen who deals with that employee. That citizen is both the 
principal at the beginning and the subject at the end of that chain of relationships – 
therefore a client of the state. 
This idea from agency theory is fundamental to understanding the principal-agent-
subject relationships in broadcasting. Figure 30 shows a set of four such relationships.  
The two on the top line represent the view of broadcasting from the perspective of the 
economic theory we have reviewed in the foregoing chapters. 
                                                 
112  Quoted in White (1985, 199) 
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Figure 30: Principal-Agent Relationships 
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State Broadcasting represents the relationship implied in the public choice model 
outlined by Noam. It  also depicts the role of the state in broadcasting according to 
Treasury’s policy prescriptions.  That is, the State is the principal, engaging the 
broadcaster as an agent to pursue its social or political objectives in respect of a subject, 
who is the audience. 
Commercial Broadcasting implies the same relational direction. The advertiser is the 
principal, who contracts with the broadcaster—again the agent—for the opportunity to 
convey a message to the subject: the audience.   
Public Broadcasting has two variants.  In both, the direction of the principal-agent 
relationship is the opposite from either state or commercial broadcasting.  In the first 
variant, depicted in the bottom left quadrant, the audience is a principal who engages the 
broadcaster as an agent to supply information and analysis regarding the activities of the 
state (and, one might argue, other members of the social and political elite). In the 
second variant, depicted in the bottom right quadrant, the audience is once again the 
principal, but now stands as a client of the broadcaster.  This is the essence of the role 
the media plays in “holding a mirror” to society in such a way that it can give effect to 
the desire for social change or stability. 
The public broadcasting relationships do not show potential role played by the state as a 
facilitator or broker of these transactions.  In the presence of a potential conflict of 
interest there is a somewhat difficult problem of establishing effective governance 
relationships for public broadcasting. Especially when the subject – who may have a 
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strong disincentive to withstand the sort of scrutiny the principal desires – has the 
opportunity and the power to intervene in the relationship between principal and agent. 
The BBC Definition 
Having established this fundamental principle, we can explore some of the other 
dimensions of what we might mean by public broadcasting, with reference to the 
analysis presented in previous chapters. The BBC’s definition provides a handy 
framework for this exploration. The BBC’s Broadcasting Research unit, in a publication 
titled The Public Service Idea in British Broadcasting, set out eight principles for public 
broadcasting.  These are: 
• Geographic universality 
• Catering for all interests and tastes 
• Catering for minorities 
• Concern for national identity and community 
• Detachment from vested interests and government 
• One broadcasting system to be funded by the corpus of users 
• Competition in good programming rather than for numbers 
• Guidelines to liberate programme makers and not restrict them 
These principles seem laudable on first sight, but what do they really mean? The 
economic ideas outlined in previous chapters can help us interrogate each of these 
principles, and perhaps achieve more clarity about which are truly fundamental to the 
idea of public broadcasting. 
1 - Geographic universality 
This principle implies that government should intervene to supply radio and TV to 
audiences that are unable to pay the full supply cost.  This is effectively a transfer of 
income to those people, which implies that the provision of broadcasting services is a 
“merit good”.  That is, a good the government believes people should receive, whether 
or not they are willing to pay for it. Merit goods, such as defence, may also have the 
characteristics of “public goods”, which are defined as being non-rival in consumption 
(an additional consumer does not deplete the amount available for others) and non-
excludability (being freely available for everybody to consume).  Free-to-air radio and 
television services have these characteristics also.   
Ensuring widespread coverage of radio and television services is one means of ensuring 
citizens’ have access to public debate and, as the previous two chapters have argued, 
that access is a merit good because it is a fundamental and inalienable right of 
citizenship.  However, there are limits to which any principle can be pursued, and it is 
not evident that citizens who choose to reside in the remotest parts of the country should 
have radio and television services provided to them regardless of cost.  The public 
interest in access to public debate does have to be weighed against other uses for public 
money. 
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2 - Catering for all interests and tastes 
This principle implies that public broadcasters should fulfil the discriminating 
monopolist role proposed by Steiner. The BBC had, of course, acted in such a capacity 
for many years, until the advent of commercial private sector broadcasting in the United 
Kingdom. As we have seen, this principle is probably irrelevant when a public 
broadcaster coexists in “mixed system” that includes commercial broadcasters.  Private 
suppliers will meet a great deal of the audience’s needs, and it is not at all clear that a 
public broadcaster needs to duplicate those services. 
However, the principle could also be taken to imply that a diversity of views, values, 
beliefs and lifestyles should be represented by the public broadcaster (or by broadcasters 
generally).  This would be consistent with the idea that broadcasting has a role to play in 
sustaining the “domain of freedom”. 
3 - Catering for Minorities 
This principle implies that public broadcasting should fulfil the role of providing 
broadcasting for audiences too small and too specialised for commercial or pay-per-
view broadcasters to service.  It is the role predicted for public broadcasting by Noam in 
the section titled Mixed Public/Private Systems (page 52).   
When a public broadcaster co-exists with commercial broadcasters and provides 
complementary programming, this principle would restrict it to only serving audiences 
which the commercial media did not or could not provide for—a sort of ghetto for 
minority audiences and interests.  This role is filled in New Zealand by community 
access radio stations, which receive a small subsidy from the license fee revenues. In 
Australia, the existence of these community services is seen as an integral part of 
broadcasting policy and a complementary adjunct to public broadcasting, not a 
substitute for it (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, 1977). 
However, we have proposed that the essence of broadcasting policy resides in a 
deciding what things audiences should, or should not, pay their scare attention to.  If 
people should pay attention to the policies and activities of their elected representatives, 
for instance, and this is part of the role of a public broadcaster, then it must be 
empowered to compete vigorously with other broadcasters to claim the scarce attention 
of audiences.  To defer to private sector broadcasters and seek only to complement their 
programming is to fail in that essential task. 
4 - Concern for national identity and community 
This principle can be seen as referring to cultural heritage as one of the external benefit 
justifications for public broadcasting outlined in the previous chapter.  In the previous 
chapter we saw that the real interest here is in the ecology of the cognitive environment 
and the production and maintenance of social control. 
5 - Detachment from vested interests and government 
If a Government should assist in the creation and maintenance of public broadcasting, 
then this principle raises important issues for institutional arrangements, especially 
concerning the accountability of the public broadcaster to Parliament. If a public 
broadcaster is to create and defend the “domain of freedom” effectively, then it must be 
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free of the conflict of interest that ownership by the government could imply.  Its 
empowering act must also provide it with sufficient independence from political 
interference and avoid conferring only very prescriptive or very limited powers and 
functions.  
On the other hand, a public broadcaster is necessarily an organ of the state and subject 
to the sovereignty of the Crown.  It must therefore be held accountable to the public and 
to its representatives for the effective and efficient use of its funding. 
6 - One broadcasting system to be funded by the corpus of users 
This principle was explored in Chapter 7, particularly under the heading Licence Fees 
and Welfare, on page 72. We have seen that the “one system” principle is viable when 
the public broadcaster is a discriminating monopolist.  However, in the presence of pay 
TV and private sector competition, many fee-payers will be forced to pay for outputs 
which they do not consume and have no desire to consume. As we have seen in Chapter 
7, advertising also impose “psychic costs” on audiences, causing them to turn off.  The 
idea that audiences should individually pay for public broadcasting conflicts with the 
intention of providing services equally to all citizens. The idea that the public 
broadcaster is funded directly by its users, rather than being beholden to advertisers or 
government budget decisions, is part of the principle of detachment or independence. 
Again, it is a matter of striking a balance between competing interests, and asking 
whether it is necessary to uphold a principle at any cost. A fully non-commercial public 
television channel would be prohibitively expensive to operate, and advertising will 
almost inevitably be required. 
It may be a matter of finding creative solutions to defend the principle of independence 
and minimise the impact on the government budget. For instance, a commercial public 
television service could still be relatively independent of the influence of advertisers, 
given appropriate mechanisms for selling advertising time.  The total amount of 
advertising time could be determined before programme schedules were decided the 
time could be auctioned to brokers.  These brokers could then sell time to advertisers at 
“spot” prices, after programme schedules were announced. This “futures market” 
approach, or something similar, might be well worth exploring. 
7 - Competition in good programming rather than for numbers 
This principle was also addressed in Chapter 7.  It could be interpreted as meaning a 
public broadcaster should provide programming that reflects the intensity of audience 
preferences, as well as audience size — thereby optimising the social welfare provided 
by its programmes. We should recall that welfare economics has a propensity to 
conflate the idea of intensity of preference with the concept of willingness to pay, and 
therefore does not provide much guidance for what constitutes good programming, if it 
is to be supplied as a merit good.  
This principle might prevent a public broadcaster from being fully self-funding under 
from commercial advertising revenue, as the requirement to obtain revenue from 
advertising would tend to promote the maximisation of audience size, rather than 
audience welfare.  Some amount of public appropriation may still be necessary to reflect 
the unfunded social benefit that public broadcasting provides. 
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Maximising welfare by reflecting intensity of audience preference, or broader social 
benefits, rather than simply audience size, poses something of a measurement problem, 
if a public broadcaster were to be held accountable for its performance by Parliament.  
Again, this would require some creative solutions to be devised, and the tools provided 
by economic theory or market research could provide answers.  
8 - Guidelines to liberate programme makers and not restrict them 
If this principle were applied to NZ on Air arrangements for providing subsidies to 
broadcasting firms, it could relate to the issue of diversity outlined in Chapter 6, 
particularly under the heading The Effects of Deregulation, where we saw that a free 
market could be risk-averse. Funding arrangements that help writers and producers 
overcome the risk-aversion of programmers might increase diversity. The Experimental 
Value  justification for public broadcasting as a provider of external benefits might also 
apply, and it can be related to the arguments explored in Chapter 7, under the heading 
Welfare and Endogenous Preferences, which noted the Peacock Commission’s claim 
that rational utility-maximising consumers of media might look to expand their aesthetic 
and intellectual horizons, rather than pander to their existing preferences. This could 
only happen if programme makers are able to explore creative directions.  
The principle was probably intended, however, as a statement about the internal 
management of a public broadcasting organisation, and therefore Tushman and 
O’Reilly’s ideas about organisational strategy and organisational culture would apply.  
A public broadcaster and its programme makers should be guided by a sense of mission 
and vision to uphold and defend the rights and interests of the public it serves, rather 
than prescriptive systems of formal or bureaucratic control. 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter we posed the question “What do we mean by public 
broadcasting?”  We can see that some parts of the BBC definition of public 
broadcasting rely on a description of what the BBC once was – an independent 
corporation and a discriminating monopolist, facing little or no competition, and able to 
secure an independent source of revenue through the broadcasting licence fee. In the 
presence of substantial competition for audience attention from private broadcasters, 
that description is outmoded, and it would be foolhardy to suggest that all of the BBC 
principles could be applied wholesale to public broadcasting now or in the foreseeable 
future, in the form they were originally intended. 
However, in the light of the analysis presented here, we can see that some of these 
principles can still be employed to describe some of the fundamental ideas about 
creating and protecting the domain of freedom in a liberal democratic society. Principal-
Agent theory has provided an argument that public broadcasters have the role of putting 
the audience’s interest above those of advertisers, the government or broadcasters 
themselves. 
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Chapter 12 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The introduction to this thesis posed three questions: 
• ‘Was the Treasury submission to the RCBRT good policy advice?’ 
• ‘Was the Treasury submission good use of economic theory in a policy setting?’ 
• ‘What should be the outcomes of broadcasting policy?’ 
Having reviewed the can now answer those three questions. 
Quality of policy advice 
The first question posed by this thesis was ‘Was the Treasury submission to the RCBRT 
good policy advice?’ 
Recall that our investigation has focused on the recommendations flowing from the 
analysis in Section Three of Treasury’s submission, which was titled “Economics of 
Broadcasting and Government Intervention”.  There were four recommendations, which 
we can divide into two groups of two. The first two relate Treasury’s proposal to open 
up broadcasting to competition by selling broadcasting rights in a market. 
Figure 31: Treasury's Spectrum Recommendations 
xii Open competitive access to the radio spectrum will tend to promote the development of 
efficient broadcasting systems funded by advertising, pay or club methods, and of efficient 
non-broadcasting systems such as cable TV.  It can be expected that most, if not all of 
these systems will tend to emerge in an open competitive system. 
xiii The development of industry along these lines will tend to result in a more efficient pattern 
of resource use and consumption than the existing or alternative developments because it 
will be based more directly on consumer preferences and opportunity costs. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 showed us that indeed there would be an expansion of 
channels under increased competition.  However, we have also seen that this will tend 
to create more homogenous and monopolistic radio and television services, with 
significantly less production of local and regional programming. 
The second of these conclusions is very dubious.  We have seen that the development of 
market-led broadcasting might lead to the efficient production of audiences, based more 
directly on the preferences of advertisers. However, in an increasingly monopolistic 
market, even this advantage to advertisers may be eroded. 
It is not clear that audiences’ preferences would be more effectively reflected in 
programming choices, or that audience welfare would be increased, either by the sale of 
unencumbered broadcasting rights or by the development of cable or broadcast pay TV.  
When the consumption choices of a significant proportion, probably the majority, of the 
 137
audience are influenced by the output of the media, the theoretical foundation on which 
this conclusion stands disintegrates. 
The RCBRT was not antagonistic toward Treasury’s proposal to sell broadcasting 
rights, as it recognised that obligations to protect the public interest could be attached to 
those rights prior to sale.  If the conclusions in Treasury’s submission were weak, then 
subsequent advice to the government from the Officials Committee was that much 
poorer for not acknowledging the RCBRT’s suggestion as a viable option. 
Treasury’s argument in favour of allocative efficiency eventually extinguished the 
implied political and social rights held by citizens, which had been wielded on their 
behalf by the Broadcasting Tribunal. 
The second two of Treasury’s recommendations relate directly to this idea. These 
recommendations were justifications for the commercialisation of the BCNZ, driven by 
Treasury’s desire to separate the commercial and social objectives of what it saw as a 
government trading enterprise. 
Figure 32: Treasury's Commercialisation Recommendations 
ix If the government or community groups considered that the composition or level of outputs 
of the broadcasting industry was not socially optimal, then the most effective and efficient 
intervention would be to directly contract with broadcasters to alter outputs in the desired 
direction be it wider coverage, more cultural programming, no advertising or more local 
content. 
x The achievement of social objectives by means of explicit contracts with broadcasters 
could be handled by a variety of institutional structures including the QE II Arts Council 
(cultural programming) The Department of Maori Affairs and the Film Commission (local
Treasury may well have been well justified in expressing doubt that the government 
needed to be an owner of broadcasting services. However, a perfectly feasible option 
would have been to transfer the BCNZ’s assets to an independent not-for-profit public 
broadcasting trust or corporation.113 
The second set of recommendations justified the transformation of a television 
broadcaster, which could have acted as the citizens’ agent and provided a measure of 
transparency into their relationship with the state, into a fully commercial enterprise.  
The first conclusion of this thesis must be that the Treasury submission was poor policy 
advice. The outcomes of this advice have been: 
                                                 
113  Had that transfer included Radio New Zealand’s commercial radio network and two commercial 
television channels, a politically independent BCNZ would also have had an independent source of 
income.  Provided the trust had been established with an appropriate deed, it might have become a 
true public broadcaster. 
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• The development of a monopolistically competitive media industry environment, 
with potentially excessive levels of cross-media ownership and excessive levels of 
ownership aggregation within media sectors. 
• Potentially excessive sales of radio frequency spectrum in the broadcast frequency 
bands, which may be a contributing factor to the above outcome. 
• Insufficient provision of radio and television frequencies for non-commercial 
broadcasters (i.e. community access, ethnic and Maori broadcasting) 
• Ongoing disputes between the Crown and Maori regarding the outcomes of 
broadcasting policy in regard to the Crown’s Treaty obligations. 
• Lack of consideration for the role that broadcasting policy may have in sustaining a 
liberal democratic polity in New Zealand and, consequently, the erosion of 
democratic principles and practices within the polity. 
A subsidiary conclusion must be that the Government has not received significantly 
better broadcasting policy advice since the current framework was implemented in 
1989/90.  
Quality of economic analysis 
The second question posed at the beginning was ‘Was the Treasury submission good 
use of economic theory to this policy issue?’  
No matter what aspect of economic theory it discusses, at the end of almost every part 
of the third section Treasury makes a similar conclusion: 
“Consideration of the means of providing tax funded broadcasting led to the conclusion that 
it was unnecessary for the Government to operate publicly owned and operated stations to 
achieve its objectives, and that, in the interests of efficiency, it would be preferable for the 
Government, perhaps through delegated bodies, to use funds from general taxation to buy 
non-commercial programmes for transmission by public broadcasting.” (44) 
“Arguments for and against tax funded broadcasting apply with equal force to (programme) 
content regulation…. Where the government wished to influence the mix of broadcasting 
services which are supplied, a tax funded mechanism of the type outlined in part Ei seems 
likely to be preferable on all grounds than a system of content and coverage regulation.” (47) 
“If there are distribution or merit grounds for government intervention in broadcasting, the 
issue is to achieve the objectives as efficiently as possible, and the efficient solution would in 
most cases be a general revenue financed subsidy for particular broadcasting outputs.” (49) 
It is clear from the discussion in this thesis that these conclusions do not flow logically 
from the “Economic Theory of Broadcasting and Government Intervention”, and that 
Treasury was using economic theory rhetorically to justify a policy of 
commercialisation and the sale of broadcasting rights. 
The most generous interpretation that can be placed the actions of the officials 
concerned was were well-intentioned but inept. They might have been well-intentioned 
to the extent they saw themselves as “entrepreneurs for efficiency” (Nelson 1987) who 
were “…making an earnest and sincere effort to… speak the truth at all costs.” 
(Heilbroner, 1988). They therefore sought to enhance the sovereignty of media 
consumers and create a more rational allocation of society’s scarce resources in respect 
of broadcasting. They may have been inept in two senses: first, if failed to recognise the 
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rhetoric underlying the Coase theorem and much of the subsequent literature on the 
economics of broadcasting that explicated Coase’s ideas. Second, if they failed to 
perceive that their plan for broadcasting deregulation necessarily involved the 
transformation of social and political rights into property rights. This failure of 
perception then led to the Crown’s protection of those rights being significantly eroded. 
The explanation of well-intentioned ineptitude is sufficient to judge the quality of the 
economic analysis, and we may therefore refrain from attributing more sinister 
interpretation to officials’ actions.   
If economists express horror when it is proposed they should employ rhetoric to 
influence policy, the economic analysis presented to the RCBRT must exemplify what 
they most fear. Economic theory has two qualities to offer any policy issue: rigour and 
restraint.  
Economics provides a powerful set of tools that can provide a rigorous analytical 
framework for analysing a wide variety of policy issues. The diagram presented in 
Figure 33 displays the economic relationships we have explored in this thesis. 
Hopefully, the discussion has brought clarity and definition to many aspects of 
broadcasting policy, to readers who are unfamiliar with the economist’s way of talking 
about the world. 
Figure 33: Economic Relationships among Audience, Broadcaster and Advertiser 
On the other hand, economics, like any form of discourse about human society, cannot 
explain everything.  One of the qualities of good economic analysis must be that it 
displays restraint; an awareness of its limitations and a respect for the insights and 
provided by other disciplines.  This is especially necessary in respect to a policy issue 
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where conflicting ideas, beliefs, values and ideologies are an intrinsic aspect of the 
analysis. 
The Treasury submission, and much of the subsequent policy advice that was based on 
it, displayed neither rigour nor restraint.   
Outcomes 
As we have stated in Chapter 9, it is for the government, not unelected officials, to 
decide the outcomes of broadcasting policy.  However, officials can and should advise 
the government in respect to outcomes if: they are expressed in existing legislation, or 
they are implied by the constitution and/or fundamental assumptions underpinning the 
social and political order, or they will self-evidently contribute to the peace, order and 
good government of society. Within those constraints, the advice regarding the 
outcomes of broadcasting policy that flows from the analysis presented in this thesis is 
can be simply stated. 
Broadcasting, along with other media, should be regulated (either by market 
mechanisms, or directly by legislated power, or some combination of these), to: 
1. Sustain and enhance New Zealand’s system of representative government and the 
legitimacy of the Crown by: 
(a) Protecting and guaranteeing citizens’ rights to receive and to participate in 
public debate on matters of government policy. 
(b) Assisting voters in making informed and competent voting decisions. 
(c) Providing electors with a means of scrutinising and monitoring the 
performance of their elected representatives. 
(d) Honouring the Crowns’ guarantee to Maori, in article two of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, to protect their tino rangatiratanga and the tāonga of te reo 
Maori. 
2. Sustain and enhance the existence of a free society based on social democratic 
principles by: 
(a) Ensuring every member of society is protected from interference with their 
free possession and expression of political, cultural religious and other 
beliefs. 
(b) Providing society with the means to discuss, debate, decide on and modify 
the beliefs and values that its members must share in some degree to 
regulate itself without the intrusion of the state. 
In creating these outcomes, it must at all times be borne in mind that it is what the 
audience should pay its scarce attention to that must ultimately be the focus of 
broadcasting policy, in regard to creating social, political or economic outcomes.  And 
the first guiding principle must be that the decision is for the audience to make in the 
first instance and for its elected representatives in the second. Broadcasters, advertisers 
and unelected officials should not presume to make these decisions on behalf of either. 
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Recommendations 
A fine principle of policy analysis is that a policy problem should not be presented to 
the government without also recommending a course of action or a solution to that 
problem. There are a number of critical problems that this analysis has identified: 
1. The policy of deregulating broadcasting significantly eroded the protections of 
citizens’ rights that were embodied in the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
2. As a consequence of this, it is unlikely that the Crown can legally sell Television 
New Zealand Limited, as such a sale could credibly be blocked by the courts. 
3. There are ongoing problems associated with Maori claims in broadcasting under 
the Treaty of Waitangi, and current policy is unlikely to resolve these effectively. 
4. There may be a problem with official ‘capture’ of broadcasting policy, and the 
government’s current sources of broadcasting policy advice are therefore unlikely 
to contribute effectively to resolving the aforementioned problems. 
There are two sets of recommendations that fall out of this analysis, the short-term and 
long-term. Both are rely on the premise that New Zealand is constitutionally a liberal 
democracy and should strive to continue developing its political and social institutions 
in that direction.  
Immediate Priorities 
The first set of recommendations relates to steps that can be taken immediately. These 
recognise that, despite evident flaws in the underlying theory, the existing institutional 
arrangements are not so unsound that relatively minor adjustments could produce 
significantly improved outcomes for society and provide a sound platform for longer-
term developments. 
It is recommended that the Government take the immediate steps to: 
1. Place a moratorium on the sale of Television New Zealand Limited and Radio 
New Zealand Limited, including their subsidiary companies, until the future of 
public broadcasting has been reviewed by a Royal Commission established for 
that purpose (see below). 
2. Inform the TVNZ Board of Directors that the Crown requires only an 11% 
Return on Shareholders’ equity (the standard public sector cost of capital). Any 
surpluses above that are to be reinvested in the business and/or used in accordance 
with recommendation 3, below. 
3. Request that Television New Zealand Limited immediately submit a Statement of 
Intent incorporating into the objects of the organisation a strategy to inform New 
Zealand citizens regarding the policies offered by political parties in the lead up to 
the 1999 General Election and the performance of their elected representatives 
thereafter. 
4. Distinguish between two aspects of broadcasting policy advice: 
(a) advice regarding the management of the radio frequency spectrum, and 
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(b) advice regarding the social, cultural and political impacts of broadcasting 
policy. 
5. Cease purchasing policy advice described in 4 (b) above, from the Ministry of 
Commerce, effective immediately, and  
6. Commence purchasing this advice from the Department of Internal Affairs, where 
it would sit more comfortably with that Department’s roles in respect to (among 
other things) heritage, history, community, identity and cultural affairs. 
7. Repeal section 44 of the Broadcasting Act 1989, thereby removing the ability of 
the Minister of Broadcasting to direct the Commission in regard to government 
policy.  All future influence over the Broadcasting Commission should take the 
form of amendments to the Act. 
8. Amend section 36 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 to include a subsection that 
reads: 
“(h)  To ensure that a range of broadcasts is available to provide for the 
interests of New Zealand’s citizens by: 
(i) improving the quality and scope of radio and television scrutiny 
of Parliament and the Executive, and  
(ii) improving the range and depth of information available to assist 
them in making voting decisions at General elections.” 
This will provide that funding for current affairs and investigative 
journalism can be made available to  private sector broadcasters, and to 
TVNZ should it fail to meet its required rate of return. 
Broadcasting Policy Review 
The longer-term recommendations reflect the conclusion that the economic analysis 
underpinning the current broadcasting framework was profoundly flawed, and so 
influential in determining the existing institutional arrangements, that a proper review of 
broadcasting policy arrangements is required. This should focus on the outcomes of 
broadcasting policy suitable for liberal democracy, in the first instance.  It should 
incorporate such economic analysis as can be applied to ensure those outcomes are 
efficiently achieved. 
It is therefore recommended that the Government: 
1. Establish a Royal Commission, with broad terms of reference, to review the 
economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of broadcasting policy.  To 
that end, the Commission should review: 
(a) The nature and the proper extent of the social and political obligations of the 
electronic media in a liberal democratic polity.  This should include, but not 
be limited to, audio and visual signals that are distributed by cable, fibre-
optic and other narrow-casting methods and terrestrial and satellite 
broadcast transmission. 
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(b) The purpose, functions and institutional arrangements of public 
broadcasting including recommendations regarding its future funding, 
independence from government and accountability to Parliament. 
(c) Past and potential future claims in broadcasting by Maori under the Treaty 
of Waitangi, and the ongoing relationship between the Crown and Maori in 
respect of broadcasting policy.  This implies that the composition of the 
Commission and its Terms of Reference should reflect the principles of 
partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi. 
(d) The specification of property rights in spectrum created under the 
Radiocommunications Act 1989, and whether these specifications can be 
changed to incorporate an obligation to serve the public interest. 
(e) Spectrum allocation policies and processes, with special attention to the 
means by which broadcasting rights are allocated to not-for-profit 
community broadcasters and the effect of policies on industry structure and 
media content. 
(f) The desirability of either re-establishing a Broadcasting Tribunal, or 
changing the powers and functions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
to enable it to allocate broadcasting rights to not-for-profit community 
broadcasters, and to attach and enforce obligations to the rights currently 
held by users of radio frequency spectrum that is, or may be, used for radio 
and television broadcasting. 
(g) The purpose and function of the Broadcasting Standards Authority and New 
Zealand on Air. 
(h) The desirability of limiting cross-media ownership and aggregation of 
media ownership, including the effectiveness of existing powers and 
provisions of the Commerce Act for achieving such limits. 
The broadcasting industry is undergoing almost rapid and accelerating transformation. 
The effects of digital technology will have a major impact in the sector over the next 
few years. Although no explicit discussion of these matters has been raised in this 
thesis, it will also be necessary for the Commission to have regard to these matters.   
Most importantly, it should advise the government in respect to the fundamental 
principles regarding social and political outcomes that should inform broadcasting 
policy in a well-functioning representative democracy.  
A well thought-out guiding philosophy that focuses on the outcomes of broadcasting 
policy for society will, above all else, assist the continued development and 
responsiveness of policy in a rapidly changing social, political and technical 
environment. 
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